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Renee Lee Gardner, Ph.D.
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Liberal feminism views vulnerability as weakness and dominance as strength. This
binary parallels nationalistic assertions of sovereignty. Within militaristic responses such
as the U.S. retaliation to 9/11, however, we see the cost of refusing to acknowledge our
vulnerability. In my analysis of eleven novels arising from eight distinct nation-states and
representing historical moments from the final decades of slavery through the early post9/11 years, I use alternative (queer, postcolonial, Islamic) feminisms to read power in
vulnerability. I explore female characters who deliberately self-abnegate – sacrificing
their lives, bodies, voices, and children – but whose actions can be read as empowered if
viewed outside of the mandates of self-protectionism. I argue that such sacrifices reveal
alternative modes of being that undermine aggressive practices done in the name of
national sovereignty. At a moment when Western measures of success are being called
into question, we are well positioned to examine the prevailing logic that privileges
success over failure and dominance over submission. My goal is to unravel the terms by
which we understand these concepts and to undermine the limitations they enforce by
considering anew the widespread and long-held tradition of female self-abnegation. The
characters I explore are citizens of different nations. They react to different political
structures and self-sacrifice in different ways. Yet putting their narratives into
conversation with one another exposes a pattern of gendered behavior that allows us to

read their actions outside of particular cultural distinctions, disrupting both assumptions
about definitions of strength and the reductive binary divisions between East and West.
My hope is that – in reading female sacrifice not as evidence of weakness, but as an
alternative source of power – I might contribute to a growing, interdisciplinary effort to
subvert the oppositionality that undergirds our polarizing, academic gaze.
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INTRODUCTION: RECONCEIVING SELF-ABNEGATION
I am urging us to indulge – [because] we love justice but don’t know what it is – in the hedonics
of critique. To do that we…have to be willing to Take a Break from Feminism. Not kill it,
supersede it, abandon it; immure, immolate, or bury it – merely spend some time outside it
exploring theories…inhabiting realities, and imagining political goals that do not fall within its
terms.
~ Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism
There is something powerful in being wrong, in losing, in failing…all our failures combined
might just be enough, if we practice them well, to bring down the winner. Let’s leave success and
its achievement to the Republicans, to the corporate managers of the world, to the winners of
reality TV shows…The concept of practicing failure perhaps prompts us…to fall short…to take a
detour, to find a limit, to lose our way.
~ J. Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure

Dominance is privileged over vulnerability. This is true in all national ideologies,
and it is true, as well, in most counter-ideologies. Despite our devotion to dominance,
however, the cost of ignoring vulnerability is immense, and the danger profound.
Resistance to precarity has led to no end of historical disasters, not least the war-filled
years since the attacks of September 11, 2001. In my analysis of eleven novels arising
from eight distinct nation-states and representing historical moments from the final
decades of slavery through the post-9/11 years, I attempt to read power in vulnerability.
The characters I explore deliberately self-abnegate, sacrificing their lives, bodies, voices,
and children in heartbreaking and deeply traumatic ways. Yet those acts of selfdestruction reveal alternative modes of being that stand to undermine aggressive practices
done in the name of national sovereignty. My goal is to unravel the prevailing logic that
privileges dominance over submission by considering anew the widespread and long-held
tradition of female self-abnegation. The characters considered here are citizens of
different nations. They react to different political structures and self-sacrifice in different
ways. Yet putting their narratives into conversation with one another allows us to
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consider them globally, at a remove from particular cultural distinctions. In doing so, I
hope to contribute to a relatively new but growing body of research that asks us to shift
our frame of reference: to refuse the binary of empowerment versus vulnerability such
that we might see anew the merits of sacrifice.
I focus on well-reasoned acts of self-destruction. In Precarious Life, Judith Butler
discusses vulnerability’s inherency, arguing that the “fundamental dependency on
anonymous others” cannot be “will[ed] away,” and that “no security measure will
foreclose [it],” just as “no violent act of sovereignty will [overpower it]” (xii-xiii). Rather
than resisting precarity as a liability, then, Butler asks that we find an escape from the
mandates of sovereignty dictated to us by virtue of our position as citizens. She suggests
that when “national sovereignty is challenged,” we should struggle not to sustain it, but to
“dislocat[e] from First World privilege”: to “imagine a world in which” our “inevitable
interdependency becomes acknowledged as the basis for global political community.”
Though Precarious Life is a call to action, Butler remains uncertain as to “how to
theorize [the] interdependency” she seeks (xii-xiii). Though critics have largely read the
characters explored here as victims – perceiving their performance of precarity as
indicative of weakness – I claim that their sacrifice is self-imposed and politically
generative, inviting the “interdependency” for which Butler calls.
I argue that in the characters of this project, the political power of self-abnegation
manifests on three levels: first in terms of “being,” when female submission functions
according to state-dominated ideology; secondly, in terms of “unbeing,” when women
resist such ideology through various forms of self-destruction; and lastly – though this is
not always accomplished – in terms of “re-being,” when women construct an identity
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outside of state structures, thereby resisting the enforced dominance that comes with all
claims to sovereignty. In my exploration of these phases of submission, I make use of J.
Halberstam’s term “shadow feminism,” which she argues exposes “the limits of a
feminist theory that already presumes the form that agency must take” (6). Critics tend –
because of liberal feminism’s influence over academic notions of power – to perceive
women only as agents when they resist, challenge, or subvert authority, thereby pursuing
actions translatable as “liberating” in nature. Halberstam calls for an approach to
feminism by which we might come to see within such un-liberated acts as “masochism,
sacrifice, [and] self-subjugation” not “failed masculinity,” but success in new terms (4).
She asks: “can we find feminist frameworks capable of recognizing the political project
articulated in the form of refusal?” (4). Alongside Butler’s examination of precarity, then,
I use shadow feminism to expose the long-ignored potential of self-abnegation. Via these
lenses, the sacrifices explored here demonstrate a profound – if ironic – level of agency,
and are demonstrative moreover of an acceptance of vulnerability that is not marked by
men in these texts, nor stereotypically by men in the cultures they represent.
I likewise use Audre Lorde’s metaphor of the master’s house to explore the
generative use of self-abnegation. While “the master’s tools” may not be useful in
“dismantl[ing]” his house (112), those tools – in this case oppression, subordination, and
subjugation – are perfect for dismantling the self. What becomes interesting, then, is the
degree to which a dismantled self is positioned to destroy the house in ways that outward
aggression never could. I argue that the weight of self-abnegation’s power can be found
in its effect over the self – in unbeing and, when achieved, in re-being – because the
destruction of the self is itself meaningful in cultures that demand the protection of the
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self at any cost. Yet the destruction of the self is likewise a powerful external tool, as it
stands to undermine either privileged individuals who witness acts of unbeing, or the
nation-state, or both. As Butler asks: “could the experience of a dislocation of First World
safety not condition the insight into the radically inequitable ways that corporeal
vulnerability is distributed globally?” (Precarious 30). This, then, is how I measure the
impact of self-abnegation: the degree to which it undermines and potentially rebuilds the
self, the privileged, and the state. Tracy Isaacs contends that “oppression” – which she
describes as “the natural order of things rather than as a situation of injustice” – renders
“subordination invisible” (138), the logic of which she uses as a call for a visible
resistance to oppression. The characters I discuss often make their oppression highly
visible, but not by resisting it. Butler defines precarity as “exposure both to those we
know and to those we do not know” (Frames 14). These characters own that “exposure,”
and they do so in ways that make invisibility impossible. They “dismantle” themselves,
and in so doing, they model a form of dismantling that stands to undermine the oppressor.
This external ability to subvert relies on proximity to people with traditional
forms of power. In “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Gayatri Spivak explores the degree to
which “the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of the Other as the Self’s
shadow” (2197), asserting that the well-intentioned “narrative of imperialism” fails in its
attempt to give voice to “the Other,” largely because the “‘subjugated knowledge’” the
privileged have of the other is “inadequate to their task” (2197). Far from condemning
intellectuals’ attempts at understanding the subaltern, however, Spivak applauds their
efforts in light of their unavoidable failure, highlighting the extent to which such efforts
operate less as a process of learning the other, and more as a process of “unlearning”
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privilege. She writes, “no contemporary metropolitan investigator is not influenced by
[the masculine-imperialist ideological formation]. Part of our ‘unlearning’ project is to
articulate our participation in that formation” (2204, emphasis mine). What we often
consider giving voice (to colonized literary characters, for example) might more
accurately be described as questioning our own privileged voice: learning to see, via the
subjugation of others, our own privileged participation in structures of dominance. This, I
argue, is the first external manifestation of self-abnegation’s power: its ability to reveal to
the privileged the system of privileging that sovereignty obscures. When it achieves that,
it is well positioned to undermine the nation-state at large, as once their privilege has
been exposed, people in positions of authority within sovereign systems are more likely
to subvert those systems. And in the narratives I include here, they often subtly do so.

Enlightenment, Liberal Feminism, and National Sovereignty
In recent years, critics struggling with the limitations of liberal feminism have laid
the groundwork necessary to perceiving the kind of power I explore here. In Split
Decisions, Janet Halley discusses the way in which theories that help us understand
structures of power likewise restrict the depth with which we might do so, contending
that “theory produces reality not only by making it visible…but by shifting the available
terms for consciousness” (4). With regard to the “terms [of] consciousness” initiated by
third-wave critics, Halley argues that “feminism as it is practiced in the United States
today is dedicated to thinking in terms of male and female (masculine and feminine, etc.),
noticing instances of male power and female subordination.” She claims that by
distancing ourselves from the language-as-reality of liberal feminism, we might begin to
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“see other arrangements of [male and female]” and therefore “other kinds of power” (8).
Halley calls our attention to lenses that might allow us to notice such alternatives. She
argues: “all theories have in them an image of power. And all of them have implications
for how power can and should be used” (17, emphasis mine). The notion that power
“should be used” in a particular way – and that not pursuing power in such terms is
unequivocally detrimental to women – governs most of the critical canon surrounding to
the texts I explore, and the female characters who sacrifice themselves within them.
The kind of critique levied by Halley above has led some scholars to conclude
that feminism is dead. I argue, however, that despite its drawbacks, the stakes of a
feminist movement are still high. Last year, I taught T Cooper’s 2006 novel Lipshitz 6, or
Two Angry Blondes at the end of a course on American Literature. We had explored the
power structures inherent to gender, class, race, and sexuality, and my students were
using language associated with various theories concerning these issues with relative
ease. Lipshitz 6 presented us with the character of Esther, a Russian immigrant who loses
one of her children at Ellis Island. Though critically savvy, my students were resistant to
seeing the complex issues shaping Esther’s response to the weight of motherhood. Both
in losing her son and in her response to that loss, Esther was seen simply as failing at her
most important job. I’ve noticed a pattern of students concluding that female characters
are either powerless or bad. Their resistance to considering motherhood – and other
manifestations of female life –with nuance makes clear the ongoing need for feminist
discourse. Yet the specific reading my students offer indicates the importance of
developing that discourse outside the norms of mainstream liberal feminism.
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In their self-abnegation, the fictional characters I consider respond to nationalistic
vulnerability in ways that are polar to those advocated by liberal feminism, and they
thereby refuse to accept the mandates of resistance and liberation: mandates that are
foundational to national dominance. Butler discusses the public reality of vulnerability,
claiming that “although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for
which we struggle are not quite ever only our own….Given over from the start to the
world of others, [our bodies bear] their imprint, [are] formed within the crucible of social
life” (26). This serves as an acknowledgement of the inherency of human exposure. It is
this vulnerability – which Butler suggests we "cannot will away without ceasing to be
human” (xiv) – that I see acknowledged within the self-abnegation of the characters I
explore. Such acceptance is not modeled on a national level, however, as Butler tells us
that “contemporary forms of national sovereignty constitute efforts to overcome an
impressionability and violability that are ineradicable dimensions of human dependency”
(xiv). Nations – though they are built of and by humans – are invested in resisting an
inherent part of humanity. A vulnerable subjectivity stands to offer an antidote to such
expressions of sovereignty. As Butler suggests, precarity might just be a gateway to
“claims for non-military political solutions, just as denial of …vulnerability through a
fantasy of mastery…can fuel the instruments of war” (Precarious 29). The potential
power of submission becomes visible when considered in these terms: as a way of
maintaining humanity in the face of dehumanizing, nationalistic resistance.
Indeed, though these characters model subordination – leading critics to assume
they are powerless within their respective national structures – they refuse the hold that
sovereignty has over how we think about precarity. In Empire, Michael Hardt and
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Antonio Negri explore the “lingering influence of the Enlightenment as the source of
domination” (137), citing the values born in that period as those from which our
contemporary concept of sovereignty arose. They offer evidence of sovereignty’s
relevance to the varied nations explored in this project, saying that though sovereignty as
we know it is a European concept, “it was born and developed in large part through
Europe’s…colonial project and the resistance of the colonized” (70). Thus sovereignty is
central to the ideological tenets of western and non-western nations alike. The logic of
sovereignty, Hardt and Negri contend, relies upon the belief that to “[survive] the mortal
dangers of war, humans must agree to a pact that assigns to a leader the absolute right to
act” (83-84). Agreement to that pact is an inherent part of citizenship, which is inherent
to birth: it occurs via “a completely implicit contract” and “prior to all social action or
choice” (Empire 84). National sovereignty, then, does not amount to personal authority.
Though it works to secure freedom “from foreign domination,” it concomitantly “erects
domestic structures of domination that are equally severe” (Hardt and Negri, Empire
133). The fact that sovereignty is equated with liberation is, thus, deeply ironic.
Hardt and Negri likewise critique attempts to subvert sovereignty, contending –
in a Spivakian way – that such efforts are too imbedded in sovereignty’s logic to avoid
reliance on its foundational approach to power. They allow that sovereignty is built of
“binary oppositions that define Self and Other, white and black, inside and outside, ruler
and ruled,” which “postmodernist thought challenges” in an effort to undermine
“patriarchy, colonialism, and racism” (Empire 139). Yet they contend that theoretical
resistance to “the logics of modern sovereignty” lacks an understanding of current models
of dominance, maintaining that most theorists oppose outdated forms of oppression. Thus
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postmodern theory runs the risk of “coincid[ing] with and support[ing] the functions and
practices of imperial rule” rather than subverting them, “the danger” of which, Hardt and
Negri conclude, is that in concentrating “so resolutely on the old forms of power,”
theorists “tumble unwittingly into the welcoming arms of the new power” (Empire 142).
This is the failing I see in mainstream feminist theory. It constructs power using the same
“‘liberatory’ weapons’” (Empire 142) that necessitated it in the first place. Sovereignty,
then, is an illusory and highly problematic form of agency. It does not extend to the
people who make up nations, yet it relies on those people to yield to it. Maintaining the
illusion of sovereignty requires that both the oppressor and the oppressed fulfill their
duties. In the terms of my project, sovereignty requires being according to the dictates of
one’s position within the sovereign community. In Multitude, Hardt and Negri maintain
that sovereignty “consists of a relationship between rulers and ruled, between protection
and obedience.” Hardt and Negri suggest, therefore, that submission is as central to
sovereignty as dominance because “sovereignty is…a dual system of power” (Multitude
332). This demonstrates that even being is evidence of agency. Consent is gained through
“fear, reverence, dedication, and obedience” (Hardt and Negri, Multitude 332), but it
likewise derives from active participation on the part of the oppressed.
Because it is an illusion, sovereignty can be overcome. Hardt and Negri note that
the dominated might at any point “refuse their position of servitude and subtract
themselves from the relationship.” Because sovereignty requires “consent,” it “crumbles”
in the face of resistance (Multitude 334). The subjects of sovereignty are invisibly
empowered to destroy it. Yet the resistance Hardt and Negri envision is “a kind of
exodus, fleeing the forces of oppression, servitude, and persecution in search of freedom”
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(Multitude 334, emphasis mine), and they consider such resistance to be “an elemental
act of liberation” (Multitude 334, emphasis mine). What’s striking about the language
Hardt and Negri use to describe the potential for refusal is that it echoes the falsely
“liberatory” tenets of sovereignty. Their use of similar language demonstrates the tenacity
of dominance and its privileging over how we think about resistance.
In Frames of War, Butler largely avoids such language, attempting in more
precise ways to define how sovereignty might be overcome. She argues that though
“aggression is part of life and hence part of politics as well,” it “can and must be
separated from violence,” and she maintains that “there are ways of giving form to
aggression that work in the service of democratic life, including ‘antagonism,’ and
discursive conflict, strikes, civil disobedience, and even revolution” (Frames 48). I make
a case here for adding self-abnegation to this list. Butler argues that nations “jealously
[guard their] right to sovereign self-protection while making righteous incursions into
other sovereignties or [in some cases] refusing to honor any principles of sovereignty at
all.” To oppose the aggression of sovereignty, she suggests that we must “find ways of
crafting…destructiveness,” or of “giving it a livable form” by “affirming its continuing
existence and assuming responsibility for the social and political forms in which it
emerges.” She cautions, though, that doing so will “be a different labor than either
repression or unbridled and ‘liberated’ expression” (Frames 49). Though Butler begins to
describe what such resistance would have to do, she stops short of suggesting ways in
which individuals might actually do it. I argue that we see some of those ways at work in
the characters of this project, who reveal what happens when vulnerability is not avoided
at all costs: indeed, what happens when it is embraced.
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Liberal feminism posits a form of liberal humanism as foundational to feminist
struggle, but in doing so it limits its potential as a tool for understanding the kind of selfdestruction I explore. Zillah Eisenstein contends that like sovereignty, “the universal
feminist claim that woman is an independent being (from man) is premised on the
eighteenth-century liberal conception of the independent and autonomous self” (4).
Liberalism’s prioritization of “independence, equality of opportunity, and individualism”
(4) – so like feminism’s prioritization of “freedom of choice, individualism, and quality
of opportunity” (229) – found its “[origin] in seventeenth-century England and took root
in the eighteenth century” (Eisenstein 4).1 Because of both its priorities and its origins,
liberal feminism is inherently and ironically invested in perpetuating the very structures it
purports to disrupt. Thus Eisenstein joins a community of feminist scholars who suggest
that we shift our focus beyond liberal feminism, recognizing that it “is but one” rather
limiting “form of feminism.” When liberal feminism – or “what Betty Friedan calls
‘mainstream,’ feminism” (Eisenstein 4) – is taken as feminism proper, alternate
manifestations such as “radical, socialist, lesbian, black, [and] anarchist [feminism]…are
rendered non-existent” (4). Because of the prominence of both liberal feminism and
national sovereignty, then, tools of non-resistance are obscured, and any potential
political purchase those tools might offer becomes invisible.
Eisenstein notes the irony of feminism’s connection with liberalism, contending
that in fundamental ways, liberal feminism “seek[s] to protect and reinforce the relations
of patriarchal and capitalist society” (5). Rosemarie Putman Tong echoes this sentiment,
asserting that though “liberal feminists wish to free women from oppressive gender roles”
1

Peta Bowden and Jane Mummery likewise acknowledge that liberal feminists find their roots in “the
philosophical vision of eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers in Europe with their focus on reason,
individual rights and equality” (2).
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(32), their struggle only truly benefits “white, heterosexual, middle-class women.” What
Tong thus finds confounding is the fact that “many minority women, lesbian women, and
working-class women allied with liberal feminists in the past and continue to do so
today” (40-41). Though certainly not all, most of the women of my project belong to one
of the subgroups of women Tong cites. They are largely read as victims, yet they reject
the tenets of a brand of feminism whose roots in liberalism and sovereign nationalism
always already fail to respond to their interests. Eisenstein urges feminists to “understand
that the state is a part of the struggles within society” (225). The rejection demonstrated
by the characters of this project reveals their profound understanding of the relationship
between the state and their status as women-citizens.
These characters likewise demonstrate a refusal to vie for power in traditionally
masculine terms. Peta Bowden and Jane Mummery contend that liberal feminism relies
on the notion “that women should have the opportunity to fulfill the dominant ideal for
(certain) male lives” (16). Though much feminist theory disrupts this assumption –
Bowden and Mummery, for example, problematize such a notion by observing that it
takes the male “ideal as universal for all human beings,” asking if this is an “effective
[response] to women’s oppression” (16) – it is rarely disputed in mainstream western
society. And even within critical dissent, foundational assumptions are maintained. For
example, Bowden and Mummery assume as unproblematic feminism’s “desire…for a
capacity for self-determination and autonomy according to which women are able to be
effective against their own oppression” (123, emphasis mine). They further contend that
women most want “some sense of entitlement to real choices and objectives, to be able to
act against their subordination” (123, emphasis mine). So too, Isaacs notes succinctly
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that “sexist oppression is unjust, and…action ought to be taken to end it” (131). The
underlying tenet to all of these claims is that to oppose patriarchy, one much resist it on
its own terms, must fight “against” oppression, must “act,” must “end it.” Liberal
feminism is less invested in undermining patriarchy than it is in leveling its playing field.
The mandate that women use their agency to a particular end pervades
mainstream feminist theory. Isaacs defines feminist agency as “women’s ability to be
effective agents against their own oppression” (129, emphasis mine). Though
contemporary feminist scholars largely ascribe to relativistic openness, most discussions
of agency demand particular conditions within which it will be recognized. Hilde
Lindemann argues, for example, that feminism is “about the social pattern…that
distributes power asymmetrically to favor men over women” (9). Isaacs makes a similar
argument, observing that one way “patriarchy subordinates women” is by subjecting
them to “feminine socialization,” which she contends “encourages [women] to be
passive, dependent, maternal and nurturing, concerned about others, compromising, [and]
unambitious,” and “to accept a subordinate place in society,” without “recogniz[ing] it as
subordinate” (131). The question of agency becomes one of definition: the word is
charged with caveats about how agency must be used to be seen as such.
Power and agency are the terms of liberal feminism that remain relevant in this
study of submission and self-abnegation, though I problematized their use here. Bowden
and Mummery remark that a “desire for effective agency…drives the manifold projects
of western feminisms” (123). In this project, I divert emphasis away from resisting
“oppression” and “subordination” – which forces a static prioritization of values – and
towards the need for an “agency” that is open-ended. Bowden and Mummery define
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agency as “having the power and capacity to act as one chooses.” They go on to note that
agency is “linked to notions of self-determination and autonomy,” and that it “denotes the
exercise of free will and personal freedom.” For a woman to have agency, they argue, she
must have the “capacity…to make sense of and rank her own needs and desires” (125).
Nothing about this definition precludes the existence of fully agented self-abnegation.
Likewise, Lindemann asserts that feminism is not “about equality, and it isn’t about
women, and it isn’t about difference. It’s about power.” This simple definition of
feminism – as “about power” – works well for this project because it isn’t valuative; it
doesn’t demand that power look a certain way to be afforded the title.
The question of “capacity” (Bowden and Mummery 125) is central to any
consideration of a woman’s agency. Though I seek to locate an alternate form of power
within self-destruction, I want to avoid implying that all suffering women face is selfimposed and politically productive. Bowden and Mummery acknowledge that “women’s
desire for agency may be seen as paradoxical” in that “owing to their social conditioning,
women may lack the requisite abilities for taking control of their lives and resisting
oppression” (124). Though this is clearly the case, it is a problematic caveat to put on any
examination of female power because – though the categories of agent and non-agent
tend to fall along gendered lines, both in historical and in literary accounts – all citizens
of all nations are shaped by “social conditioning.” This is as true for men as it is for
women, though it’s discussed far less often with regards to men, or in terms of
troublesome (and just as arguably non-agented) expressions of dominance. Because
mainstream culture subscribes to an ideology that equates dominance with agency, we
assume that people are less agented when they demonstrate less dominance. Bowden and
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Mummery observe that “in order for someone to be completely autonomous she or he
would surely need to be completely self-sufficient and unencumbered,” and would be
“able to extricate herself or himself from all socialized norms and expectations” (125). I
cannot claim the characters of this project to be “completely self-sufficient and
unencumbered.” Instead, I find such impossible standards of agency flawed enough to
attempt to see beyond them in my evaluation of the choices these characters make.
The subject of community is likewise relevant, as the women of this project are
all deeply entrenched in the communities to which they belong. Indeed, each of the
sacrifices explored here is set within specific communal (national) circumstances.
Though their nations may not serve their individual interests, the female characters of this
project nevertheless serve their nations, and at great personal cost. Jean Behtke Elshtain
critiques mainstream feminism’s devotion to an Enlightenment-based privileging of
independence by observing that “there is no way to create real communities out of an
aggregate of ‘freely’ choosing adults” (qtd. in Tong 35). Though their actions are often
dismissed as lacking agency, then, these characters willingly expose themselves to the
realities of life within a community. They are deeply invested in the needs of that
community, and of their fellow citizens. In Imperial Leather, Anne McClintock maintains
that nationalism is “radically constitutive of people’s identities” (353). McClintock
perceives that centrality as inherently perilous, contending that “nations have historically
amounted to the sanctioned institutionalization of gender difference,” and that “no nation
in the world gives women and men the same access to the rights and resources of the
nation-state” (353). Indeed, McClintock argues that “all nationalisms are gendered, all are
invented and all are dangerous…in the sense that they represent relations to political
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power” (352). The simplicity of this reading is complicated, however, by Elshtain’s
contention about the impossibility of “creat[ing] real communities” from groups of
supposedly sovereign citizens. Such communities are as necessary to securing a thriving
nation as the need for a deeper humanity of which Butler speaks. I argue that female selfabnegation has the potential to lead to both thriving nations and a deeper humanity, while
Enlightenment-based liberal feminism and national sovereignty fail to prioritize either.

Approaching Precarity
The specific characters I explore here purposefully submit to vulnerability, yet
they demonstrate their submission in various ways. They are citizens of different nations,
react to different political structures, and fulfill different roles within the violence of
which they are a part. They are colonizers, colonized, decolonized, and occupied. Some
are born with privilege; others are born with very little and are stripped of even that.
Some – Toni Morrison’s Sethe and J.M. Coetzee’s Barbarian Girl – are denied even
citizenship in the structure (nation or colony) that oppresses them. To date, critical
conclusions about the relationship between women and the nation of which they are a
part have been drawn largely about specific nations, or specific national structures (i.e.
colonizing nations versus those subject to colonial rule). While such conclusions are
necessary to any understanding of the complex gendered hierarchies of given cultures at
given points in time – and while I thus make use of such work in my own – localized
consideration prevents us from drawing suppositions that extend beyond national borders
and chronological boundaries, and from making comparisons as well as distinctions. The
work of isolating specific structures that recur in otherwise disparate nations stands to
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expose ideological necessities upon which nationhood relies, as well as consistent
methods by which women who are assumed to lack agency might actually affect change.
For these reasons – and because such consideration disrupts the reductive binary
divisions of East vs. West – I find it useful to put the narratives of this project into
conversation with one another. If self-abnegation is deliberately performed, for example,
by a runaway slave mother, the Palestinian-born wife of a naturalized Israeli surgeon, and
the white South African daughter of communist anti-apartheid activists, then we cannot
attribute it merely to local circumstances. Thus I also intend to subvert the oppositionality
that undergirds our polarizing, academic gaze.
By necessity, then, this project responds to the academic tradition of categorizing
literature (and culture) via precise moments of time and locations in space. Though
patterns clearly emerge as a result of historical and spatial structuring, other patterns –
which may arise under different categorizing devices – are obscured. As academic
inquiry becomes increasingly interdisciplinary and transnational, there is clear value in
studying particular elements of literature and/or culture as they manifest across various
historical periods and localities. According to Mary Hawkesworth, the planet is currently
“divided into just under two hundred nations, whose rights to sovereign autonomy were
recognized by the United Nations.” Hawkesworth argues that though “studying women
and politics within any one of these nations affords insights into particular raced and
gendered political dynamics,” transnational consideration “enable[s] the identification of
patterns in women’s political activities,” which “can be surprising and enormously useful
in dispelling mistaken notions” (3). Her purpose in conducting transnational feminist
research is to “[identify] innovative strategies developed by women in specific regions”
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(3-4), which can then, perhaps, “be imported [by] or imposed [in] other nations” (4).
Hawkesworth cites as an example of such a transnational ideological shift the fact that
“the bourgeois ideology of separate spheres” – which came into being in Western nations
– was ultimately “imposed on nations in Africa and Asia with the expansion of colonial
empires in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (4). My methodology is in keeping
with Hawkesworth’s, as are my justifications for such an approach. What I propose here,
however, is a reading of behavior that is learned not from the privileged, but by the
privileged. To greater and lesser degrees, self-abnegation is the purview not of the
dominant, but of the dominated. It is theirs to teach, and insomuch as people in power
observe self-abnegation among the powerless, the lesson has arguably been effective.
Just as this work disrupts the categorizing principles of time and space, it likewise
calls for exploration of the intersections of postcolonial and gender theories. In “Algeria
Unveiled,” Frantz Fanon argues that the structure of colonial nations mirrors the domestic
structure of patriarchal ones; thus he compares colonial oppression to gender oppression.
If we allow – as Fanon, McClintock, and others have contended – that the nation relies
inherently on gender inequity, then using gender theory in concert with postcolonial
theory – and using both models to look at texts that have emerged from both colonized
and non-colonized nations – stands to expose the degree to which these hierarchies are
inherent to the structure of nationhood itself. 2 What do different national moments share
in their assumptions about women? How are those assumptions changed by

2

McClintock expresses frustration with postcolonial scholars whom she sees as failing to apply Fanon’s
claims, and with feminist theorists, who endeavor to keep sexism distinct in study from classism or racism.
In the sixteen years since the publication of Imperial Leather, however, a number of scholars have worked
to integrate postcolonial discourse with feminist theory, including Anthony C. Alessandrini, R.
Radhakrishnan, Ania Loomba, and Elleke Boehmer.
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circumstances (colonialism, war, et cetera) governing a specific nation at a specific
moment in time? And more importantly, in what ways do those assumptions not change
dependent on such values? I want to be clear that it is not my intent to assume that the
relationship between women and the nation of which they are a part is a static one, nor
that there are not significant variances within specific nations with regard to gendered
structures. Instead, I hope to trace a genealogy not of the origin of female submission
within historical structures – which would wed submission tightly to specific
circumstances, making it more likely that we would read it as demonstrative of
victimhood – but of occurrences of submission as they widely appear. My hope is that
this work will be geographically and historically comparative, but not reductive in terms
of the individualizing nuances at work in every woman and every nation across the globe.
I focus on eight different nation-states. This analysis is organized not by nation,
however, but by thematic pattern. I draw distinctions based on the aspect of a woman’s
life that is being voluntarily sacrificed in a given text, by a given woman-citizen. When
considered in these terms, four clear categories emerge: a woman’s life itself, her sex or
sexuality, her voice (used, as is common, to denote agency), and her motherhood (i.e. her
children or her reproductive potential). Each chapter focuses on one of these concepts, all
of which are central to women’s sense of identity. I don’t mean to suggest here that all
women find all of these concepts integral to their lives, as clearly categories like
“motherhood” and “sexuality” are of lesser importance to some women than to others.
But I do contend that these four elements are so central to the humanity of women at
large that the voluntary sacrifice of them is striking and warrants attention not granted
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when we assume – as we have for so long – that submission and sacrifice are marks of
powerlessness, and not of deliberate intent.
My first chapter, “Suicide as Subversion,” explores women who take their own
lives. Butler observes in Precarious Life that we are always already vulnerable, yet we
struggle to deny that fact such that we might live our lives within the comforting illusion
of immortality. In this chapter, I argue that female literary characters of various nations
fight against such denial via the radical method of absolute self-abnegation. I consider the
suicides of Susan Isaacson Lewin in E.L. Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel, Erica in
Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist, and Sihem Jaafari in Yasmina Khadra’s
The Attack, each of whom exercises a nationalistically endorsed self-abnegation that
amounts to being, followed, in death, by an extreme example of unbeing. I use the
distinctions Giorgio Agamben draws between “zoe” and “bios” to argue that in their
sacrifice of “zoe” (physical life), these women generate “bios” (political life) that they
might not otherwise have possessed.
The characters I discuss in my second chapter – “Sexual Reparations” – turn to
sex to set right an injustice perpetrated by their nation-state. Each of these texts is
positioned either at the outset or the aftermath of a highly politicized historical event: the
Rosenberg execution, the end of South African apartheid, and the precipice of the recent
war in Iraq. Comparing the compliance of Phyllis Lewin in E.L. Doctorow’s Book of
Daniel, Lucy Lurie in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, and Daisy Perowne in Ian McEwan’s
Saturday calls into question traditional readings of submission by exposing the politically
generative power of sexual surrender.
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In my third chapter, “Anti-Sovereign Silence,” I examine literary characters who
willingly self-silence to bring about political change that dominance or more traditional
empowerment has failed to affect. I look here at Leda in Glenway Wescott’s Apartment
in Athens, Rosa in Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter, and the unnamed “Barbarian
Girl” in J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians. These novels – set respectively in
Germany’s World War II occupation of Greece, the middle years of South African
apartheid, and the bitter decline of an unspecified empire – engage the personal and
political fallout of colonization. As power structures shift, these characters withdraw their
voices, thereby revoking their consent to the travesties done either in their name or to
their fellow citizens. I argue that their silence functions as the verbal equivalent of a
hunger strike: they claim empowerment by refusing to participate in demands for it.
Lynne Huffer asserts that “under patriarchy, to be a woman is to be a mother”
(15). Indeed, the concerns of my final chapter, “(Un)Conceived Motherhood,” indicate an
irony not seen elsewhere in this project, in that motherhood is something all cultures
expect women to pursue, yet women are often not afforded the tools necessary to do so
successfully. This chapter focuses on two mothers: Sethe Suggs of Toni Morrison’s
Beloved and Mary Metcalf Crick of Graham Swift’s Waterland, both of whom selfabnegate in ways that function as self-sacrificial unbeing. Like the women of my other
chapters, these characters perform “unbecoming” before attempting to “become” again
on post-maternal, post-patriarchal terms. It is in their powerlessness that they demonstrate
“maternal power,” and though liberal feminism would have us view that power as
reductive – and their destructive use of it as further evidence of their inherent weakness –
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shadow feminism reveals how they use their own vulnerability, in tandem with their
maternal power, to subvert patriarchy.
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CHAPTER I: SUICIDE AS SUBVERSION
If today I heard that some American had committed suicide rather than live in disgrace, I would
fully understand.
~ J.M. Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year

As Butler’s Precarious Life points out, we are always already vulnerable. We are
ceaselessly exposed to violence, to accidents, and to the breakdown of the body. At any
moment, our lives – or the lives of the people on whom we depend – can be extinguished.
Yet we ignore these facts such that we might subscribe to the sovereignty-driven illusion
of immortality. In this chapter, I argue that female literary characters of various nations
expose the inherency of vulnerability by sacrificing their own lives: that they, in
Butlerian terms, “lay claim to [their] bod[ies] as their own” via the radical method of
absolute self-abnegation. I consider the self-imposed deaths of Susan Isaacson Lewin of
E.L. Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel, Erica of Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant
Fundamentalist, and Sihem Jaafari of Yasmina Khadra’s The Attack, all of whom take
their own lives during a period in which they are entangled with the political realities and
ideological mandates of their respective nation-states. In terms of the process of selfabnegation – being, unbeing, and re-being – mapped out in this work’s introduction, these
characters are more limited than those of the chapters to follow. We see the
nationalistically endorsed self-abnegation that amounts to being, and, in their deaths, we
see extreme examples of unbeing. Because they die, however, they never achieve the
kind of re-being we’ll see in the chapters to come; thus I focus here on the obscured
power of unbeing itself: on the women who demonstrate such power via their own
deaths, and on that power’s politically generative potential. I also focus on the degree to
which the self-destruction of these characters forces others to cede power. Though these
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women don’t discover themselves anew on the other side of self-abnegation, their
unbeing initiates a form of re-being in the privileged citizens around them such that those
people are positioned to work against their own privilege, and thereby against the state.
Because these novels depict circumstances arising in, respectively, 1930s-1960s
United States, post-9/11 United States and Pakistan, and contemporary Israel and
Palestine, they would not commonly be placed into conversation with one another. When
read separately it is possible to imagine that the choices these women make are unique to
the political or historical situations in which they find themselves. Where patterns are
discerned, it would be easy to conclude that they confirm the presence of culturally
mandated subaltern-like powerlessness, and thus offer nothing revelatory regarding the
relationship between agency and self-sacrifice. The first character I include kills herself
in the aftermath of her parents’ execution. The second disappears – having almost
certainly committed suicide – in the wake of September 11th. And the third blows herself
up – along with a café full of people – in a well-planned suicide bombing. Yet despite
their differences, I argue that each woman’s self-sacrifice engages with the politics of her
nation, and that each woman participates willingly in that sacrifice. Acknowledgment of
this dynamic subverts the subaltern-like status commonly attributed to submission.
In Diary of a Bad Year, J.M. Coetzee’s protagonist, J.C., claims provocatively
that – in light of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – “if [he] heard that some American
had committed suicide rather than live in disgrace, [he] would fully understand” (43).
This suggests not only that we are all complicit in the political activities of our nation, but
that the shame of that complicity might well overpower our will – or even our right – to
live. It seems, however, that while the suicide of a male citizen could be perceived in
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such noble terms, the suicide of a female citizen might instead incite assumptions of
weakness. Considered via the tenets of liberal feminism, the deaths of the characters I
discuss could be used to demonstrate female powerlessness: taken as examples of times
when the choice of life has been out of women’s hands. This is where I see liberal
feminism as dangerous. These characters were not murdered; they took their own lives,
thereby demonstrating agency within complex political systems. As I note in this
project’s introduction, if individuals had to act in ways entirely unguided by cultural
conditioning to be considered agents, no one would attain that designation. Yet we look
for that level of personal sovereignty when considering female – especially third-world
female – agency. When we don’t see it, we dismiss a woman’s actions as not of her own
making. I follow Coetzee’s logic – and make use of Halberstam’s shadow feminism – to
read the deaths of the women I discuss in this chapter as fully demonstrative of will.
In looking at acts of fictional self-abnegation, I hope to hear these characters: to
examine their submission without taking the power they have managed to claim away
from them. In “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Gayatri Spivak discusses the case of a young
Indian woman named Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, who hung herself in her father’s apartment.
In a twist on the practice of Sati – a wife’s suicide after her husband’s death, which was
not the motive behind Bhaduri’s suicide, but which no doubt had cultural relevance –
Bhaduri chose to kill herself when she was menstruating, presumably to inform her
family that her suicide was not a consequence of sexual indiscretion. Spivak’s interest in
Bhaduri originates not only in the fact that her motives have never been entirely
understood, but that her family has made little effort to grasp her choice. Spivak asks if,
for speech to have been successful – to have, essentially, amounted to “voice” – it must
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be not only spoken, but “deciphered” or “interpreted” accurately as well. If Bhaduri’s
action is not interpreted at all – or if the conclusions drawn about her motives are
inaccurate – any voice she may have gained via her final act is arguably lost, as she has
not, therefore, been heard. Spivak is skeptical of academic attempts to hear, focusing
instead on the process by which a subaltern is silenced. Yet because the women of this
chapter never attain re-being, I find value in striving to grasp all we can of their unbeing.
I argue that the acts of absolute self-abnegation performed by these characters
demonstrate both a profound level of agency and a profound potential for undermining
the state even after their death. Butler claims: “that we are subject to death at the whim of
another [is] reason for both fear and grief.” But she goes on to ask if “the experiences of
vulnerability and loss have to lead straightaway to military violence and retribution,”
insisting: “there are other passages. If we are interested in arresting cycles of violence to
produce less violent outcomes, it is no doubt important to ask what, politically, might be
made of grief besides a cry for war” (Precarious xii). I propose that, in these characters’
deaths, we have found alternative passages. The political ends these women seek are
completely divested of notions of invincibility, are instead deeply rooted in the inherency
of bodily susceptibility. Thus their actions work to subvert long-held narratives that insist
on the necessity of war at any cost. In unbeing, these characters prove that other passages
exist: that precarity can be embraced. And if other passages exist, we might move closer
to abandoning the default passages of warfare, sovereignty, and aggression.
Several assumptions figure centrally in the difficulty of perceiving self-sacrifice
as a desirable choice, as they rely on suppositions about the nature of life that are
incompatible with a personal or political desire for powerlessness. In Politics of Piety,
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Saba Mahmood makes evident many of these in her critique of “normative liberal
assumptions about human nature.” Among such assumptions are that “all human beings
have an innate desire for freedom, that we all…assert our autonomy when allowed to do
so, [and] that human agency primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms and not
those that uphold them” (5). These assumptions are dangerous because they presuppose
what (all) beings will (and won’t) use agency to accomplish, thereby limiting what can be
perceived as an action, and who can be perceived as an actor. They render invisible any
action born of a desire to forsake freedom.
Another assumption is that life itself is irrefutably and invariably precious, that it
must be valued above all else. Giorgio Agamben disrupts this supposition by critically
deconstructing the elements of what we broadly refer to as life using the Aristotelian
binary of zoē and bios. Agamben describes zoē as “the simple fact of living common to
all living beings” and bios as “the form or way of living proper to an individual or a
group” (1). In Aristotelian terms, the life that we commonly consider an integrated reality
is actually an amalgam of our biological or cellular existences (our zoē) and our political
or cultural existences (our bios). Here the “normative liberal assumptions” Mahmood
contests are helpful. Ironically because of narratives of sovereignty, we are led to believe
that our real lives are our bodily presences (our zoē), and that nothing should impinge on
our pursuit of physical continuation. Though bios includes citizenship and sovereignty,
zoē is still privileged, which is evident by the fact that sacrifice of it is seen as abhorrent.
If instead we define life in terms of the complex relationship between bios and zoē
– and we allow that we are constituted by both constructs – those same sacrifices become
rich with generative meaning. When we assume that self-abnegating women are
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powerless, we read their self-destruction as evidence that they have failed to
appropriately live. Agamben’s distinction allows us to complicate this view of suicide as
the ultimate surrender of power and agency. Jeffrey Nealon and Susan Searls Giroux
further this discourse, discussing German philosopher Theodor Adorno, who contends
that life “has to be animated, configured, or deployed within a context, given a particular
sense, for it to live” (213). By considering bios as interactive with – but separate from –
zoē, we see that the choice to sacrifice the latter for the former might be read as the
process of performing just such an “animation”: of “configur[ing]” the life of a womancitizen within a context whose meaning we might be able to perceive. Suicide can thus be
seen as a way of reconfiguring the political implications of bios, and not simply as
eliminating zoē. Without such a lens, however, lifelessness is dismissed as powerlessness.
Part of the reconfiguration modeled by these characters is born of the troubling
violence that marks their suicides; thus it seems necessary to acknowledge its presence.
Butler calls violence “a touch of the worst order, a way a primary human vulnerability to
other humans is exposed in its most terrifying way, a way in which we are given over,
without control, to the will of another” (28-29). So what does it mean when violence is
imposed on the self, when it is the will of the self that brings about such “primary human
vulnerability”? I argue that this manifestation of violence functions in simultaneous
reaction to and against the state, which Butler claims, “shores itself up, seeks to
reconstitute its imagined wholeness, but only at the price of denying its own
vulnerability, its dependency, its exposure” (41). Violence, therefore, is central to the
assertion of sovereignty against which these women work. Yet here it is performed in
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ways that subvert the standard (sovereignty-mandated) outward trajectory of aggression.
This violence is, first and foremost, directed inward.
Because of the direction of self-abnegation’s violence, we don’t ascribe power to
its perpetrators. In The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault uses the term bio-power to
outline what he sees as “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving
the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations” (140) marking the modern
historical period. He contends that “genocide is…the dream of modern powers…not
because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill,” but “because power is situated and
exercised at the level of life” (137). Indeed, when individuals kill other individuals, we
attribute to them a great deal of power. We make clear that they are responsible for death,
and we rely on our judicial system to take their power away, which it often does by
demonstrating its own power to take life. Yet as I note above, because sovereignty does
not extend to the citizen, we don’t ascribe this level of power to individuals taking their
own lives, nor especially to women doing so. Foucaultian logic reveals a potential
nationalistic reason for such a dismissal: namely, that suicide is threatening to an
institution (a nation) that claims as its sovereign space the right to kill. Foucault writes of
suicide that it was “once a crime” because it was seen as “a way to usurp the power of
death which the sovereign alone…had the right to exercise,” and he concludes that a
“determination to die…was one of the first astonishments of a society in which political
power had assigned itself the task of administering life” (138-39). We still see this
“astonishment” at work in the reactions these female characters garner from other
characters, readers, and critics. By perceiving suicide as inherently connected to the state,
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we are able to see the danger such an action poses to the illusion of national sovereignty,
and the reasons behind its dismissal as merely the desperate ends of an agentless being.
Moreover, Foucault claims an intrinsic connection between the modes of biopower and capitalist economy. He asserts that “bio-power was without question an
indispensable element in the development of capitalism,” which he contends “would not
have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of
production” (141). That relationship is largely responsible for how we in the west are
trained to perceive life. By way of demonstrating this, Nealon and Giroux write that
“nearly everywhere you look these days (advertising, politics, art, education), there is an
appeal to this thing called ‘life,’” a demand that we must all invest in “making life better,
enjoying life more, living the life of the mind.” They assert that “contemporary power
mobilizes a certain form or understanding of life” (214). Thus we are all, regardless of
cost, under impetus to improve upon and grasp onto life. According to these terms, not
doing so – indeed, abandoning zoē, forsaking it, refusing to value it above certain
ideological realities – is inherently anti-national and, especially, anti-capitalistic. Thus the
behavior of these women – though largely invisible – is subversively political.
What’s important to note, however, is that the mandate of living does not extend
to the other, but merely to the self, and to that which is most like the self. Offering
American exceptionalism as an example of such a distinction, Butler maintains that
“some lives are grievable, and others are not; the differential allocation of grievability
that decides what kind of subject is and must be grieved…operates to produce and
maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: what counts as a
livable life and a grievable death?” (xiv). Thus even our supposedly reverential
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consideration of life is inconsistent and conditional. Nealon and Giroux note that for
Agamben, “even the death-dealing Nazi genocide…was made possible by a strange
appeal to life.” They explain: “the twisted logic of the holocaust was that Germanic
Aryan life needed protection from being infected by a whole series of supposedly inferior
forms of life,” and so, “in short, Nazi power was biopower” (214). To reject the mandate
of self-life – by protecting the other, even symbolically, at a cost to the self – is to turn
the dynamic of in-group/out-group treatment on its head. By choosing to die, these
women challenge assumptions about who we grieve, who we hold accountable, and how
we can be changed by the process of surrender.
Considered in these terms, we begin to see the motives underlying our dismissal
of self-abnegation as weak and powerless: namely that if it is politically motivated,
female suicide is so flagrantly rebellious as to constitute a “real and credible threat” (to
borrow the language of the post-9/11 U.S. government) to national sovereignty. Indeed,
such behavior effectively amounts to rejection of the cultural construction of biopower,
which works, according to Nealon and Giroux, to regulate behavior precisely because it
“invent[s] a species or life-form lurking behind the acts of criminality: the delinquent, the
monster, the sociopath, the pervert.” Such citizens “may or may not have done anything
illegal or transgressive, but their lives are nonetheless outside the slippery slope of
biopolitical normativity” (216), and thus they must be villainized. The actions these
women engage in position them outside of “normativity.” Indeed, these characters
conform so exaggeratedly to demands for female submission that they fail to conform at
all, thereby threatening the norms by pointing out their otherwise-obscured fault lines.
Nealon and Giroux claim that “because power (like life) is so ubiquitous that it’s nearly
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impossible to localize, it’s easiest to locate social power…where power clamps down on
various forms of resistance.” Power is most apparent, they suggest, when it is “brought to
light against ‘resistant’ acts or practices that power wants to eradicate” (218). Within the
intranslatability of these women’s suicides (like the intranslatability of Bhaduri’s), we are
positioned to see the danger of sovereignty, as well as a potential way to overcome it.
Where before these women have been read as failing to survive, I propose that
we read them as illuminating dangerous norms that – in the absence of such drastic
measures – would likely remain invisible. Mahmood writes that “the ongoing importance
of feminist scholarship on women’s agency cannot be emphasized enough.” To be
effective, however, that scholarship needs to divorce itself from the assumptions of power
that place our analysis of women squarely within the terms dictated by hegemonic
structures of authority. As Mahmood contends, “it is critical to examine the assumptions
and elisions that attend [our understanding of] agency, especially the ways in which these
assumptions constitute a barrier to” our ability to recognize alternate manifestations of it
(7). These are the terms of my analysis of the following female characters, and of their
self-imposed deaths. For these women, the stakes of political resistance are high. If we
dismiss them as powerless, their deaths cannot attain a payoff that would make such
sacrifice politically or personally worthwhile. Halberstam asserts: “failure allows us to
escape the punishing norms that discipline behavior and manage human development
with the goal of delivering us from unruly childhoods to orderly and predictable
adulthoods.” Indeed, failure “provides the opportunity to use these negative affects to
poke holes in the toxic positivity of contemporary life” (3). Acknowledging the
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transcendent potential of failure allows us to see in the deaths of these female literary
characters a generative form of unbeing, and not merely a cessation of bodily life.

Susan
In E. L. Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel, Susan Isaacson Lewin kills herself after
living for just over two decades. Though on the surface Susan is depicted as
psychologically fragile, I argue that her actions are, if not sound, then at least well
reasoned and purposeful. The Book of Daniel positions readers historically within the Red
Scare of the 1950s, during which time Rochelle and Paul Isaacson – a couple modeled
after real-life communists Ethel and Julius Rosenberg – are put to death for Conspiracy to
Commit Espionage. The novel follows their children, Daniel and Susan, who demonstrate
an inability to attain closure from the deaths of their parents until some form of justice
has been done, and who seek to bring such justice about in violent and symbolic ways. I
contend that because of the common practice of punishing the female body for
ideological indiscretions, a female form becomes – for both Susan and Daniel – the site
of punishment meant to take the place of the perpetrator – the United States Government
– which cannot be punished because it lacks corporeal form. Susan’s self-violence –
which is the focus of this chapter – and Daniel’s sexual and physical abuse of his wife
Phyllis – which I discuss in the chapter to follow – can be read as cathartic, extra-judicial
responses to the wrongful executions of Paul and Rochelle Isaacson.
Moreover, unlike Daniel’s externally directed violence, Susan’s unbeing likewise
serves as a refusal to adhere to the doctrine of self-protection promoted by sovereignty. In
ending her existence as a middle-class American, Susan models a refusal to live as such
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for others. Her actions function as a letting-go of one set of mandates for female
submission (the set imposed on Rochelle from the moment she was arrested until the
moment of her death), and a claiming of a second, un-condoned set. Finally, Susan resists
the state’s sovereignty-driven claims vis-à-vis the imposition of death. The government
may have had control over the end of Rochelle’s life, but Susan refuses to give them
control over the end of hers. Though The Book of Daniel offers little specific insight into
Susan – thus there’s less direct textual evidence to support her willingness than can be
found in this chapter’s other examples – I argue that the few glimpses we get into the
logic driving her choices are sufficient to warrant consideration of Susan’s selfabnegation in deliberate, non-victimized terms.
Critical reception of The Book of Daniel has focused on what is perceived as
Daniel’s search for the “truth” of his parents’ guilt or innocence, while subordinating
Susan’s concomitant (though markedly different) search.3 When critics do mention
Susan, it is usually via a comparison meant to demonstrate Daniel’s superior strength or
survival instincts. For example, Douglas Fowler contends that “Daniel is psychologically
deformed by the weight and irony of this tragic burden, but his deformity allows him to
bend and survive” while “Susan can only break” (48). I argue, however, that Daniel
“survives” only because he directs his rage externally, while Susan directs hers towards
the self. It could have been Daniel who attempted suicide, or Susan who acted sadistically
towards a partner. Yet these scenarios feel less plausible to us because we are more
3

Morton P. Levitt argues that “Daniel’s difficulties as an adult and Susan’s destruction arise directly from
their being the children of figures of myth…His historical search is designed to uncover the truths
underlying that myth” (102-03). So too, Harter and Thompson claim that “Daniel writes his book in an
attempt to free himself from the past [and] from his guilt over his parents’ fate” (34). Finally, Christopher
Morris states: “Daniel is moved by the detective motive of determining guilt or innocence…His empirical
quest ends in nothingness when the Isaacsons’ senile accuser, Mindish, cannot establish the reliability of
his own account of events” (83).
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conditioned to perceive women as victims than men. Thus the weakness inherent to
Daniel’s abuse of his wife is overlooked. Daniel’s survival mirrors national sovereignty
in that it figures as self-protection at a disregarded cost to others. Susan, however, flaunts
illusions of personal safety. Carol C. Harter and James R. Thompson argue that “unlike
Susan, Daniel remains functional” (35). In concluding that Susan is not “functional,”
Harter and Thompson dismiss any reading of her as empowered. They join Daniel in
assuming that Susan kills herself merely out of grief and weakness. In this way, Daniel
and scholars alike participate in Susan’s dismissal. They overlook her overt and
deliberate choices – first to assume that her parents are innocent, then to advocate for
them, and ultimately to refuse complicity in their deaths by ending her own life – which
mark Susan as arguably more agented than her verbose but ineffective brother.
Though only Daniel is critically considered in such terms, both he and Susan
function as historians, constructing and creating facts so as to make the present and the
future more intelligible. Daniel does this overtly via his frame-narrative construction of
the novel: choosing which facts to recount and thereby shaping a particular written
version of history. Susan does it more subtly: continually constituting history in her own
life, both by remembering and focusing on certain events of the past and by acting as an
agent in ways that reflect (and even reenact and alter) those remembered events. Linda
Hutcheon asserts that Daniel is “culturally and familially conditioned in his response to
history, both public and private” (838). Such “cultural and familial condition[ing]”
governs the way both of the Isaacson children perceive their lives. Both have had the
private and public realms merge as a result of their parents’ trial, and neither has been
able to disengage from questions of ideology surrounding the events of their parents’
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lives and deaths. The voice Doctorow offers us, however, is Daniel’s and – with very few
exceptions – Daniel’s alone. Susan says remarkably little. It would be easy to take her
silence as evidence of her powerlessness, which would be to fail to notice that – far more
successfully than Daniel – Susan rewrites history, moving from one form of being (the
impoverished daughter of revolutionaries) to another (the birth child of executed
communists and the adopted child of secure, middle-class parents) and, ultimately, to a
revisionary, violent, and symbolic form of unbeing.
Though we’re given little insight into the immediate motives behind Susan’s
suicide attempt, the level of situational – political, historical, symbolic – awareness with
which Susan approaches her pre-abnegation state of being is too significant to dismiss
either her way of living or her choice to die as unplanned or apolitical. The desire Susan
has to make sense of the events of her childhood – and of the ramifications of those
events – is clear throughout the novel, which makes evident two things: first, that the past
dictates her understanding of the present, and second, that she perceives her behavior in
the present to be historically connected. Daniel tells us: “in Susan resides the fateful
family gift for having definite feelings. Always taking stands, even as a kid. A moralist, a
judge” (9). Even as a child, then, Susan is no hapless victim of circumstances. Moreover,
of the Isaacson family (including Susan), Daniel says: “everything was theory.
Everything was done for a reason, and was usually not the way the rest of the world did
it. All the more reason. All part of the plan” (31). In her being, then, we’re led to see
Susan’s daily actions as calculated and political.
Indeed, even before Susan’s unbeing she resists narratives of sovereignty, though
she performs that resistance from within its structure. Of their imprisoned parents, Paul
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and Rochelle’s attorney tells the kids: “we shall prove that they are not guilty” (148).
Though both Susan and Daniel go on to question Ascher’s contention, Susan never does
so in a fundamental way. Instead, Susan works to undermine the state’s narrative about
her family. We see this manifest in a pivotal scene in which Susan and Daniel fight at
Christmas (one of the few times we hear Susan speak), during which Susan makes clear
that she sees her role as daughter to be one of vindication. She tells her adoptive father:
“‘you let [Daniel] sit there and twist everything I say. My mother and father were
murdered – why do you let him sit here and do it again!’” (82). Though she has yet to
perform unbeing, Susan accepts the vulnerability of injustice, thereby rewriting the
narrative of Paul and Rochelle Isaacson such that readers perceive them not as
perpetrators of crime, but as victims of it. In asking, “why do you let him sit here and do
it again?,” Susan demonstrates a belief in symbolic power. Daniel, of course, cannot
literally kill their parents again. Yet Susan’s claim that his language amounts to such lets
us know that she perceives a relationship between the real and the representationally
realized. If they can be killed again, it stands to reason that they can be resurrected, and in
her post-execution being, Susan struggles to bring that symbolic potential to fruition.
When she fails to do so via being, Susan turns to unbeing, which functions for her
on two significant levels. Grasping the logic of the first requires accepting that the
Isaacsons’ executions amounted to “murder.” In traditional terms, closure on a crime like
murder is reliant upon the criminal (in this case the U.S. government) facing appropriate
consequences.4 Yet such closure-via-consequences is effectively impossible to attain in

4

Reading the (fictional) deaths of Paul and Rochelle Isaacson as the result of murder is, of course, logical if
one accepts evidence that they were not guilty of the crimes of which they were convicted, or if one
believes that those crimes did not warrant the death penalty. For the purposes of this work, however, I
won’t attempt to prove these premises and will merely assume this reading henceforth.
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situations wherein murder is committed not by a person, but by a nation, especially when
that nation offers no acknowledgement, no public apology, no recognition even of
wrongdoing. And it is especially impossible in this case – where the murders were
committed by the justice system itself – because Susan cannot pursue the culturally
prescribed method for seeking justice. I contend that it is in part this inability that results
in Susan’s decision to take her own life. When we turn to the justice system to avenge
murder, we ask that retribution be enacted via punishment of the transgressor’s corporeal
form. If the justice system itself is the transgressor, however, there is no corporeal form
to punish. There are thus few alternatives to self-abnegating unbeing for Susan to achieve
corporeal justice for the murders of Rochelle and Paul Isaacson.
The second level on which her unbeing functions is the degree to which Susan’s
suicide attempt, her passive lingering, and her ultimate death allow her to escape
complicity in the injustice of her parents’ trial and its outcome.5 Unlike the examples to
follow – in which I argue that women gain bios by relinquishing zoē – Susan deliberately
destroys zoē by sacrificing bios. Susan’s unbeing is clearly historically grounded: it is
tied intimately to the crime of her parents’ executions. Among the few items Daniel finds
in Susan’s car after her attempt is a poster that was once used to protest the Isaacsons’
conviction: a “black and white double portrait” of Paul and Rochelle (30). The presence
of this poster demonstrates that Susan’s suicide attempt is itself a form of protest.
Moreover, Susan is an American, and is thus a participant in the justice system that

5

Susan’s suicide attempt is initially unsuccessful. She survives the slashing of her wrists, and is conscious
and able to sit up on the following day. Though she is moved from one hospital to another, however, she is
never released from mental health care, and she dies of apparent hospital-related pneumonia after a
prolonged bout of illness.
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murdered her parents. And after the executions, she is raised in a comfortable middleclass home. We read: “embarrassingly, Daniel and Susan adjusted to the rise in their
fortunes. The life provided by an assistant professor of law was, by comparison, one of
spectacular wealth…It was life in the middle class and it was unbelievably good” (62).
The comfort of these new circumstances causes Susan to feel privileged by the economic
system her parents advocated against, and thus complicit in the lifestyle protected by the
courts that sentenced her parents to death.
What Susan resists when she rejects life, then, is not merely her parents’
executions, and it is not merely her being either: it is arguably sovereignty itself. Susan is
a sovereign subject, but she refuses that reality by willingly modeling the forced denial of
sovereignty experienced by Paul and Rochelle. In Frames of War, Butler argues that “a
sovereign position not only denies its own constitutive injurability but tries to relocate
injurability in the other” (178). While the United States government “relocate[d]
injurability” onto the Isaacsons, Susan makes no attempt to “deny [her]
own…injurability.” Butler goes on to insist that violence is usually “a way of relocating
the capacity to be violated (always) elsewhere” because “it produces the appearance that
the subject who enacts violence is impermeable to violence” (Frames 178). In refusing to
“relocate” the violence she perpetrates, Susan demonstrably rejects the illusion of
personal sovereignty. She refuses to be the citizen she’s been since her parents’ deaths: a
citizen who allows such travesties as wrongful executions to be done in her name. She
thus destroys a bios she cannot abide. In killing herself, Susan ceases to be an American.
She stops being middle-class; her adoptive parents’ wealth is no longer of value to her. In
unbeing, then, she refuses complicity.
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Susan is a baby when her parents are arrested, and a child when they’re executed.
She performs unbeing in the context of the Vietnam War and, more directly, the protests
it inspired. Douglas Fowler asserts that Susan “not only believes in the innocence of her
parents, she believes that something must be forthcoming from the American national
conscience in order to justify her parents’ destruction, to compensate for their literal selfsacrifice” (52). In the years following her parents’ deaths, Susan tries to bring such
compensation about by establishing and donating her trust money to a foundation she
calls “The Isaacson Foundation” (17). It is only when she discovers that the members of
“the new left” are corrupt – and that, therefore, activism will not lead to the promised
breakthrough – that she chooses to fight injustice by unbeing via self-abnegation.
Susan has a model for the performance of self-abnegation. Daniel reminds us that
Susan’s death comes in the summer of 1967; thus it has as a backdrop “young people”
choosing to adopt “a form of protest originated…by the Buddhist monks of South
Vietnam.” This involves “dous[ing] themselves with gasoline and light[ing] matches to
themselves…burn[ing] in protest” (17). Though her reasons are more precise, they are no
less political, and Susan joins these Americans in performing willing vulnerability. In
Multitude, Hardt and Negri insist that “the modern military figure of sovereignty” has
“the power to decide over the life and death of its subjects” (332). Susan’s selfabnegation is subversive precisely because, like the monks, she denies the state sovereign
power. Hardt and Negri speak to the possibility of such a denial, saying: “even the
seemingly absolute power [of sovereignty] is radically thrown into question by practices
that refuse the control over life…such as…the protest of the Buddhist monk who sets
himself on fire [or] the terrorist suicide bomber.” Such “practices” are revolutionary
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because “when life itself is negated in the struggle to challenge sovereignty, the power
over life and death that the sovereign exercises becomes useless” (Multitude 332).
Susan’s self-abnegation, then, has both historical precedence and political purchase.
This is the context in which I read Susan’s attempt to end her life, which she does
– as Daniel imagines it – not by lighting herself on fire, but by “locking the stall door,
taking out a fresh Gillette Super Stainless blade, slicing veins, [and] holding the opened
veins over a toilet bowl in a public bathroom” (29). Susan’s self-abnegation is thus
intensely violent. But as Butler argues, “one has to come up against violence to practice
non-violence,” and “the violence one is up against does not issue exclusively from the
outside” because “if who we ‘are’ is precisely a shared precariousness, then we risk our
own nullification.” Indeed, Butler cautions that sometimes, “non-violence is not a
peaceful state, but a social and political struggle to make rage articulate and effective –
the carefully crafted ‘fuck you’” (Frames 182). I argue that Susan’s unbeing can be read
as just such a message to the state. Though we might be led to dismiss her suicide as
evidence of disempowerment, it offers closure that would otherwise have remained
unattainable, and it allows Susan to escape a form of bios that makes her complicit in her
parents’ deaths. Susan cannot force her government to bear consequences for Paul’s and
Rochelle’s executions, but she can choose to bear those consequences herself.
Like the methods employed by the monks, Susan’s resistance comes in the form
of absolute surrender. In the aftermath of Susan’s suicide attempt, Daniel is banned from
the hospital for attacking Susan’s doctor upon hearing of his plan to administer electric
shock therapy, an especially cruel treatment option for a woman whose parents have been
electrocuted. For this reason, Daniel breaks into her hospital room. This is the last time he
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sees Susan alive. Upon observing her as she moves silently on her bed, Daniel concludes,
“today Susan is a starfish. Today she practices the silence of the starfish. There are few
silences deeper than the silence of the starfish. There are not many degrees of life lower
before there is no life” (207). Susan’s self-punishment is not merely physical; even before
her life drains away, she disposes of her voice. After holding her for some time, Daniel
returns Susan to her bed, and he watches as “her arms moved out slowly and her feet
hooked the mattress and she fixed herself to the bed, sucking to the bed with the vacuum
pores of her shrinking bone marrow,” after which “she stared once more at the ceiling
and listened to the slow ebb of the sea.” Watching this silent, fully surrendered body,
Daniel continues his metaphor, noting that “a starfish is not outraged.” He concludes that
to resist the assumed righteousness of sovereignty, “a certain portion of…energy must be
used for the regeneration of energy. That way you don’t just die like a bird falling, like a
rock sinking, you die on a parabolic curve. You die in a course of attack.” Daniel thus
realizes: “Susan knows” that “to be a revolutionary you need only hold out your arms and
dive” (210). No longer an agent in the world, Susan’s transition to “starfish” is a
transition away from humanity – from life – and towards self-obliteration. Doctorow’s
starfish metaphor seems more apt than most critical takes on Susan’s self-destruction.
The external effects of Susan’s unbeing are limited. Both she and Phyllis
influence Daniel – which I discuss more fully in the chapter to follow – but they do so to
a lesser degree than we see in most of the other examples of this project. In response to
Susan’s self-abnegation, Daniel confesses: “I was learning. I was learning how to be an
Isaacson. An Isaacson does things boldly calculated to bring self-destructive results”
(206-07). With the influence of first his parents, and now his sister, Daniel begins to shift
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his destruction from its external manifestation (his abuse of Phyllis) to an internal
manifestation (his withdrawal from society). He notes, “my face now bearded, my hair
longer than it had ever been I careen through my changes at an accelerating pace. The
sense is of running too fast downhill. But why not, why the fuck not” (207). But in the
days before her death, he also writes: “to be truthful, Susan, I can live with your death. I
will make a fuss because it will be expected of me. But I can live with it. I know how to
do that. I’m not saying I won’t hang sad, but at suppertime I’ll be hungry, right? I’ll want
a hamburger with everything on it” (208). And at her funeral, he seems to read her death
as meaningless. He writes, “it is the kind of day the crocuses get fucked, exposing their
petaled insides of delicate hue, yellow and white, lavender and flesh, to the spring. And it
is too soon. It’s a miscalculation. Crocus, first flower, dead flower, flower of
revolutionaries” (300). Thus he uses metaphor to dismiss her unbeing as “a
miscalculation.” We’re given little with which to read Susan’s self-abnegation as having
a revolutionary effect on Daniel.
So too, it merely destroys her adoptive parents. Daniel notes, “my mother wears a
black hat with a veil over her eyes. Her eyes are swollen and red and her mouth is turned
down in ugly grief. My father.…is demolished” (300). And in terms of the potential for
broader consequences, John G. Parks claims that “Daniel and Susan...are scarred
psychologically and they exhibit many of the traits psychologists and historians have
noted in survivors of atrocities and political oppression.” This is certainly true. Yet Parks
goes on to claim that “they bear the burden of the ‘survivor’s mission,’ the compelling
need to tell the world what happened so that others might learn from it” (43). While this
applies to Daniel, I argue that if Susan’s most “compelling need” were to tell the world
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about her experiences, she would be invested not in self-destruction, but in selfpreservation: she would continue to use her voice to educate others. Yet even before her
unbeing, Susan’s use of voice is strikingly sparing. When Daniel visits Susan in the
psychiatric hospital the morning after her suicide attempt, she says little beyond:
“‘goodbye, Daniel. You get the picture’” (9). Susan is more interested in constituting
justice and resisting complicity than in the normative notion of helping others to “learn”
what happened to her. Unlike the examples to follow, then, the success of Susan’s
unbeing exists largely in the symbolic.
The Book of Daniel functions as we might imagine the opposite of a
Bildungsroman would: Susan performs unbeing steadily throughout the novel,
surrendering first her consciousness, then her humanity, and then her life. She moves
from woman-citizen to starfish, which is neither woman nor citizen. This is her limited
form of re-being. Watching her, Daniel thinks: “life recedes like the tide going out, the
waves of life shrinking back, and over her forehead and down through her eyes a dryness,
a loss of life” (209). Having rejected the illusion of sovereignty in the aftermath of her
parents’ executions, Susan leaves behind only an empty body, a form over which the state
can exert no influence. Daniel writes: “when I picked her up there was no weight to her.
There was no heft of ocean and slide of salt dune…Her arms hung down from the
shoulders, her skinny legs from the knees” (209-10). Though we are trained to read in
every agented person’s action a desire to self-protect, Susan demonstrates just the
opposite: an instinct to self-destruct. By considering that self-destruction as a
transgressive example of unbeing, we are positioned to read within Susan’s narrative a
powerful refusal of the concept of hegemonic sovereignty.
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Erica
Though her circumstances are less overtly personal than Susan’s, Erica – of
Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist – likewise responds to national events
with absolute self-abnegation. The Reluctant Fundamentalist is set in a café in Lahore,
where a Pakistani man tells an unidentified – and, in Anna Hartnell’s terms, “wholly
silent” – American the story of his love affair with both the United States and an
American woman. Changez studied at Princeton, started work in New York City shortly
before September 2001, and returned to Pakistan shortly after 9/11. He may or may not
have become a terrorist in the years following the attacks. The American with whom
Changez speaks may or may not be a CIA assassin. The novel may end in one or both of
their deaths, or neither may be in real danger. The entire narrative is delivered in the
second person, via Changez’s side of the conversation; thus everything we learn about the
American, the U.S., and Erica is offered not merely via Changez’s consciousness, but via
his deliberate word choice. This structure subverts the empowered West vs. subaltern
East binary by lending voice to the othered character while silencing the traditionally
empowered one. What’s relevant here, though, is the degree to which this shift is echoed
in the actions of privileged Manhattanite Erica, who uses unbeing to self-silence.
Though her self-abnegation is made almost invisible by the prescriptive nature of
rhetorics of liberation, Erica’s subversion of those rhetorics is apparent when considered
through the lens of shadow feminism. Margaret Scanlan contends that The Reluctant
Fundamentalist “is a Rorschach inkblot test exposing our own interpretive strategies,
histories, and desires” (277). And Hamid states in an interview with Deborah Solomon
that the ambiguity of the novel’s ending forces readers to face their own assumptions:
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that we experience the closing scene between Changez and the American via whatever
prejudices we bring to our encounter with the characters. Scanlan argues that – while
most 9/11 novels merely reaffirm the East/West binary – The Reluctant Fundamentalist
“internalize[s] a conflict in ordinary people.” Such “internalization” can be seen via the
private reactions its characters have to public events. Scanlan contends that the novel’s
“hesitations, qualifications, and complexities of lived experience become alternatives to
the lethal polarities of public rhetoric” (266), which it “challenge[s]” by “revise[ing] the
West’s vision of itself as a haven for the oppressed” (267). Though the focus of Scanlan’s
analysis is the complexity with which Hamid portrays Changez, I argue that her
contentions apply to Erica, as well. Considered in such terms, Erica’s death can be seen
as politically generative precisely because, in self-abnegating in the face of America’s
retaliation, she offers a way around the “lethal polarities” that dominate 9/11 discourse.
Erica is the most overtly allegorical of all of the characters I discuss in this
chapter, as she (by name and by action) is a clear representative of both pre- and post9/11 America.6 Hamid houses this national allegory in a female body, which allows us to
see clearly the feminized notion of the state discussed above. Scanlan labels Erica “the
best of America” and notes that she “shares with [Changez] her ‘insider’s world’” (274).
By viewing Erica as an allegorical figure, we begin to see the non-militaristic side of
America’s reaction to 9/11. The America portrayed via Erica is not the violent, retaliatory
America we might expect, but a submissive America, longing for the past and punishing
6

The names Hamid uses in this novel make clear the high degree to which his characters and company
names are meant to be allegorical. For example, the valuation firm Changez works for, Underwood
Samson, clearly represents the corporate nature of the United States (“Underwood Samson” and “United
States” share initials). Erica is a personified version of America, and her deceased, “old world” boyfriend
Chris brings to mind, in Hartnell’s terms, “not only Europe’s Christian roots but also Christopher
Columbus’s encounter with the Americas, and the continent’s status in the European imagination as an
object of its own discovery” (343).
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itself (herself) with and for that longing. In her willingness to accept profound
vulnerability, Erica exposes the danger of the sovereignty-driven assumption that
external, retaliatory violence is the only approach to precarity.
Erica’s acceptance of vulnerability manifests in traditionally feminine ways,
making the distance between her approach and the masculine, militaristic approach of the
United States government all the more clear. In the wake of 9/11, Erica is inconsolably
struck by the grief of an old loss. As Changez attempts to win Erica’s affection, she
withdraws further and further into herself, succumbing to self-pity, nostalgia, and a
destructive (literally self-wasting) eating disorder. Kristiaan Versluys contends that the
events of 9/11 exposed an emptiness that had been present in the lives of Americans for
some time, and that as such, 9/11 merely provided an outlet for – and was not the origin
of – the cultural grief felt in the wake of those events. Because of her allegorical status,
Erica’s unraveling serves as an exaggerated example of the weight of such grief: it offers
insight into America’s self-absorbed response to the terrorist attacks. As Scanlan notes,
the U.S. breaks down in similar ways to Erica in the post-9/11 period: “the nation
committed to progress is determined to ‘look back’” (117). This is not the America of
outwardly-focused vengeance, but of navel-gazing self-obsession. In her unbeing, Erica
absorbs fear and grief instead of propelling those emotions onto the Muslim (or merely
dark-skinned) other, as do the bulk of Americans Changez encounters. Butler notes,
“certain forms of grief [are] nationally recognized and amplified,” while “other losses
become unthinkable and ungrievable.” Butler clarifies this distinction, observing that “the
names, images, and narratives of those the US has killed” are largely unknown to us,
while America’s “own losses are consecrated in public obituaries that constitute so many
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acts of nation-building” (Precarious xiv). In her state of being, Erica is a wealthy,
attractive, white American; thus her death is visible. Yet – ironically because of those
same characteristics – we’re conditioned to read her as a victim, especially in the context
of 9/11. Perceiving her death instead as a clear and deliberate choice subverts the network
of assumptions that sprung up in post-9/11 rhetoric, problematizing the clarity with which
we see American deaths and making visible the deaths of non-Americans.
The potential power of the submissive side of America represented by Erica
becomes especially apparent when considered alongside Hamid’s second U.S. allegory:
Underwood Samson (US), the valuation firm for which Changez works, whose
subscription to national notions of capitalistic dominance is far more destructive than
Erica’s naval-gazing nostalgia. Scanlan argues that “at first Changez is too pleased to
have made it through the firm’s rigorous selection and training process to criticize its
aims,” but that as time goes on he begins to notice that “the firm is a powerful force,
embodying a fundamentalist conviction in American domination of world markets”
(275). Considering the aggression inherent to western military might, it makes sense that,
as Scanlan points out, “Underwood Samson is ‘not nostalgic whatsoever’”; that unlike
Erica, the valuation firm “remains focused on productivity, fundamentals, ‘the task of
shaping the future with little regard for the past’” (276).7 Changez’s corporate career with
Underwood Samson – especially in the context of the retaliatory war in Afghanistan that
develops during his short tenure at the firm – exposes the dangerous, sovereignty-driven
side of American culture, which makes visible the potential of Erica’s unbeing.

7

Hartnell distinguishes between Hamid’s two American allegories, saying that the firm embodies
“American state power…while American nationalism is personified by [Erica]” (337).
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Just as it takes very little to imagine Susan Isaacson Lewin killing herself, it is
easy for readers to see the nostalgic and vulnerable side of America’s national
consciousness manifest in a female character. Erica punishes herself in the decisive act of
suicide in response to a perceived wrongdoing (a terrorist attack), but she does so by
wracking herself with grief for events beyond her control (the death of her lover, as well
as those killed in the towers), by denying herself sustenance (she starves herself in
keeping with cultural norms that govern women and weight), and by refusing to let go of
the single-minded suffering through which she ultimately destroys herself. Because she
self-abnegates in such feminized terms, it would be easy to read Erica as a victim.
Ironically, though, her allegorical status problematizes our ability to do that. Erica
represents a nation that is deeply averse to weakness, even as she herself performs
vulnerability. Her self-abnegation can thus be read as national-abnegation, as well.
Though her suicide has no literal impact over the imperialistic decisions her government
makes on her behalf, her death functions to resist complicity in those decisions, and
might thus be read as in keeping with the kind of deliberate nobility about which
Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year protagonist theorizes. Changez says: “the United States
was supposed to be the place that could not be attacked, where life was safe from
violence” (39). Erica’s power as an allegorical figure is in her ability to demonstrate –
and even to perform – a manner of vulnerability that America at large fervently resists.
John Milbank explores that vulnerability – and America’s resistance to it – asking
why we grieve certain deaths (the people who died in the towers) and not others (the
deaths our retaliation brought about). Milbank argues that, first, we are all invested in the
idea that sovereign nations have the right to take life judiciously, but individuals don’t.
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He writes, “killing on this scale is something only the state is supposed to be capable of”
(306); thus, as we saw with Susan, to kill outside of the state – as I suggest Erica does – is
to attack the sovereign structure of the state itself. Secondly, like Versluys, Milbank
argues that our grief-stricken response served as a justification to act on certain alreadypresent desires.8 He discusses use of the term “liberty” – which, though it’s meant to
convey agency, amounts to national, and not personal, power – claiming that
globalization puts national ideas of liberty in danger, and that as a consequence, nations
require an enemy if citizens are to stay locally (nationally) loyal. Tracing America’s quest
for such an enemy, Milbank asserts that the new American empire is even more
dangerous than past empires in that we’ve found in the “war against terror” a long-term
adversary (309-10).9 This is the dangerous America to which Erica offers contrast, and
against which her unbeing leads Changez to retaliate.
Milbank goes on to expose a political similarity between terrorism and our
reaction to it, saying that the war against terror functions as “an effort to resolve the crisis
of state sovereignty in the face of globalization.” Yet he likewise suggests that because
“both the Western and the different Islamic state forms face the same crisis,” the war on
terror shares similar means and ends to terror itself, as both “terrorism and
counterterrorism…are attempts to resolve this crisis” (314-15). Erica’s obsession with the
self and her paradoxical self-destruction undermine both the shared and the contradictory
elements of terrorism and counterterrorism. She refuses to perpetuate the illusion of an
8

These include “a continuous war against ‘terrorists’ everywhere; a policing of world markets to ensure
that free-market exchange processes are not exploited by the enemies of capitalism [and] an opportunity to
reinscribe state sovereignty” (306).
9

Milbank’s work traces America’s pursuit of an enemy via such historical occasions as western expansion,
World War II, and the second Red Scare.
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enemy – rejecting a foundational tenet of both terrorism and counterterrorism – but in her
willing unbeing, she forces America into the position of vulnerability exhibited by
suicide bombers. She makes no bid for power – nationalistic or otherwise – thus she
refuses to perpetuate the demands for sovereignty exhibited by both the perpetrators of
9/11 and the retaliatory U.S. government.
In the pre-9/11 period, however, Hamid’s allegorical references to the U.S.
remain fairly undifferentiated; far from being subversive, Erica’s state of being is
submissive in state-sanctioned ways. Changez first meets Erica on holiday in Greece,
where he learns that “she hated to be alone….She attracted people to her; she had
presence, an uncommon magnetism….a naturalist would likely have compared her to a
lioness: strong, sleek, and invariably surrounded by her pride” (21-22). The sexuality of
this metaphor is important, as Erica tempts Changez in ways not dissimilar to those
exhibited by Underwood Samson. Before their relationship turns romantic, Changez sees
Erica almost naked (24). The significance of this moment is given context when Changez
notes that “being in Pakistan heightens one’s sensitivity to the sight of a woman’s body”
(26).10 It is precisely the American quality of immodesty that Changez picks up on in this
encounter with Erica: her willingness to submit to his gaze, and the gaze of others on the
beach that day. Before 9/11, then, her submission is in keeping with cultural expectations
regarding women. In her state of being, Erica does not challenge notions of sovereignty.
Indeed, in her being – which is a product of class- and nation-based privilege as it
interacts with a feminine willingness to submit – Erica seduces Changez easily. Though

10

Changez goes on to recount how “one’s rules of propriety make one thirst for the improper…once
sensitized in this manner, one numbs only slowly, if at all; I had by the summer of my trip to Greece spent
four years in America already…but still I remained acutely aware of visible female skin” (26).
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Erica’s “magnetism” proves captivating in Greece, it is not until they return to the United
States that Changez begins to understand how different Erica’s reality is from his, and
how secure she could be from certain vulnerabilities if she wanted to be. Far from finding
it off-putting, however, Changez is transfixed by Erica’s family’s stature. Of a dinner
they share with Erica’s parents at their upper-east-side apartment, Changez notes: “Erica
received me with a smile; her tanned skin seemed to glow with health. I had forgotten
how stunning she was….although she was wearing a short Mighty Mouse T-shirt and did
not appear to have been quite as preoccupied with issues of dress selection as I had been”
(50).11 While Changez has agonized over what to wear, Erica’s privileged position carries
with it a degree of assuredness. Though in observing this, Changez’s attraction deepens –
letting us know that before 9/11 he is drawn to privilege – his awareness of the
significance of Erica’s wealth nevertheless creates tension. As Erica leads Changez about
the city in the month before 9/11, he notes: “I realized I was being ushered into an
insider’s world…to which I would otherwise have had no access” (56). In her
sovereignty-claiming state of being, Erica’s openness to Changez functions as an
invitation to the touted pinnacle of the American dream, which Changez gladly accepts.
Even before the fall of the towers, however, Erica is unwell. In this way, her post9/11 unbeing is in keeping with Versluys’s observation that the grief most Americans felt
over the events of that day was a product of already-present sorrow. For Erica, even that
sorrow is linked to the nation-state. Changez recalls a moment from their early
interactions when he saw in Erica’s eyes “something broken…like a tiny crack in a

11

Similarly, in a scene at his boss’s house in the Hamptons, Changez notes that, “Jim’s house was so
splendid, I thought even [Erica] might be impressed. And that, as you will come to understand, is saying a
great deal” (44).
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diamond that becomes visible only when viewed through a magnifying lens” (52). So too,
Changez repeatedly notices that Erica is “introspective,” prone to “withdraw, to recede a
half-step inside herself.”12 This “broken[ness]” comes from grief. Erica’s boyfriend Chris
– whose death from cancer resulted in Erica’s hospitalization for, among other things, an
eating disorder a year before she met Changez – is central to her “rece[ssion],” and thus
to America’s nostalgic longing for the past. Describing Chris, Erica fondly recalls: “‘his
nurses had been charmed by him: he was a good-looking boy with…an Old World
appeal’” (27). As critics note, Chris embodies a Christopher Columbus-styled America.
This makes Erica’s comparison of Changez’s homesickness to her longing for Chris – she
says “‘I kind of miss home, too…Except my home was a guy with long, skinny fingers’”
(28) – all the more interesting. In implicitly likening Pakistan to America, Erica indicates
that there’s a degree to which she is already positioned to mourn her own nation.
Erica gives us details of this grief, noting on a picnic that when Chris died, she
“‘stopped talking to people. I stopped eating….They told me not to think about it so
much and put me on medication” (59). Changez notes: this “evoked in me an almost
familial tenderness….I offered her my arm and she smiled as she accepted it….We had
never before remained in contact for such a prolonged period…her body was so strong
and yet belonged to someone so wounded” (60). In this passage, we see not only the
degree to which Erica has already begun the process of unbeing, but the fact that the
physical intimacy Changez shares with Erica is tied up in that unbeing via her past with
Chris. It thus becomes evident that – though Changez struggles to indentify with what we
might call a “new world” America – the nation’s present cannot be separated from its

12

He further observes: “she reminded me of a child who could sleep only with the door open and the light
on” (57).
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“old world” history. Even in the days before 9/11, then, Erica (America) is influenced as
much by her (its) past as by the present. Instead of claiming her position of privilege in
the aftermath of America’s history, therefore, Erica self-abnegates in response to it,
yielding to the historical pain of her nation by shifting her gaze inward.
Erica’s self-abnegation stands to manifest only its internal potential – like Susan,
she is positioned to undermine narratives of sovereignty only by refusing to participate in
them – until Changez begins to read her as an American allegory, and until he begins to
see her as worthy of grief. Once he attaches both personal and political meaning to her,
however, Erica’s process of unbeing stands to undermine Changez’s devotion to the
United States. In what is arguably the novel’s most controversial passage, Changez
recounts for the American his initial experience of the 9/11 attacks, which he learned
about via a television in a hotel room in Manila. He recalls: “I turned on the television
and…watch[ed as]…the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Center collapsed. And
then I smiled. Yes, despicable as it may sound, my initial reaction was to be remarkably
pleased” (72). The coldness of his response causes Changez anxiety, as does his inability
to feel sadness until – observing his colleagues’ concern for their family members – he
remembers that Erica is in New York. He notes: “I was almost relieved to be worried for
her and unable to sleep; this allowed me to share in the anxiety of my colleagues and
ignore for a time my initial sense of pleasure” (74). Here we see that Erica is Changez’s
path to grief. Via his subject position as a Pakistani man, he cannot perceive America as a
victim. Yet because of the details of Erica’s being, it is easy to perceive her as such.
Since she is not a victim of the attacks, Changez’s sympathy is warranted only
when Erica becomes a victim of her own willingness to self-destruct. Nevertheless, in
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terms of Butler’s (and Milbank’s) contrast between grievable and ungrievable beings,
Erica fits profoundly in the former category, though she has not been directly injured by
the attacks. Moreover, she is perceived as grievable not just to her insider group of
Americans, but to her Pakistani suitor, as well. In this way – though entirely unharmed –
Erica is positioned as the novel’s primary victim of terrorism. This is in keeping with
Susan Faludi’s findings: that instead of working to understand the complexities of 9/11,
Americans responded with fear, reverting to 1950s gender dynamics wherein men are
seen as heroes and women as victims in need of rescuing (5). This is ironic in that the
majority of that day’s casualties were men, and the attacks were perpetrated within our
commercial and governmental centers. At first glance, this indicates that in The Reluctant
Fundamentalist, Hamid perpetuates perceptions of female victimization. I argue,
however, that the readiness of this reading is a result of liberal feminism’s assumptions
about women and power. When considered in terms of shadow feminism, we begin to see
the way in which Erica’s unbeing breaks down this construct. Though he is ostracized as
he travels back to America after 9/11, Changez’s connection to Erica intensifies his sense
of connection to the U.S.: her grievability functions at first to unite Changez with
America. Only via her unbeing does Erica’s status as a privileged American undermine
Changez’s devotion to the United States. Though in her death she never accomplishes rebeing, then, Erica uses her position as a woman-citizen to undermine assumptions about
both privilege and female victimhood.
In the weeks following 9/11, Erica shifts from demonstrative victim to selfdestructive agent.13 Observing this process, Changez notes that Erica is becoming “utterly

13

In their first post-9/11 encounter, Changez notes that Erica’s “lips were pale, as though she had not slept
– or perhaps had been crying,” and she admits: “‘I keep thinking about Chris…I don’t know why. Most
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detached…Her eyes [are] turned inward” (86). What her unbeing models, then, is that the
biggest danger to America is not terrorists, nor even loss, but its devotion to sovereignty.
Significantly, this is Erica’s state when Changez first touches her intimately. Erica gets a
bruise while practicing tae kwon do, and, looking at the tender spot of the bruise itself,
Changez recalls: “Without thinking, I extended my hand. Then I hesitated. She returned
my gaze watchfully, but her expression did not change, so I touched her, placing my
fingers on her bruise. She rested her hand on the back of her head as I traced the line of
her ribs” (89). Here we see Erica begin to submit to vulnerability, to open up to being
touched where she has already been hurt. That night, Changez tries to parlay the intimacy
of the bruise-touch into a sexual encounter. He recalls that Erica “did not respond; she did
not resist; she merely acceded as I undressed her….she was silent and unmoving….I
found it difficult to enter her” (90). Though Hartnell notes that this scene exposes the
“impenetrable” aspect of the Erica/America allegory, I find that the passivity with which
Erica yields to Changez here complicates the rigidity of a word like “impenetrable.” She
is not “aroused,” but neither does she “resist.” Instead, she is “silent and unmoving,”
permissive, yet not participatory. I read this scene as an early manifestation of Erica’s
post-9/11 unbeing. In allowing Changez access to her body, the symbolic victim of terror
attacks – the wealthy, white, prototype of female vulnerability – begins a process of selfexposure that will end in her death. She does so voluntarily. And doing so is political.
Shortly after this encounter, Changez watches the start of America’s bombing of
Afghanistan (99). In this context, Erica’s submission to Changez reads as profoundly
polar to the aggression of American military might.

nights I have to take something to help me rest. It’s kind of like I’ve been thrown back a year….I feel
haunted’” (80).
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Even before her death, then, we see Erica move towards a compliance not unlike
Susan’s eventual “starfish” state. Unlike the limited degree to which Susan’s unbeing
influences Daniel, however, Erica’s self-abnegation drastically undermines Changez’s
devotion to America. When Changez invites her to his apartment again – and Erica
“acquiesce[s]” – Changez observes that Erica is “vanishing before [his] eyes” (104). And
of their second sexual encounter, Changez notes that Erica doesn’t “move her lips or shut
her eyes.” As with their first time together, then, she submits, but her compliance is not
fed by desire. She receives and accepts his passion, but she does not participate in it. As
she does not “shut her eyes,” Changez “shut[s] them for her,” after which he asks: “‘Are
you missing Chris?’” When she admits that she is, Changez tells her: “‘then
pretend…pretend I am him,’” and, he later recalls: “in darkness and in silence, we did”
(105). His use of the word “we” makes clear that Erica is not the only one pretending. In
terms of Reluctant Fundamentalist’s system of allegories, this is the most concrete
example of Changez’s attempts to assimilate into American culture.
Even before her suicide, then, Erica’s unbeing initiates a process of shifting
identity in Changez. In his role as Chris, Changez understands Erica’s vulnerability anew.
He recalls that “the entrance between her legs was wet and dilated, but was at the same
time oddly rigid,” such that it lent the encounter “a violent undertone.” Changez thinks
Erica is bleeding, but he recalls: “when I reached down to ascertain with my fingers
whether it was her time of the month, I found them unstained.” Finally, Erica “shuddered
towards the end – grievously, almost mortally; her shuddering called forth [Changez’s]
own” (105-06). Though she experiences pleasure in this scene, Changez is aware of the
depth of her surrender. He carries this awareness with him in the months to follow, and it
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impacts his relationship with the U.S. Changez realizes that Erica is “disappearing into a
powerful nostalgia, one from which only she could choose whether or not to return”
(113). His allowance that Erica is empowered to “choose,” even in this compromised
state, is evidence of his newfound understanding of the agency driving her vulnerability.
In one of the novel’s most overtly didactic passages – occurring in the aftermath of
Erica’s deterioration – Changez “wonder[s] how it was that America was able to wreak
such havoc in the world – orchestrating an entire war in Afghanistan, say, and
legitimizing through its actions the invasion of weaker states by more powerful
ones…with so few apparent consequences at home” (131). Similarly, he later tells the
American: “as a society, you were unwilling to reflect upon the shared pain that united
you with those who attacked you” (168). I argue that Erica functions as an embodiment
of America that is willing to suffer such “consequences,” and that her willingness makes
the resistant side of America all the more visible to an increasingly dismayed Changez.
Weeks after Changez visits Erica in a mental institution – which is the last time he
sees her – he learns that she has disappeared. A nurse tells him that though they never
found her body, “‘her clothes had been found on a rocky bluff overlooking the Hudson,
neatly folded in a pile’”; she is presumed to be dead. Changez leaves America for good
shortly after Erica’s self-abnegation. In his outsider status, Changez seems to understand
the complexity of Erica’s surrender. He attempts to honor it as he departs the United
States by leaving his “jacket on the curb as a sort of offering, [a] last gesture before
returning to Pakistan, a wish of warmth for Erica – not in the way one leaves flowers for
the dead, but rather as one twirls rupees above the living.” Though Changez has been
affected by Erica’s surrender, however, America at large is still deeply invested in
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dominance and sovereignty, which is profoundly visible in this scene. Changez recalls
that after leaving the jacket as a gesture, he “saw that [he] had caused a security alert, and
[he] shook [his] head in exasperation” (168). Like Erica’s self-sacrifice, Changez’s
gesture is misread. Both of these misreadings have potentially dangerous consequences
for America. Reading the actions of Changez as possibly terroristic leads to the
possibility that Changez becomes – by the novel’s end – a “reluctant fundamentalist.”
And if we dismiss Erica’s suicide as a product of mental illness, the generative
possibilities of her sacrifice are rendered invisible. Like Susan’s, Erica’s death functions
as a refusal: an unwillingness to share complicity in the actions of her nation-state. And
like Susan’s, Erica’s unbeing functions as an overt rejection of U.S. sovereignty. Unlike
Susan’s, however, Erica’s unbeing has significant external ramifications: she undermines
Changez’s loyalty to America such that her death triggers his abandonment of the U.S.,
and possibly his active resistance to it. As such, Erica provides a model for submissive
resistance that destabilizes demands for sovereignty in post-9/11 wartime America.

Sihem
Finally, Sihem Jaafari – of Yasmina Khadra’s The Attack – takes her own life in
the most overtly political move of the women I discuss here. And unlike Susan and Erica,
she takes the lives of others in the process. Sihem is a Palestinian woman living in Israel
with her surgeon-husband, Amin, another Palestinian assimilated to Israel. In one of the
novel’s opening scenes, Sihem kills herself – along with a café full of people many of
whom are children – in a suicide bombing near the hospital in which her husband works.
Until her death, Amin has no knowledge of his wife’s fundamentalist beliefs; thus the
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novel follows his attempts to grasp the baffling action she takes. The violence Sihem
perpetrates is especially complex because of her liminality as a Palestinian living in
Israel, her economic privilege as a surgeon’s wife, and her status as a non-practicing
Muslim. Though clearly politically motivated, the nature of Sihem’s politics is difficult to
discern. Amin joins readers in struggling with the same question an investigator poses:
how a beautiful, intelligent, modern woman, esteemed by the people around her,
thoroughly assimilated, pampered by her husband, and worshiped by her friends –
the majority of whom are Jews – how such a woman could get up one day and
load herself with explosives and go to a pubic place and do something that calls
into question all the trust the state of Israel has placed in the Arabs it has
welcomed as citizens. (48)
This question works as a puzzle throughout the novel, its answer being the nearly
untranslatable message Sihem leaves behind. Perhaps her unbeing is most like Bhaduri’s,
then: easy to misconstrue, but, if heard, full of resonant potential.
Though it’s complex to read redemptive value in an action that amounts to the
murder of a café full of people, I argue that the tragedy of Sihem’s victim’s deaths is
made only more deeply tragic if Sihem’s unbeing is never translated: if no attempt is
made to understand the potentially subversive value of her destruction. In Frames of War,
Butler contends that via the “ongoing contestation over power…the question of doing or
not doing violence emerges.” But she cautions that “it is not a position of the privileged
alone to decide whether violence is the best course; it is, paradoxically, even painfully,
also the obligation of the dispossessed to decide whether to strike back and, if so, in what
form” (177-78). Via such a lens, Sihem’s action can be translated as a politically
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informed – and maybe even fully rational – choice. Because the novel ostensibly opens
with Sihem’s death, however, the measure of her self-abnegation comes less via the
internal and more via the external, or the degree to which her unbeing chips away at the
privilege Amin has worked to build. In its effects on Amin, Sihem’s unbeing is far from
politically impotent: as we saw with Erica and Changez, Sihem’s action drastically
undermines her husband’s loyalty to Israel, returning him to a family he all but
abandoned and wartime realities he long ignored. Though she never achieves re-being,
then, Sihem’s unbeing functions subversively even after her death.
The Attack traces how much Amin changes in the weeks following his wife’s
death, and preceding his own. That evolution consists largely of the stripping of
assumptions about Sihem (locally), about the role of female-citizens in war-torn cultures
(globally), and, ultimately, about the role Amin himself should play in the conflict
between his home of birth and his home of choice. Mahmood critiques “the assumption
that there is something intrinsic to women that should predispose them to oppose the
practices, values, and injunctions that the Islamist movement embodies” (2). Such
assumptions drive the narrative of The Attack, as Amin struggles to understand why the
“freedom” and “autonomy” he provided his wife didn’t sustain her. This is especially
hard for Amin to understand because there is little he won’t do to achieve success in
western terms.14 Though we never hear from Sihem directly, the answer to why she
makes the choices she does comes via Amin’s efforts to understand her unbeing. She
does not “oppose the practices” of Islam; indeed, she submits to Islam’s most radically
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He notes, “I’ve clung to my ambitions like a jockey to his horse,” and admits that in his pursuit of
success in Western terms, he “renounced [his] tribe, agreed to leave [his] mother’s side, [and] made
concession after concession in order to dedicate [himself] to [his] career alone” (165-66).
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violent subculture, using her body not to secure freedom and autonomy, but to undermine
Amin’s notions of freedom and autonomy in the face of decades of holy war.
Through Amin’s search for answers, we learn that Sihem understands her own
gendered role as a Palestinian woman to be one of surrender, and that she adheres to that
role (the being that preceded the privileged being she gained via Amin’s success in Israel)
above the “desire for freedom” she is expected – according to Amin, demands for
national sovereignty, and the tenets of liberal feminism – to value most. In “Third World
Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” Fredric Jameson provides a framework
for understanding the difference between Amin’s perceptions and Sihem’s, and therefore
for tracing the unlearning that Sihem’s self-abnegation initiates in her husband. Jameson
asserts that literature produced by capitalist societies reflects a barrier between the public
and the private, while “third world texts…necessarily project a political dimension in the
form of national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory
of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and society” (69). Though
Amin embraces the boundaries he encounters in Israel (the barriers between the public
and the private), Sihem finds that she cannot do so, and – in the ultimate blurring of those
boundaries – she offers her life to her state of origin. What’s especially interesting about
Sihem’s choice is that – as we saw with both Susan and Erica – such willingness is itself
feminized. As Amin searches for answers, he is told: “Sihem was a woman, not just your
woman. She died for others” (226). Thus the act of sacrifice is offered up as a thing
women do. Though Khadra could have given readers a male suicide bomber, these
gendered notions of sacrifice become strikingly apparent via a character like Sihem

62

Jaafari who intelligently, consciously, and deliberately offers her life (and in so doing
demands the lives of others) to a cause she deems more worthy than individual existence.
The insider/outsider binary I discuss throughout this chapter manifests here in the
oppositionality of Israel and Palestine, the dichotomy of silent femininity and dominant
masculinity, and the subversive potential of feminine submission to undermine masculine
authority. As The Attack is set largely in Israel, our first introduction to Palestine comes
via the racism Amin experiences in the hours after Sihem’s bombing. Our insight into
Palestine is thus complex: it comes in the form of Israeli prejudice as it manifests in the
life of a Palestinian-born, naturalized Israeli surgeon. Amin notes: “it was hard for a son
of Bedouins to join the brotherhood of the highly educated elite without provoking a sort
of reflexive disgust” (7).15 Thus we come to understand the lengths to which Amin has
gone to assimilate into Israeli culture. We don’t see Palestine first-hand until Amin
travels there in search of answers about Sihem’s choice. His first trip largely brings him
frustration with his homeland, but on his second trip – which ends in his death – Amin
discovers for himself a submissive willingness not unlike his wife’s. Arguably, only
Sihem’s unbeing could have initiated this return for Amin – this willing abandonment of
the prosperity he found in Israel – thus Sihem’s unbeing leads Amin to relinquish the
values that Sihem’s radical cause struggles to oppose.
Having just concluded a surgery, Amin is in his hospital near the attack site at the
time of Sihem’s detonation; he feels its reverberations. He spends the better part of the
day operating on her victims, yet he still does not know Sihem is dead, and he certainly
15

When news of his wife’s attack gets out, their home is vandalized, and covered in newspapers that read,
“THE FILTHY BEAST IS AMONG US” (52). This is a good example of both dehumanizing rhetoric and
the public invocation of fear, which manipulates people into behaving in particular ways. Indeed, moments
later, Amin “find[s] some food in the fridge and pounce[s] on it like a famished beast” (54). Thus he is
reduced to animal behavior based on, or in accordance with, prejudicial expectations.
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does not suspect that she perpetrated the attack. He is sleeping at home – under the
assumption that his wife is at her grandmother’s house – when he receives a call from a
friend: a police investigator, Navid, who asks him to come to the hospital. When he
arrives, Navid informs Amin that he is needed to identify Sihem’s body, which bears the
marks of her violent unbeing. We read: “only Sihem’s head, strangely spared by the
devastation that ravaged the rest of her body, emerges from the mass, the eyes closed, the
mouth open a little, the features calm, as though liberated from their suffering” (29). In
time, Amin comes to understand how this look of “liberation” functions symbolically for
Sihem, signaling that she finds in her death a sense of peace that eluded her in her
privileged life with Amin. At this point, however, it reads as cruelly ironic.
After he identifies her body, Amin is told that Sihem is suspected of perpetrating
the attack, and he observes: “I can clearly make out the captain’s words, but I can’t
manage to attach any sense to them. Something seizes up in my mind….I no longer
recognize the world I live in” (33). In her violent unbeing, Sihem has initiated what
Butler calls “the disorientation of grief” (Precarious 30), undermining assumptions about
security and assimilation that Amin has been cultivating for decades. Amin notes: “in a
fraction of a second, all my reference points have vanished. I no longer know where I am,
don’t even recognize the walls of the building where I’ve spent my whole professional
career” (28). When Amin gets a (pre-written) letter from Sihem in which she confesses to
the attack, we read that his “last reference points have hit the fucking road” (70).16 This is
not a world that Amin is equipped to make sense of. Because of the power of Sihem’s
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Sihem’s note says simply: “what use is happiness when it’s not shared, Amin, my love? My joys faded
away every time yours didn’t follow. You wanted children. I wanted to deserve them. No child is
completely safe if it has no country. Don’t hate me. Sihem” (70).
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unbeing, Amin’s grief functions as a process of creating a system of knowledge within
which this tragedy is possible, and perhaps even within which it ceases to be tragic.
The external measure of Sihem’s success takes time to manifest, however, and at
first we see Amin’s resistance to the lessons his wife’s actions have to offer in his
desperation not to read Sihem as agented. His quest to understand her choice first
functions as a need to discover who’s to blame. He tells his friend Kim, “‘they killed my
wife,’” to which Kim responds, “‘Sihem killed herself…She knew what she was doing;
she’s chosen her destiny. It’s not the same thing’” (143). Interestingly, it is Amin’s only
female friend who is capable of offering these insights. Because voluntary subordination
is foreign to him, Amin needs to believe that Sihem was controlled by an outside force,
that she was as much a victim as the people she killed. Kim, however, doesn’t try to
redeem Sihem. Instead, she merely affirms Sihem’s ability to have freely “chosen.” We
likewise see Amin’s need for someone to blame in his insistence that he “can’t mourn”
his wife until he “look[s] into the eyes of the son of a bitch who stole her mind.” He
perceives an imagined manipulator as a competitor who won the attention of his wife,
saying: “‘I want to understand what he’s got that I don’t,’” and thinking of Sihem as “‘the
worst slut in the world’” (144). Finally, Amin struggles to comprehend “‘why the woman
[he] was crazy about was more receptive to other men’s sermons than she was to [his]
poems’” (108). In his early attempts to understand it, then, Amin poses Sihem’s unbeing
as infidelity, unwitting sexual submission being a part of feminine being: a vulnerability
in which women are expected to engage.
Even when he begins to recognize Sihem’s agency, Amin continues to attribute
her actions to the model of generations of terroristic violence. Thus he reads her unbeing
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– and the external violence it entails – merely as in keeping with those who would
“reduce the exercise of faith to an absurd and frightening question of power
relationships” (99), blind faith and a desire for power being the motives typically
afforded terrorists. In contrast, Amin is invested in the classic anti-terrorist rhetoric: that
nothing matters above life. His ethic as a surgeon is founded on resisting death; he says:
“the only battle I believe in, the only one that really deserves bleeding for, is the battle
the surgeon fights, which consists in re-creating life in the place where death has chosen
to conduct its maneuvers” (234). He likewise recalls a saying his father had, that
“‘anyone who tells you that a greater symphony exists than the breath in your body is
lying. He wants to undermine your most beautiful possession: the chance to profit from
every moment of your life...There's nothing, absolutely nothing, more important than
your life’" (99-100). Though this ideology is friendlier than Sihem’s, it relies on
assumptions that are central mandates of sovereignty. It neglects the lived reality of many
for whom life offers little to “profit from,” and insists only on the protection of the self
with no mention at all of the potentially dangerous impact of protecting the self over the
other. Yet Amin subscribes to these assumptions. He claims: “I have never felt implicated
in any way at all in this bloody conflict, which is in reality just a slugfest at close quarters
between the punching bags and the scapegoats of history” (165-66). Considered in these
terms, Sihem’s death is a meaningless waste: she is yet another scapegoat.
In Amin’s journey to understand Sihem, he begins to recall her familiarity with
vulnerability, which no doubt helped prepare her for such a drastic choice. For example,
Amin remembers that “when [Sihem] was eighteen, her mother died of cancer, and her
father was killed in a road accident a few years later.” He reflects: “it took forever before
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she finally agreed to accept me as her husband” because she feared that “fate…would
return and deal her another blow” (22). Likewise, he recalls that Sihem “grew up among
the oppressed, as an orphan and an Arab in a world that pardons neither,” and that “she
must necessarily have had to bow very low” (228). She had, thus, a great deal of practice
learning to live with precarity. Moreover, her response to that practice – her willingness
to embrace it – is portrayed as distinctly feminine. As Amin searches for answers to his
wife’s choice, he is told: “‘the fact of being a woman doesn’t disqualify or exempt a
resistance fighter. Men invented war; women invented resistance. Sihem was the
daughter of a people noted for resistance….She wanted to deserve to live…not just to
enjoy her good fortune’” (226-28). Again the act of sacrifice is offered up as a thing
women do. The question of whether or not one deserves free life is not central to notions
of sovereignty; it is a foregone conclusion. Yet according to the logic to which Sihem
subscribed, life, self, and joy are not rights, but privileges. This is the foundation of
Sihem’s perspective. When she discovers Amin’s nephew Adel’s allegiance to the cause,
the walls of the (capitalist) fortress that Amin has built for her come down, and she
abandons the Western belief that is so important to Amin: that there are barriers between
the private and the public. Without a belief in an inherent right to life, Sihem is free to
use her body to whatever ends she sees fit.
Because this use of freedom is such a deviation from the rationality of
Enlightenment thinking – and also from the sovereign and biopolitical nation-state – it’s
the hardest part of Sihem’s death for Amin to understand. Yet he comes to realize that
Sihem chose destruction over self-preservation when he learns that the leaders of her
fundamentalist group neither solicited nor, at first, endorsed her decision to become a
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suicide bomber. When questioned, Adel – who served as Sihem’s conduit to the cause –
tells him, “it’s not my fault. It’s not anybody’s fault. I didn’t want her to blow herself up,
but she was determined.” In terms of Sihem’s reasoning, Adel recalls: “she said she was a
full-blooded Palestinian, and she didn’t see why she should let others do what she ought
to do herself,” adding that they “told her she was much more useful to us alive than
dead….She was the keystone of our Tel Aviv section’” (221). Here we see the willfulness
of Sihem’s unbeing. No ill-fated victim, Sihem chose to kill herself and others.
Once he accepts the responsibility Sihem bears, Amin begins to realize that he is
implicated in her death and, as such, in the entire catastrophic conflict. In this way,
Sihem’s unbeing leads to Amin’s re-being: he comes to know himself anew through the
trauma of learning to understand her. This part of the process is initiated when one of
Sihem’s fellow fundamentalists picks up on Amin’s assumption that her death was the
cause’s fault, and he turns that assumption around, implying that Amin was the greater
manipulator. He asks tauntingly: “‘she was so happy in her gilded cage, wasn’t she? She
ate well, slept well, enjoyed herself. She lacked nothing.’” He continues to voice the
assumptions Amin has been making, suggesting facetiously that all of this was true until
“‘a bunch of mental cases turn her away from her happiness and send her to – how did
you put it? – to ‘blow herself away.’’” Having given voice to Amin’s assumptions, he
concludes bitingly: “the good doctor lives next door to a war, but he doesn’t want to hear
a word about it. And he thinks that his wife shouldn’t worry about it, either’” (212).
Amin is accused of not merely failing his wife, then, but of failing his people: of being
willfully ignorant with regards to the suffering surrounding him, and of demanding that
Sihem be ignorant too. But Sihem, Amin is told, was unwilling to remain blind to
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suffering. She rejected “‘the happiness [Amin] offered her’” because it “‘smelled of
decay. It repulsed her….She couldn’t work on her suntan while her people were bent
under the Zionist yoke’” (213). Though Sihem only makes such assertions directly in her
brief note, her unbeing communicates her unwillingness to live as Amin does. As Amin
begins to understand that unwillingness, it invades his own righteous sense of distance
from the chaos of holy war. He begins to question all that, in her death, Sihem rejected.
Amin’s acceptance of his complicity grows until what began with denial – a rigid
resistance to the precarity of Sihem’s position, and of his own – becomes an
abandonment of sovereignty and an effacement that mirrors his wife’s. We see this in the
language Khadra uses to describe Amin’s evolving state of mind. For example, when he’s
first questioned about Sihem’s unbeing, Amin observes that his interrogator’s
“voice….surges up like a dark wave, submerging [his] thoughts and shattering [his]
incredulity before it suddenly withdraws, taking with it entire sections of [his] being”
(34). The loss of self he experiences here is not of his making; he is involuntarily stripped
of voice. It makes sense, then, that at this stage he interprets Sihem’s loss of self as out of
her control as well. Amin maintains this resistance to vulnerability in the days following
the attack, recalling that when Kim “offers [him] her shoulder” he refuses, “prefer[ring]
to lean on the wall” (59). Likewise, he confesses to “pray[ing] that [Kim] won’t say
anything…that she won’t take [his] hand in a gesture of compassion; one consideration
too many, and [he] may not survive” (61). His discomfort with vulnerability is evident in
nearly all of his actions during this period.
When he receives the letter from Sihem in the post, however, we see Amin begin
to submit to the vulnerability she has thrust upon him. As he “take[s] a deep breath [to]
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rip open the envelope” he remarks: “I could slit my wrists and feel less threatened, less
endangered, than I do now” (69). As he moves beyond unyielding denial, his first clear
emotion is anger, and ironically, this makes Amin almost bomb-like himself. He feels
that he has “to be offensive” his “rage…like a monster of the abyss, crouched in the
darkness of its lair, waiting for the right moment to rise to the surface and terrify its
world.” He recognizes how transparent his anger is, acknowledging: Kim “knows I’m
trying to externalize the horror wallowing around in my guts; she sees that my
aggressiveness is only a symptom of the extreme violence laboriously welling up in me,
waiting to gather together the propelling charges of its eruption” (88). In this way, the
first lesson Amin learns from Sihem is a willingness to harm others, outward violence
manifesting more quickly than willing vulnerability. During this period of anger, Amin
concludes: “Sihem must have been carrying that hatred inside her forever, long before
she met me” (228). When he felt powerless, he assumed Sihem was powerless. Now that
he’s filled with rage, hatred is the emotion he assumes drove her actions. As he translates
her exclusively via the lens of his own behavior – and he isn’t ready to accept his own
vulnerability – Amin still cannot fathom Sihem’s willing precarity.
Once he goes to Palestine looking for answers, however, the boundaries he
subscribes to erode further. Adel describes the difference between Sihem’s perceptions
and Amin’s, saying: “‘it was as if you were firing up a barbecue in a burned-out yard.
You saw only the barbecue; she saw the rest, the desolation all around, spoiling all
delight.’” Adel’s vindication of Sihem functions as an indictment of Amin. And this
rhetoric – as irresponsibly as it is often used in situations of terror – works to bring about
a process of unlearning that undermines the privilege Amin felt securely worthy of before
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Sihem’s death. If Amin is blind to “‘the desolation all around’” before Sihem’s unbeing,
he no longer is in its aftermath. And for better or worse, what he now sees makes it
impossible to live in ignorant privilege. The world Amin lives in now – Sheikh Marwan
would argue – is the world that always was, a place “‘where people tear one another to
pieces every day that God sends,’” where “‘evening[s are spent] gathering [the] dead’”
and “‘mornings burying them.’” From this recognition forward, Amin exhibits no
righteousness as to his time as Sihem’s husband or his subscription to the values of Israel.
Amin ultimately submits to the lessons of vulnerability his wife’s radical unbeing
offers. Yet even before his eventual submission, Amin recalls: “you think you know.
Then you lower your guard and act as though everything’s just great….Life is smiling on
you….You love and are loved. You can afford your dreams.” But then, “without warning,
the sky falls in on your head. And once you’re flat on your back, you realize that your
life…hangs and has always hung by a thread as flimsy and imperceptible as the threads in
a spider’s web” (70-71). Though he does not yet embrace this fragility, his recognition of
it demonstrates that Sihem has initiated a process of unlearning in him. That process is
brought to completion by surviving members of Sihem’s cause, who isolate and mentally
torture Amin when he voluntarily presents himself to them. Having kept him solitarily
confined for days – threatening his life repeatedly – his tormenter tells him: “‘I’m told
that you’re a decent man and an eminent humanist, and that you’ve got no reason to wish
people ill. So it was difficult for me to make you understand my point of view without
stripping you of your social rank and dragging you through the mud’” (217-18). And
indeed, this process is effective; we read: “a few hours later, still handcuffed, I’m gagged
and blindfolded and thrown into the trunk of a car. I believe this is the end.” What is
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noteworthy in this scene is Amin’s “docility”: “the way I submitted to them. A lamb
would have defended himself better” (213). He does not fight. He is most struck not by a
desire for dominance, but by “the sadness that takes hold of [him] when the lid of the
trunk comes down,” which provokes in him the thought that he’s “not anything anymore”
(214). Though far more a product of force than Sihem’s unbeing, Amin’s pursuit of
understanding is unflinching, which demonstrates his openness to the destruction it may
bring. When Amin finally embraces precarity, he sees Sihem anew, and from that vantage
point he wonders: “how could I have lived her when I never stopped dreaming her?”
(184). Here Amin’s Enlightenment-inspired reasoning is turned on its head: his
rationality is presented as ungrounded, while her willing submission connotes reason.
As his re-being unfolds, Amin recalls his devotion to Sihem, and to making a
child with her as a way of ensuring their continuation. He remembers saying: “‘I want
you to give me a daughter….I want her to be healthy and beautiful….I’d like her to have
your features and your dimples, so that when she smiles, she’ll be the spitting image of
you’” (174). Her death functions as a refusal to do this: a refusal to offer him a daughter
who will inherit the privilege that is so foreign and uncomfortable to Sihem, and so
welcome to Amin. In forcing Amin to give up on this dream, Sihem compels him out of
that privilege too, such that Amin ultimately contends: “‘there are only two extreme
moments in human madness: the instant when you become aware of your own impotence
and the instant when you become aware of the vulnerability of others’” (220). Sihem’s
unbeing makes Amin aware of both precarities.
In the chaos of an Israeli aerial bombing that injures and ultimately kills him,
Amin begins to hallucinate, and what he sees is revelatory in terms of Sihem’s influence
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over him. Shifting from the masculinist demands for sovereignty exhibited by Israel –
and necessary to his own role as a surgeon whose duty is to save lives – to a domestic or
even feminized depiction of Palestine, Amin notes: “I look for my mother amid the
chaos…and discover only orchards, stretching as far as I can see…a land of orange trees,
where every day was summer” (5). Amin’s death – an unbeing brought about by his
willing re-being – is not deliberate like Sihem’s, but it is a product of his acceptance of
vulnerability, which is reflected in the degree to which he submits to his dying moments.
Though the violence of Sihem’s unbeing is devastating and deeply disturbing, it is not
without the consequence of unlearning she sets out to initiate. Like Bhaduri’s suicide, it
could easily go untranslated, or could be read merely as the product and cause of harm. In
finding his way towards precariousness and away from the demands for sovereignty that
drive the conflict between Israel and Palestine, however, Amin makes use of Sihem’s
choice. Even before his death, Amin has willingly sacrificed his status, thereby refusing
complicity in kinder terms than did his wife, and yet just as completely. Thus Sihem joins
Susan and Erica in violating and disrupting the illusion of sovereignty that perpetuates
the relentless cycle of nationalistic, retaliatory violence.
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CHAPTER II: SEXUAL REPARATIONS
“To be cut, to be bared, to be violated publicly is a particular kind of resistant
performance….[Such willing precarity] invite[s] us to unthink sex as that alluring narrative of
connection and liberation and think it anew as the site of failure and unbecoming conduct.”
~ J. Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure

In J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace, Professor David Lurie visits his daughter, Lucy, in
rural, postapartheid South Africa. During his visit, three black South Africans invade
Lucy’s farm, kill all of the dogs she shelters, and rape her. When Lucy refuses to report
the rapes, David assumes it is because she is too ashamed, a fact she seems, disturbingly,
to embrace. Though Lucy acknowledges the likelihood that the men will return to rape
her again, she refuses to leave, suggesting that rape may be the price to pay for staying on
in a land where whites benefited for so long from inequity. By choosing to stay, Lucy
exposes the degree to which those who benefit from hegemony refuse to face
consequences for having done so. She does not run from such consequences. Her
acceptance is a product of her gender, which is evidenced by David’s failure to
understand her choice. It is not merely as a white South African that Lucy comprehends
that a price must be paid, but as a woman. And it is as a woman that she chooses to pay
that price bodily. David’s resistance to Lucy’s submission is in line with the tenets of
liberal feminism. Using Disgrace alongside two other novels, this chapter envisions an
alternate reading of such willing unbeing: one that acknowledges the transgressive power
of sexual submission in the face of sovereignty-inspired assertions of dominance.
That women are conditioned to sexually submit – not in direct effort to meet their
own needs, but in adherence to political or economic structures – is undeniable. That they
might gain power from doing so, however, is a complicated and controversial suggestion.
Guided by the logic of western liberalism, we are encouraged to question power that
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comes via sacrifice of one’s own body, or to assume that the surrender of one’s body
functions inherently as a surrender of power. I hope to disrupt such assumptions. Like the
suicides discussed in the previous chapter, these characters – Lucy Lurie of J.M.
Coetzee’s Disgrace, Phyllis Lewin of E.L. Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel, and Daisy
Perowne of Ian McEwan’s Saturday – use their bodies to satisfy divergent aims. Indeed,
the ends to which these women offer themselves vary considerably, ranging from a direct
effort to save the lives of family members to a symbolic gesture of subjugation in the
wake of profound racial injustice. Nevertheless, each of the novels I discuss is set within
the context of an especially fraught sovereign situation: the end of South African
apartheid, the second “Red Scare,” the Vietnam protests, and the start of the second Iraq
War. And each of these characters performs a provocative form of unbeing – and to
varying degrees, re-being – underscoring the degree to which existence as a womancitizen often manifests as a willingness to sexually self-sacrifice, and that, moreover,
makes clear that such a willingness undermines the mechanisms of power that demand
our allegiance to the tenets of sovereignty. According to Halberstam, “in order to inhabit
the bleak territory of failure we sometimes have to write and acknowledge dark histories,
histories within which the subject collaborates with rather than always opposes
oppressive regimes and dominant ideology” (23). Here, then, are the “dark histories” of
these characters, and of their powerful collaborations with oppression.

Lucy
I trace the process of Lucy’s self-abnegation from her pre-attack state of being –
during which she exists as a privileged white South African woman who was raised under
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apartheid rule and who now lives in the lingering racism of apartheid’s aftermath – to her
self-imposed unbeing – which is instigated not directly by the rapes she endures, but by
her refusal to resist the vulnerability those rapes bring about. From there, I explore
Lucy’s attainment of re-being, which manifests in her decision to permanently sacrifice
the privilege granted her at birth by her nation-state: to stay on at her farm as a relative
subordinate to Petrus, and to willingly carry to term and raise one of her rapists’ babies.
In abandoning her privileged being and constructing in its place a subordinated identity,
Lucy resists the enforced dominance that comes with all claims to sovereignty. In ceding
her power to resist rape, Lucy cedes her role as a citizen altogether; thus she attains rebeing more fully than the other characters I discuss in this chapter. Using shadow
feminism, I trace Lucy’s movement through these phases of submission as she ceases to
be the white, female South African the privileged circumstances of her birth made her
and becomes instead a tool for undermining state-sanctioned oppression.
Lucy’s choices destabilize the illusion of an equitable postapartheid sovereignty,
which like apartheid sovereignty, still dictates who has power and for what purpose it
should be used. The power of Lucy’s self-abnegation can be found primarily in its effect
on the self: in her unbeing and in her ultimate re-being. Lucy’s refusal of comfort,
privilege, and personal sovereignty is meaningful in a culture where those qualities are
hungered for, discriminately given, and denied. Lucy rejects the being to which she was
born, but in so doing, she demonstrates Halberstam’s “queer art of failure”: she “quietly
loses,” and in her loss she “imagines other goals for life, for love, for art, and for being”
(88). Moreover, she becomes a model for those goals. As I argue in the previous chapter,
the destruction of the self can be a powerful external tool, as it stands to undermine
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privileged individuals who witness acts of unbeing. We see this at work in Lucy’s
influence over David, who slowly yields to her way of thinking, taking up the mantle of
vulnerability himself by the novel’s end. According to the markers by which I measure
the impact of self-abnegation – the degree to which it undermines and potentially rebuilds
the self, the privileged, and the state – Lucy’s response to rape is profound. In addition to
tracing the effect of self-abnegation over Lucy, then, I trace it over David, and over
postapartheid South Africa at large. Her influence over the state is more abstract than her
influence over David, but it is apparent when one considers Lucy’s sacrifice of personal
sovereignty as a model for sacrifice of state sovereignty in the postapartheid era. Lucy
uses self-abnegation to disrupt the narrative of sovereignty promoted by apartheid and
postapartheid South Africa alike, and in so doing, she models a potentially sanative form
of re-being for a culture that has been deeply injured by boundaries and resistance.
Despite Disgrace’s acclaim – it earned Coetzee a second Booker Prize – critics in
and outside of South Africa have largely found its treatment of postapartheid racial
politics appalling. Nadine Gordimer, for example, contends that in Disgrace, “there is not
one black person who is a real human being” (qtd. in Donadio 1).17 Indeed, the novel’s
few black or interracial characters – David’s conquest Melanie, Lucy’s farming partner
Petrus, and the three black African attackers – are notably less well developed than its
white players. Athol Fugard critiques Disgrace on the grounds of its rape-as-justice
narrative. He retorts: “we've got to accept the rape of a white woman as a gesture to all
17

As Mardorossian observes, Gordimer’s resistance to Disgrace is ironic in that “in 2006, the eighty-twoyear-old Nadine Gordimer was attacked in her Johannesburg home by four young black men but resisted
relating the incident in terms of her own trauma.” Indeed, in a position similar to Lucy’s, Gordimer
“focused on her attackers’ social status, describing them as ‘products of a society grappling with the legacy
of South Africa’s past.’” She seemed to feel that “any individualized attention to the trauma experienced by
the victim would serve as fodder for generalizing racist assumptions” (75).
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the evil we did in the past. That's a load of bloody bullshit. That white women are going
to accept being raped as penance for what was done in the past? Jesus! It's an expression
of a very morbid phenomenon” (qtd. in Attridge 164n). Likewise, Lucy Valerie Graham
suggests that though “female silence in Coetzee’s previous novels [can] be linked to ‘the
power to withhold,’ Lucy’s refusal to speak about her experience certainly does not
empower her” (265). Carine M. Mardorossian summarizes these critiques, suggesting that
at first glance, the novel is guilty of “colluding with and perpetuating the worst
nightmares and clichés about South Africa as a violent society.” And Michael Marais
argues that “this ‘reading’ is now so commonplace that [the]…term ‘Lucy syndrome’ [is]
used to signify the notion that white South Africans should be prepared to abase
themselves in atoning for their collective responsibility for apartheid” (32). Both Marais
and Mardorossian complicate these assumptions, however, with Mardorossian suggesting
that “Disgrace focuses not on the attack so much as on the response to it” and that it
“does not reproduce so much as expose the workings of racist ideologies and the
inextricable link to gender” (73, emphasis mine). This exposure comes – for
Mardorossian – via Coetzee’s subtle critique of his protagonist, whose obvious racism
and sexism blind him to the complexities of both his own affairs and those of his
daughter. As Laura Wright suggests, David’s “lack of understanding…is the necessary
product of a postcolonial and post-apartheid narrative about shifting and renegotiated
power in an historical moment fraught with various racially and sexually determined
displacements” (91). We’re not meant – I join Marais, Mardorossian, and Wright in
asserting – to take David Lurie as an embodiment of a healthy, postapartheid attitude.
Moreover, David’s limitations mirror the reader’s, as like David, we resist Lucy’s
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submission. In doing so, however, I argue that we condemn her – even more so than do
her attackers – to the position of victim, not allowing space for the complexities that
dictate and even empower her actions.
Lucy attempts to undermine David’s resistance to submission even before the
attacks. When David first arrives at Lucy’s farm having resigned from the professoriate
in the wake of a sex scandal, Lucy asks, “‘so you stood your ground and they stood
theirs. Is that how it was?....You shouldn’t be so unbending, David. It isn’t heroic to be
unbending’” (66). This dynamic – Lucy as sacrificial; David as “unbending” – is evident
throughout the early part of their time together. We see it manifest overtly in terms of the
plight of animals in South Africa, of which Lucy says, “‘on the list of the nation’s
priorities, animals come nowhere’” (73-74). To this, David replies, “‘we are of a different
order of creation from the animals….So if we are going to be kind, let it be out of simple
generosity, not because we feel guilty or fear retribution’” (74). This separate-but-equal
logic – which fuels the common trope of colonial resistance to guilt – reveals David’s
devotion to notions of personal sovereignty. As I demonstrate above, critics often respond
to Disgrace in ways that replicate such oppositional thinking. Marais, however, contends
that Disgrace “requires the reader to think beyond conventional antinomies which, as it
shows, threaten still to determine our interactions and thus our history.” He suggests that
we might instead “imagine possibilities of being and belonging with difference that are
excluded by these dualisms.” And he argues: “to read the novel merely as…an
articulation of a politics of white abasement is…to reduce it to a term in precisely those
dualisms that it questions and seeks to destabilize. Such readings…evince a failure of
historical imagination” (38). Lucy’s subordination forges a way out of the “dualisms”
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offered by national sovereignty and liberal feminism alike, opening up the possibility of
existence external to institutions of inequity that are too deeply entrenched to be
undermined by legislated shifts like the end of apartheid.
Lucy’s movement from being to unbeing is already at work when the attack
occurs, positioning her to choose self-abnegation. David, however, is resistant to such
vulnerability, though he does immediately understand the situation’s relevance as
allegory. As the three attackers lock David in the bathroom – leaving him powerless to
help his daughter – David thinks, “so it has come, the day of testing. Without warning…it
is here, and he is in the middle of it” (94). Calling the attack and its aftermath “a day of
testing” draws our attention to both the political landscape of a newly postapartheid
South Africa and the dichotomy of David’s and Lucy’s respective reactions. Though it is
difficult for David to accept Lucy’s decision not to report the rapes – and her decision to
stay on at her farm knowing the likelihood that she’ll be raped again – resistance to her
intention to do so reads as a desire to save Lucy, which here (recalling Spivak) means to
save Lucy from black men. I want to be careful not to suggest that Lucy deserves the
violence she faces because of the paleness of her skin. I am not advocating for the
common critical response to Disgrace: that, in Marais’s terms, the novel demands that
“white South Africans must…be prepared to accept humiliation by black South Africans”
(33). Indeed, such a reading is in direct opposition to what I propose as it relegates Lucy
to the prolonged status of victim: if she must pay for the sins of apartheid, then her selfsacrifice is not a choice; unbeing is forced upon her by the history of South Africa, and
no deliberate re-being can take place.
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Yet unwitting humiliation is the only lens through which David can view Lucy’s
choice, at least until she offers him another. David Lurie functions as a sort of neocolonial figure, especially in light of the events that come to transpire in the whitedominated, urban, university setting in which we first encounter him. When observing
Melanie Isaacs – a student of his course on the Romantics with whom David has an illplanned and arguably non-consensual affair resulting in his resignation – David wonders,
“does she know he has an eye on her? Probably. Women are sensitive to it, to the weight
of the desiring gaze” (12).18 Thus Coetzee establishes at the outset both that women are
sexual objects, and that they know it. Later, when trying to convince Melanie to have sex
with him, David says, “‘a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone….She has a duty
to share it’” (16). Considered in the context of what is to come, this notion is striking.
These words in particular – “duty” and “share” – will dominate Lucy’s argument vis-àvis her own submission, where they will become, ironically, repugnant to David, who
utters them so haphazardly here. As his seduction of Melanie continues, David watches
her rehearse for a university play – Sunset at the Globe Salon – in which “catharsis seems
to be the presiding principle: all the coarse old prejudices brought into the light of day
and washed away in gales of laughter” (23). Here we see David’s awareness of the
continued (postapartheid, post-Truth and Reconciliation Commission) struggle for
“catharsis.” Though he is skeptical of any healing that might come via such structures as
the TRC, David demonstrates even before he arrives at Lucy’s farm that he is conscious
of both the role of female subservience and South Africa’s ongoing need for redemption.

18

Though these insights come via a narrator – and not via David – Coetzee’s use of free indirect discourse
signals that the narrative voice is charged with David’s thoughts. I’ll therefore attribute insights delivered
in such a way to David himself.
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In his seduction of Melanie, however, David seems concerned only with the
former. Though as Graham points out, “the majority of reviewers of Disgrace read in
sympathy with Lurie, glossing his interaction with Melanie as a seduction, rather than a
rape” (262), David consummates his relationship with Melanie in an overtly colonial
way.19 When he “takes her in his arms, her limbs crumple like a marionette’s. Words
heavy as clubs thud into the delicate whorl of her ear. ‘No, not now!’ she says,
struggling” (24). Despite these pleas, however, we read that “nothing will stop him” (24),
and for her part, Melanie does not overtly try. Indeed, “she does not resist. All she does is
avert herself: avert her lips, avert her eyes….Not rape, not quite that, but undesired
nevertheless, undesired to the core” (24-25, emphasis mine). David’s assessment of the
encounter as “not rape, not quite that” creates room for grey area with regards to consent:
“resistance” defines rape; “aversion” is something less than that. David assumes that
Lucy resists more overtly than Melanie, but Lucy’s willingness to absorb the assault
without retribution suggests otherwise. If we allow for the possibility that Lucy’s reaction
is largely aversion, what we’re able to imagine about both the political and the personal
ramifications of the assault changes. Conventional thinking holds that if she does not
resist, she is to some degree consenting. But if she is powerless either way (as we are
encouraged to see her), we might ask what purpose her resistance serves.
Here’s where I see the logic of sovereignty falling apart. Because only resistance
is conventionally translatable as a “liberated” response, women in such situations are
often perceived as agents only when they actively resist. If women forcefully refuse – and
yet are raped – their behavior is in keeping with an acculturated desire for personal
19
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sovereignty – and yet they have none. In their resistance, they perform a desire for
agency, maintaining the tenets of liberal feminism while ironically proving that those
tenets don’t secure free will. If, however, they do not overtly resist, we consider them
accomplices in their own undoing, implying that they possess power in the situation after
all. I argue that – according to the structure of power imposed by cultural privileging of
dominance – only in consenting to the inevitable submission can a woman in Lucy’s
situation demonstrate the agency necessary to challenge narratives of sovereignty.
Though both the danger and the strength of surrender are largely invisible, Lucy
demonstrates that women are not blind to either. Recognition of this dynamic baffles
mainstream feminism’s desire for female dominance, and begs for an alternate reading of
submission. By consenting to this inevitable subjugation, then, Lucy undermines invisible
assumptions still at work in postapartheid South Africa. Unbeing and re-being – and, in
the process, undermining David’s devotion to both personal and national sovereignty –
may be the only way Lucy can claim power in the ongoing double bind created not just
by apartheid rule, but by liberal feminism as well.
Considering the invasions of Melanie and Lucy in such terms – and in light of one
another – David’s description of Melanie’s participation becomes even more telling: the
resistance David wants Lucy to demonstrate is precisely the resistance he doesn’t want to
see in Melanie. Indeed, the novel’s language vis-à-vis this dynamic suggests that female
subservience is easier for David to accept when it is performed by and on a non-white
(always already less powerful) body. David describes Melanie’s body language as
suggesting that “she had decided to go slack, die within herself for the duration, like a
rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck” (25). He perceives her as a victim of
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prey, and he sees being such as a kind of “death.” Yet arguably because she’s of
interracial heritage, this does not disturb him. When his white daughter enacts a similar
relegation of the self at the hands of her black attackers, however, David refuses to grant
her precarity, wanting Lucy to reinstate apartheid racial dynamics: to move via the
protection of a still-biased legal system to the position of predator, prey being – to David
– the only alternative. When Melanie seeks justice, however – reporting David to the
university – he refuses to cede guilt, though he allows that the “affair” took place.
In fact, in a university investigation that Mardorossian claims “evoke[s] South
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and its media coverage” (74), David
refuses to deny Melanie’s claims in any way. This refusal ends his tenure in Cape Town,
and prompts his fateful visit to Lucy’s farm: “a low, sprawling farmhouse painted
yellow…the front boundary” of which “is marked by a wire fence and clumps of
nasturtiums” (59). Right away we see Lucy’s vulnerability through David’s eyes: not
barbed wire and weaponry, but a fence and some flowers separate her land from its
surroundings. David next describes Lucy’s body, noting that “her hips and breasts are
now (he searches for the best word) ample. Comfortably barefoot, she comes to greet
him, holding her arms wide….What a nice girl, he thinks, hugging her; what a nice
welcome” (59). Like her land, David sees Lucy as open and vulnerable, “welcom[ing]”
with that word’s myriad of connotations. Made full-bodied by her years in the African
countryside, Lucy greets David “barefoot,” and with open arms. Her time in rural South
Africa has made her not harder – as one might expect given the history of that space – but
comfortable with exposure, which demonstrates the steps she’s already taken to move
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away from the being of her birth.20 When David asks if she finds it unnerving to run the
farm alone, she replies: “‘if there were to be a break-in, I don’t see that two people would
be better than one’” (60). Regarding his daughter’s ease in the face of potential violence,
David thinks, “bread in the oven and a crop in the earth. Curious that he and her mother,
cityfolk, intellectuals, should have produced this throwback, this sturdy young settler. But
perhaps it was not they who produced her; perhaps history had the larger share” (61).
This is David’s first allusion to how different Lucy’s choices are from his own: she is a
“throwback,” iconic of a time before his.
Before the rapes that inspire her unbeing, David is able to appreciate the peace
Lucy finds in the country. He “strolls with her past the mud-walled dam, where a family
of ducks coasts serenely, past the beehives, and through the garden.” He notes too the
pleasure Lucy takes in relating the facts of her land to him. “She talks easily,” he says, “a
frontier farmer of the new breed. In the old days, cattle and maize. Today, dogs and
daffodils…History repeating itself, though in a more modest vein. Perhaps history has
learned a lesson” (62). This allusion to “a lesson” feels prophetically unsettling,
especially when David ties it to his perception of Lucy as a legacy holder. We read,
“Lucy’s bare toes grip the red earth, leaving clear prints. A solid woman, embedded in
her new life. Good! If this is to be what he leaves behind – this daughter, this woman –
then he does not have to be ashamed” (62). The language here suggests that even before
the rapes it is Lucy’s “goodness” – and not his own – that secures David’s atonement. As
a white man, David acts as a conqueror. As a father, he offers up a “bare-toed” daughter,
implying that doing so redeems him. He has no problem with the abstract notion of
20
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offering Lucy to South Africa by way of penance. He only resists when she does so
herself. It is not female submission with which David is uneasy, then, but willingness.
David grows increasingly uncomfortable with vulnerability throughout and after
the attack. When he realizes that the men plan to set him on fire, “a vision comes to him
of Lucy struggling with the two in the blue overalls, struggling against them. He writhes
trying to blank it out” (97). David meets his realization of Lucy’s precarity with an
attempt to eradicate it, which is in keeping with the response he’ll go on to have. What
starts as denial morphs into a desire to turn responsibility over to the authorities such that
justice can be done and Lucy can “move on.” This desire leads to his desperate attempts
to convince Lucy to abandon the farm, and rural South Africa altogether. Lucy, of course,
also seeks justice, though she defines it in radically different terms. She thinks of the
assault as evidence of a continued need for “payment.” Her logic becomes apparent when
considered in terms of the arguably inadequate efforts of the TRC to bring justice for the
irreparable harms of apartheid.21 Lucy offers herself as a body on which a form of justice
that avoids replicating the demands for individual sovereignty might be done. Yet David
cannot read her efforts through any lens other than that of sovereignty.
David struggles with this from the outset: if Lucy has been the victim of black
men, David clearly sees himself as the heroic, white rescuer. The night of the attacks –
Lucy having reported only the burglary and the killing of the dogs and not the rapes – he
wakes up having “had a vision: Lucy has spoken to him; her words – ‘Come to me, save
21
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me!’ – still echo in his ears. In the vision she stands, hands outstretched, wet hair combed
back, in a field of white light” (103). Lucy’s unwillingness to actually reach out to him is
both personally and culturally confusing to David. When he goes to her, “she confronts
him, neck stiff, eyes glittering. Not her father’s little girl, not any longer” (105). Though
he wants Lucy to resist her rapists, then, David still expects her subservience with regards
to his own paternal role in her life. In his frustration with Lucy for refusing to cede to her
role as daughter, David equates the power she denies him with the power she grants her
attackers. He assumes bitterly that the rapists “will read that they are being sought for
robbery and assault and nothing else,” and that it “will dawn on them that over the body
of the woman silence is being drawn like a blanket. Too ashamed, they will say to each
other…and they will chuckle luxuriously.” He wonders: “is Lucy prepared to concede
them that victory?” (110). David demonstrates a need to understand how the attackers
think about the assault, what it taught them about power. It is not the lived reality of what
Lucy has faced that haunts David. Rather, it is the thought that her rapists might gain
power from the event, while (because of her silence) he and Lucy will lose it.
We likewise see David’s desire for enforced sovereignty emerge immediately
after the attacks. Recalling Lucy’s neighbor Ettinger – who “‘never go[es] anywhere
without [his] Beretta” (100) – David thinks they “ought to install bars, security gates, a
perimeter fence….They ought to turn the farmhouse into a fortress” (113). So too, when
Lucy does not want to go to the market the week of the attack, David thinks, “she would
rather hide her face…Because of the disgrace. Because of the shame….that is what they
have done to this confident, modern young woman….How they put her in her place, how
they showed her what a woman was for” (115). This description – that Lucy is a
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“confident, modern young woman” – is striking in that it is more consistent with the
discourse of liberal feminism than the novel’s overall portrayal of Lucy. Far from being
“modern,” Lucy is – even according to David – a “throwback.”
Similarly, in David’s conclusions vis-à-vis what’s been done to Lucy, he holds no
space for what’s been done to the attackers. He continues to assume that he can
comprehend their motives despite his radically divergent experience of South Africa.
When he “thinks of the three visitors driving away...their penises, their weapons, tucked
warm and satisfied between their legs,” we read that “purring is the word that comes to
him. They must have had every reason to be pleased with their afternoon’s work; they
must have felt happy” (159). Indeed, David thinks that he “can, if he concentrates, if he
loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit them, fill them with the ghost of himself”
(160). It seems, however, absurd to assume that what he – as a colonial presence in the
aftermath of a segregation from which he still benefits – imagines the men gain from the
encounter is what they actually do gain. Dominance simply cannot read the same to
someone to whom it has been handed as it would to someone who fights for it. We see a
similar lack of comprehension in David’s naïve hope that “Lucy is healing too, or if not
healing then forgetting…so that one day she may be able to say, ‘The day we were
robbed,’ and think of it merely as they day when they were robbed” (141). This hope
reveals both the degree to which David minimizes the impact of the rapes and his
unwillingness to see that impact as generative. With both the rapists and Lucy, David
demonstrates discomfort with the possibility that the situation is in any way beyond him.
Conversely, Lucy’s power lies in her acceptance that the struggle for dominance
cannot secure it. Marais contends that Lucy uses her submission to “[refuse] to perpetuate
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the cycle of domination and counter-domination out of which colonial history erects
itself” (37). Such “refusal” stands in stark contrast to David’s aggressive and resistant
reaction, which becomes – more than the attacks themselves – the narrative’s dominant
conflict. According to Marais, Coetzee positions the assault within “the Hegelian relation
of dominance and subservience” (33). Marais summarizes this context, explaining that
for Hegel, when someone who “assert[s]…independence” is “pitted…against” another,
“his/her autonomy is challenged” and he “may seek to solve this problem by eliminating
the challenger.” Hegel cautions, however, that “this ‘life-and-death struggle’” is “a false
solution” (Marais 34). The power struggle doesn’t stand to resolve the conflict, Marais
suggests, largely because the “relation of dominance and subservience is fundamentally
unstable and ‘self-frustrating’…since the master can never know whether the recognition
that ‘he’ receives is a function of ‘his’ reduction of the challenger to an extension of ‘his’
will” (34). The structure, therefore, is an illusion wherein “the slave may realize that it is
through his/her labour that nature is dominated and, accordingly, that the master is
superfluous…Rebellion is thus endemic in the very structure of this relationship” (34). In
terms of Disgrace, David and the rapists (in their counter-aggression) act in terms of this
“false solution.” Only Lucy does not. Marais contends that “the only way of breaking out
of this cycle is by bringing an end to the entire struggle for affirmation” (34). This is what
Lucy’s unbeing stands to accomplish.
Viewed through a Hegelian lens, we see in Lucy’s actions “an acknowledgement
…of the other’s right to exist, [which] can bridge the gap between the ‘I’ and the other ‘I’
and thereby end the struggle for affirmation” (Marais 34). David’s resistance maintains
these divisions, as does the rapists’ violence. Only by ceasing to react can Lucy position
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herself to “bridge” oppositionality. We see this at work in a conversation Lucy has with
her father about Petrus, who chains up two lambs in an ungrazable area for days before
he plans to slaughter them. David says, “‘I’m not sure I like the way he does things –
bringing the slaughter-beasts home to acquaint them with the people who are going to eat
them.’” To this, Lucy asks, “‘what would you prefer? That the slaughtering be done in an
abattoir, so that you needn’t think about it?....Wake up, David. This is the country. This is
Africa’” (124). While Lucy accepts harsh realities, David denies them in deference to
cultural assumptions. Lucy’s acceptance affords her a relationship with Petrus that pushes
against the norms of postapartheid power structures (and that profoundly rejects the
norms of apartheid). As Marais suggests, her “denial [of power] signifies a desire to
transcend the cycle of domination and counter-domination that determines the course of
history” (35). Conversely, even in postapartheid South Africa, and even in this rural,
majority-black part of the country, David wants his own system of ethics to reign.
Before David leaves the farm, he makes one final attempt to convince Lucy to
change her mind. He writes her a letter in which he states, “‘you wish to humble yourself
before history. But the road you are following is the wrong one. It will strip you of all
honour. You will not be able to live with yourself’” (160, emphasis mine). Once back in
Cape Town, David tells his ex-wife Rosalind that Lucy “‘would be mad to feel safe. But
she will stay on nevertheless. It has become a point of honour with her’” (187, emphasis
mine). Despite their time together, David has yet to be moved by Lucy’s process of
unbeing. To assume that staying is a matter of “honour” is to assume that Lucy gains
from staying what nations gain from resistance: sovereignty, regardless of cost. Instead,
she gains little and cedes much. In not reporting the rapes, Lucy cedes her safety and her
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sexuality. In not leaving, but in offering the land to Petrus in exchange for his protection,
she cedes her property. And in her willingness to carry the (biracial) child she conceived
as a result of the rapes, she cedes much of her racial privilege. Lucy seems to agree with
David that staying will “strip [her] of all honour.” What she disagrees with is the notion
that dishonor should be avoided, a distinction David seems unable to make.
Despite his resistance, however, Lucy tries repeatedly to explain her unbeing to
David, and I argue that those efforts eventually pay off. She maintains: “‘in another time,
in another place [what happened to me] might be held to be a public matter. But in this
place, at this time, it is not. It is my business, mine alone.’” The “place” and “time,” of
course, is postapartheid South Africa, where Lucy suggests that crime can only be read
through the cultural lens of ongoing racial oppression. Still not understanding, David
asks, “‘Do you think that by meekly accepting what happened to you, you can set
yourself apart from farmers like Ettinger? Do you think what happened here was an
exam: if you come through, you get a diploma and safe conduct into the future?’” Though
he grasps his daughter’s political stance, he mistakenly assumes that her unbeing is born
of a desire for redemption. To this assumption, Lucy responds: “‘I am not just trying to
save my skin. If that is what you think, you miss the point entirely….Guilt and salvation
are abstractions. I don’t act in terms of abstractions’” (112). The assumption that guilt
motivates Lucy’s submission is a common one: critics largely contend that we’re meant
to see her sexual self-sacrifice as a way of atoning for privilege. Lucy’s argument that
guilt is an “abstraction” arises because guilt in this situation wouldn’t be personal: it
would be a product of one’s nation’s actions and not one’s own. Lucy absorbs anger and
violence not merely for the sins of her state, but in and of herself. Her body is penetrated
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and impregnated. Her unbeing is personal. By trying to understand Lucy’s actions only
within a framework of guilt, David relegates them to the status of self-imposed
punishment. By seeing them as personal choices, their potential power becomes visible.
Wright explains the danger of missing this nuance, arguing that readers run the
risk of doing what Lucy accuses David of here: reading “women’s bodies [not as bodies,
but as] sites of displacement.” Wright argues that “for the black men who rape her,
Lucy’s white female body symbolizes the land from which they have been dispossessed”
and that “for David, Melanie’s biracial female body offers the opportunity to
symbolically reclaim not only his youth, but also his authoritarian position at a university
where the white male professor is marginalized by increasing demands of gender and
racial diversification.” The concern, she suggests, is that “in the case of both women, one
runs the risk of reading their bodies on a purely symbolic level, as metaphors that inform
the men who enact varying degrees of violence upon them” (90). I want to be careful in
reading Lucy allegorically to leave space for her actual, lived reality. It is only because of
her body – which houses her consciousness – that Lucy can suffer, and it is in her
willingness to suffer that I hope to find something other than victimhood. If Lucy is mere
allegory – or if her motivation is merely the abstraction of historical shame – then her
unbeing can’t be read as personal. But it is personal: for Lucy and for her rapists. It
makes visible the suffering body as a body, though it does so without ignoring the
historical or allegorical significance that body might convey. Thus a version of the future
might arise from Lucy’s unbeing that would otherwise be impossible to attain. After all,
the crimes of apartheid exist outside of the history books that summarize them. The
legacy is inherently of the body. And as Marais suggests, the personal nature of Lucy’s
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submission may be the only path to a South Africa that can exist outside of the unequal
sovereignty driving even the postapartheid era.
Though the actual rapes are hidden from readers – we only see the attack through
David’s eyes, and by locking David in a bathroom Coetzee makes literal his figurative
blindness – we do see Lucy suffer in their aftermath. And I argue that in that suffering,
Lucy begins the process of re-being. Lucy tells her father, “‘I think they have done it
before….At least the two older ones have. I think they are rapists first and foremost.
Stealing things is just incidental. A side-line. I think they do rape.’” Lucy’s attackers are
not looking for a way to support themselves through thievery, then; they are looking for
women to violate. Thus their intentions are deeply personal. Lucy says, “‘I am in their
territory. They have marked me. They will come back for me,’” to which David replies,
“‘then you can’t possibly stay….that would be an invitation for them to return.’” After
some time, Lucy replies, “‘isn’t there another way of looking at it, David? What if…that
is the price one has to pay for staying on? Perhaps that is how they look at it; perhaps that
is how I should look at it too. They see me as owing something ….Why should I be
allowed to live here without paying?’” (158). She makes no mention of the past; her
focus here is on her choice to live in South Africa. That choice requires that she be
something new, and so, instead of leaving, she struggles to become whatever that is.
David concludes it is “slavery,” insisting: “they want you for their slave.’” It
seems that if it were slavery, however, it would be a direct product of the past. Slavery
would be overt historical vengeance. Lucy senses this. “‘Not slavery,’” she insists,
“‘subjection. Subjugation’” (159). I argue that her rejection of the term slavery is a way
of rejecting the colonial terms of that relationship itself. Using the word “subjection”
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instead relates more to the notion of subjecthood, or of being a subject. If subjecthood
has to do with subjecting oneself to a particular subordination (as postmodernists think of
it), then David’s position is that of a white South African under apartheid. Lucy realizes
this – intuiting that David will continue to perpetuate colonial logic – and she wants to
inhabit a different subject position. This functions as a relinquishing of privilege. Lucy
can no longer fall back on the graces that apartheid provided her; she is in a willing state
of disgrace. “Subjection” and “subjugation” are deeply personal. They aren’t merely
about ownership; they are about humiliation. Lucy recognizes this, and bears it willingly.
By re-being in these terms, Lucy also helps move David (and likewise readers)
away from a privileged subject position. This is the external work of self-abnegation. To
gauge the effectiveness of Lucy’s submission in these terms, I use David and Lucy’s
dispute about animals and its evolution throughout the novel. This conflict provides
useful ground on which to evaluate Lucy’s effect on David because it represents the most
profound movement we see in him. Graham suggests that in Disgrace, “female bodies
may not fare better in the new order, as after Lucy is raped she becomes pregnant, gives
up her land, and retreats into the house” (260). Yet despite the fact that David still
misunderstands her when he first leaves her farm, we see the effect Lucy’s willing
unbeing has had over him via his relationship with the novel’s dogs. Tom Herron
suggests that in their “lack of power” dogs in Disgrace “come to assume an exemplary,
transformative status.” Herron contends that the whole notion of “disgrace” can be
understood “only when the condition comes to articulate not just David’s individual fall,
or Lucy’s rape and subsequent silence,” but “the being of animals themselves: in other
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words, when the notion of disgrace has expanded to include all animals” (472). This is
the journey David takes, and it is initiated by Lucy’s modeling of precarity.
When Lucy first asks him to help Bev – who works as a stand-in veterinarian,
offering rudimentary treatments and humane euthanasia to a host of unwanted dogs, cats,
and other small animals – David says, “‘I’m dubious, Lucy. It sounds suspiciously like
community service. It sounds like someone trying to make reparation for past misdeeds.’”
Once more, “reparations” are not something David feels willing to make. Like his earlier
misinterpretation of Lucy’s subordination, David misunderstands the work Bev does. By
the novel’s end, however, he willingly subordinates himself to that work: David “is the
one who holds the dog still as the needle finds the vein and the drug hits the heart and the
legs buckle and the eyes dim.” Not only is he willing to subject himself to such trauma,
he acknowledges the emotions he feels as such. Wright argues that “while David never
actively participates in a vegetarian ethic, his sensibility with regard to the lives of
animals is greatly altered after Lucy is raped” (91-92). Indeed, one night after assisting
Bev, “driving home in Lucy’s kombi, [David] actually has to stop at the roadside to
recover himself. Tears flow down his face that he cannot stop” (142-43). So too, when
they euthanize the dogs, “he and Bev do not speak. He has learned…to concentrate all his
attention on the animal they are killing, giving it what he no longer has difficulty in
calling by its proper name: love” (219). This passage suggests that David has moved
from understanding animal stewardship as public guilt to considering it a private form of
engagement. Seeing this service as an act of “love” is the first step David takes towards
his daughter’s position of willing unbeing.
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As Wright suggests, “critics read the role of animals in Disgrace as the means by
which David Lurie begins to learn to love the [other]…by taking responsibility for the
bodies of dead dogs” (93). “Responsibility,” however, is arguably tied more to David’s
hierarchically oriented, neo-colonial viewpoint than to Lucy’s way of thinking. In the
immediate aftermath of the rapes, David wants to take “responsibility” for what happened
to Lucy, to “handle” it by controlling her reaction. What comes of David’s development
in terms of the dogs is something different. His newfound openness can be seen
particularly well via a connection David shares with one of the dogs, “a young male with
a withered left hindquarter which it drags behind it,” for whom "he has come to feel a
particular fondness.” This animal is “alone,” and “no visitor has shown interest in
adopting it. Its period of grace is almost over” (214-15). As the novel draws to a close –
with Lucy still refusing to leave her farm, still pregnant, and still willing to raise the child
she’s carrying – we think David might want to rescue something and, unable to rescue his
daughter, might “take responsibility” for the dog by trying to save him. Instead, we see
David carry that dog’s small body towards Bev. When she asks, he says that though his
kindness “will be little enough, less than little: nothing,” he will offer it, and that he is,
despite his attachment, “giving him up” (220). Wright argues: “it is through the dog
himself that David learns to give without expecting anything in return” (98-99). I argue,
however, that Lucy’s subordination heavily influences David in this scene. I also argue
for another shift in reading: one that recognizes that David learns not to give – as that
implies a force I don’t see present here, a force that is tied to “responsibility” and
“control” – but to accept. He loves the dog in spite of the fact that he doesn’t perceive it
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as his duty to save him. This is a significant change for David Lurie. He doesn’t merely
recognize this dog’s vulnerability; he facilitates it, and his own in the process.
From such a place of acceptance, David says to Lucy, “‘how humiliating….Such
high hopes, and to end like this.’” He finally acknowledges the disgrace of the situation
without trying to alter it. And at last, Lucy agrees with him, saying, “‘it is humiliating.
But perhaps that is a good point to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to
accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No
cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity.’” To this, David replies, “‘like a
dog,’” and Lucy concedes: “‘Yes, like a dog’” (205). David’s tentative grasp of Lucy’s
willingness indicates that he has begun to unlearn privilege. She does not resist this
comparison, and David does not make it to persuade her to choose otherwise. Instead, he
seems to perceive the possibility of a different kind of future, one pursued by his daughter
throughout Disgrace and hinted at when Halberstam asks: “we are all used to having our
dreams crushed, our hopes smashed, our illusions shattered, but what comes after hope?”
(1). At Disgrace’s close, we’re not told “what comes after hope,” arguably because for
these characters, it’s too soon to tell. But Lucy says to David simply, “‘I am determined
to be a good mother…A good mother and a good person. You should try to be a good
person too’” (216). In response to this, David thinks that Lucy “is becoming a peasant”
(217). This is a striking way to think about Lucy’s refusal to dominate, to colonize, to
resist. To become a peasant is to move backwards in time, to shift away from the
“advancements” of modern civilization and towards a genuinely pre-colonial way of
being, a re-being in which one’s “goodness” is more important than one’s superiority. I
argue that Lucy’s choice to live on under dangerous conditions is an example of the
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potential influence of unbeing: she stands to shift South African politics away from
Apartheid dynamics in ways that Truth and Reconciliation – which was invested in
healing and disallowing suffering – could not. For Lucy, more suffering is necessary;
there will be no clean resolution to apartheid’s legacy. Lucy’s narrative ends
pessimistically, yet her willing suffering instills hope.

Phyllis
Phyllis Lewin – of E.L. Doctorow’s The Book of Daniel – likewise offers herself
as a sexual object, though unlike Lucy, she does so not to strangers but to her husband,
whose physical and sexual abuse I read as an unconscious attempt on his part to seek
retribution for his parents’ wrongful deaths.22 I argue that – as we saw with Lucy and her
rapists – Phyllis’s compliance with Daniel’s sexual domination functions as a voluntary
sacrifice to the need for retribution. As I discuss in my first chapter, Daniel’s sister Susan
makes use of her own (complicit American) body to avenge the murders of her parents.
Daniel makes use of his young wife, whom he describes as a “helpless breeder” (5),
thereby establishing his view of her as agentless. Arguably even his choice of a younger
and seemingly naïve wife is an effort to secure an agentless body, a corporeal form to
punish for the crimes committed against his family by the formless and sovereign state. I
question Daniel’s assessment of Phyllis as powerless. Despite her youth and her
vulnerability, Phyllis demonstrates an awareness that part of her role as Daniel’s wife is
22

As I establish in the previous chapter, I read the Isaacsons as having been murdered by the United States
Government. Andrew Pepper claims that, “any novelist who [like Doctorow] had witnessed the upheavals
of the Vietnam War, campus protests, assassinations and race riots would…view the USA in a changed
manner. In the cold afterglow of Kent State and the Tet offensive any lingering notions about the benignity
of the US state could be put to rest” (479). Considered in this historic context, the idea that Doctorow (via
Daniel) positions the Isaacsons not as perpetrators of crime, but as victims of the state, seems sound.
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to absorb his violent retaliation – a level of consciousness we don’t see reflected in
Daniel himself – and she seems, moreover, willing to comply. The unbeing Phyllis
voluntarily endures is a replication of the unbeing that was forced on Paul and Rochelle.
Her apparently masochistic form of unbeing stands out in this chapter, however, because
it is the only example of submission that could be argued to come from actual sexual
desire. This contributes to the fact that Phyllis meets with less success than do the other
characters I discuss. Yet there are sufficient indications that she understands the
connection between Daniel’s violence and his grief over the injustice of his parents’
deaths to conclude that at least part of Phyllis’s pleasure comes from the role she plays in
her husband’s quest for justice. In the limited re-being she attains, Phyllis makes of
herself – in Daniel’s language – a “sex martyr.” Thus – despite the relatively insignificant
impact of her self-abnegation – Phyllis joins Susan in attempting to bring closure to
deaths that would not otherwise be avenged.
Because Daniel has personally suffered for the state’s claims to sovereignty over
its citizen’s lives, we might expect that he is more open at the outset to the lessons of
vulnerability Phyllis has to teach than was David to Lucy. Though this does not turn out
to be the case – despite both Susan’s and Phyllis’s modeling of vulnerability, Daniel’s
aggression remains fairly intact by the novel’s end, limiting the degree to which we might
consider Phyllis’s unbeing an external success – he does search for closure. Daniel
remains committed to finding that closure through some form of justice, however, and
not through a shift in ideological perspective. Like Susan, Daniel inherits a faith in justice
from his parents, Paul and Rochelle Isaacson. Of Paul, Daniel recalls, “he told me about
Henry Ford…and the Depression which came like a blight over capitalist
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America…about Sacco and Vanzetti….He ran up and down history like a pianist playing
his scales…‘And it’s still going on, Danny’’” (35). And like Susan, he lacks tangible
recourse to securing it. Daniel cannot even seek justice out in grand or illicit ways
because, as he says, “there is nothing I can do, mild or extreme, that they cannot have
planned for” (72). Though he is relegated to searching, then, Daniel is unlikely to find
justice via traditional means, for which reason he begins manifesting it symbolically: by
acting it out on his wife’s body. Though Susan and Daniel share this need for justice,
critics distinguish Daniel’s apparent strength (ability to survive) from Susan’s apparent
weakness (willingness to die) without speaking to the assumptions about dominance and
submission upon which such an assessment relies.23 This distinction fails to acknowledge
both the scale of Daniel’s abuse and the reality that abuse is able to obscure.24 Moreover,
it fails to acknowledge Phyllis altogether: the role she plays in the strength critics
perceive in Daniel, and the subtle signs that she plays that role willingly.
I argue that it is Phyllis – and not Daniel – who is most able to endure, as like
Susan, Phyllis acknowledges the fallout of America’s actions with regards to the
Isaacsons. Daniel resists that fallout, projecting what he isn’t able to repress onto his
wife. Rather than perceiving strength in Daniel’s abuse – a reading that exposes our own
disturbing privileging of dominance – I suggest we see it in Phyllis’s internal resilience.
23

Douglas Fowler contextualizes the suffering Susan inflicts on herself (discussed in the previous chapter)
with that Daniel inflicts on Phyllis, saying that “Daniel is psychologically deformed by the weight and
irony of this tragic burden, but his deformity allows him to bend and survive. Susan can only break” (48).
Fowler also contends that Daniel’s repeated abuse of Phyllis is “his means of maintaining a precarious
sanity, a draining off of large evil done to him by means of a small evil done by him…Incapable of this
transmutation and soul purge, Susan is broken, catatonic, finally dead. She has the immaculate honor and
yet the brittle vulnerability of the saint” (49-50).
24

Though Reed contends that “by the time [Daniel] reaches adulthood, [his] survival instinct has turned
into a cynical, nihilistic will to power he exercises through the sadistic torture of his wife” (297), he never
observes the similarities between Daniel’s aggression and the violence with which his sister destroys
herself.
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Any implication that Daniel is better equipped to handle trauma ignores the dynamic of
Daniel’s marriage. Daniel’s sadism seems a product of anger, which calls into question
the degree to which his actions might be read as fully agented. He is playing out old
trauma, his inability to escape which leaves him psychologically rooted in the past – in
the years spent as a powerless child in the midst of familial tragedy – and not in the
present. His performance of dominance is consistent with David Lurie’s performance of
colonialism, and cultural blindness to the degree of Daniel’s sadism is as disturbing as
critical dismissal of David’s encounters with Melanie as an “affair” and not “rape.”
Conversely Phyllis, like Lucy, chooses to stay knowing she’ll face violence again and
again. She is complicit in the abuse Daniel inflicts on her, and not acknowledging this
further denies her character agency, casting readers in a similarly dehumanizing position
to Daniel. Though we never get direct insight into her motives, I argue that we see
sufficient evidence of Phyllis’s astuteness to read her unbeing not as naiveté, but as a
potentially cathartic willingness to bear the sins of the state on the body.
In addition to reading Daniel’s abuse of Phyllis as healthier than his sister’s selfabuse, some critics conclude that Daniel’s relationship with his wife is not even
particularly vexed. Fowler claims, for example, that Daniel’s cruelty towards Phyllis is
not unlike the hostility he directs at everyone in his family. He argues that Daniel “lashes
out at his wife, his child, his adoptive parents, and the sister with whom he shares his pain
and humiliation precisely because they are family” (51). Daniel is certainly angry, and he
takes that anger out on his entire family. Yet he is not – with one notable exception in a
scene with his son – violent towards them, while he is clearly and consistently violent
towards Phyllis. Moreover, Daniel admits that abuse has been part of his relationship
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with Phyllis since their courtship (56-57). Unlike Susan and the Lewins, Phyllis knew
upon meeting Daniel what their dynamic would be, and she chose to go further. Thus
distinction between his treatment of his wife and the rest of his family is warranted.
Critics arguably perceive Phyllis as a hapless victim largely because Doctorow
describes her as such. As with David and Lucy, however, all of our observations of
Phyllis come via Daniel, and Daniel makes clear that he’s a highly unreliable narrator.
When we first meet Phyllis, Daniel notes that she is “nineteen, with long straight natural
blond hair worn these days in braids. She came to his shoulder” (4). He wants us to know
that in both age and stature, Phyllis is not his equal. He further observes that “as a matter
of principle she liked to talk to strangers and make them unafraid” (4). Like Lucy, Phyllis
is unthreatening and comfortable with exposure. Yet Daniel does not depict that
vulnerability as strength. In his description of meeting Phyllis at a sit-in, for example,
Daniel mocks her openness, saying, “someone had solemnly offered her a daffodil…
Solemnly with a spiritual smile, she walked with her flower, taking those too large,
slightly awkward strides of hers. She was avid for spiritual experience” (56). He sees
himself as taking advantage of such naïve “solemnity,” noting that on this occasion he
“took her home to 115th Street and put on some Bartók… suggest[ing] to her that fucking
was a philosophical act of considerable importance.” He adds: “I knew that in deference
to this possibility she would allow herself to be fucked” (56-57). We are thus led to
believe that Phyllis does not choose to submit; she is manipulated into doing so.
Though it seems likely that what Daniel describes as “the strong erotic content of
[their] marriage” (4-5) is a result of Phyllis meeting Daniel’s sadism with her own
masochism – and likely too that she has other reasons for being willing to absorb his
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anger – Daniel rarely discusses his wife with enough complexity for us to do more than
speculate about her motives. Instead, he disparages her, describing her as “the kind of
awkward girl with heavy thighs and heavy tits and slim lovely face whose ancestral
mothers must have been bred in harems,” as well as “the kind of unathletic helpless
breeder to appeal to caliphs,” and “the kind of sand dune that was made to be kicked
around” (5). Though acknowledgment of the historical prominence of female subjugation
lends ironic depth to her position, we are led to dismiss any intentionality on the part of
Phyllis: according to Daniel, she is subordinate not of her own inclination, but because
she comes from a long line of women “bred” to be so. Daniel likewise tells us that his
adoptive parents disapprove of his choice of a wife, “but of course they wouldn’t say
anything. Enlightened liberals are like that. Phyllis, a freshman dropout, has nothing for
them. Liberals are like that too. They confuse character with education” (4). Here he
critiques Phyllis for her lack of education, western liberalism for its dogmatism, and his
parents for their bourgeois attitudes. Thus Daniel attempts to establish himself as
intellectually and rhetorically superior, an ethos that serves, once more, to prejudice
readers towards him. His actions are consistently those of a deeply disturbed man, yet
critics overlook this fact in deference to Daniel’s assertions of strength. And in so doing,
they follow his lead in dismissing Phyllis as unworthy of serious consideration.
With little direct textual insight, the easiest way to draw conclusions about
Phyllis’s submission is via a nuanced understanding of Daniel’s sadism. We see subtle
evidence of that sadism in the first scene in which he describes having sex with Phyllis,
which consequentially is what Daniel is doing when he receives a phone call about
Susan’s suicide attempt. He sets up this scene by showing us – in the third-person

103

narrative technique he uses to distance himself – “Daniel and his child bride at sex in
their 115th Street den.” He exaggerates Phyllis’s youth here, arguably to make us more
aware of her vulnerability to him. He then shifts to the first person, taking responsibility
for the degradation to which he subjects her. He writes, “the music of the stones pounds
the air like the amplified pulse of my erection. And I have finally got her on all fours,
hanging there from her youth and shame, her fallen blond hair over her eyes, tears sliding
like lovebeads down [her] long blond hairs” (6, emphasis mine). Unlike Lucy’s rapes,
this sex is consensual. Yet as we intuited with Lucy’s rapists, Phyllis’s “shame” is central
to Daniel’s arousal. He notes that when Phyllis is high, “all her inhibitions come out. She
gets all tight and vulnerable and our lovemaking degrades her.” Far from wanting his
wife’s inhibitions to come down – as we might expect – Daniel wants them to “come
out,” such that being penetrated by him is “degrading.”
Despite his implication that Phyllis is an unwitting victim, however, Daniel hints
at the fact that Phyllis chooses subjugation, seemingly for both personal and political
reasons. He tells us: “Phyllis grew up in an apartment in Brooklyn, and her flower life is
adopted, it is a principle” (6). Though he thinks of her as a descendent of a “harem” (5),
then, he acknowledges contradictorily that she has chosen the stereotypical hippie
vulnerabilities of subordination and pacifism. He continues, “her love of peace is a
principle, her long hair, her love for me – all principles. Political decisions.” Yet when
she’s high, Daniel claims, “all her instinctive unprincipled beliefs rise to the surface and
her knees lock together. She becomes a sex martyr. I think that’s why I married her” (6).
The shame she exhibits in this scene is something Daniel works deliberately to affect. He
offers these insights not to demonstrate Phyllis’s agency, but to show us his ability to
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undermine what he sees as her attempts at autonomy. Yet ironically, this passage makes
clear the deliberate nature of Phyllis’s actions. If “her love for [Daniel]” is “a principle,”
then the lived reality of that love is a conscious choice. Phyllis does not suffer for a
schoolgirl crush (as Daniel would sometimes have us believe) but for an ethical
adherence to a complex value system. If she is a sex martyr, she has martyred herself.
As this encounter progresses, Daniel conflates the power dynamic of sex with the
political landscape that dominates his consciousness, reading flawed (and to his family,
dangerous) manifestations of communism onto Phyllis’s body and making clear the
connection between his abuse of Phyllis and his parents’ deaths. He begins in
exhibitionist fashion – using overtly lascivious language – depicting his wife as
“suffering yet another penetration and her tormentor Daniel gently squeezing handfuls of
soft ass while he probes her virtue, her motherhood, her vacuum, her vincibles, her vat,
her butter tub.” Yet he soon shifts to political language, describing her body in terms of
“the small geography of those distant island ranges, that geology of gland formations,
Stalinites and Trotskyites, the Stalinites grow down from the top, the Trotskyites up from
the bottom” (6). As Daniel reads onto Phyllis’s body various manifestations of
communism, his aggression intensifies. Indeed, he depicts himself here as a kind of
McCarthyite, probing for sources of communist threat to Phyllis’s “virtue” and
“motherhood” in paranoid terms. Yet in this first scene, we are not given the insight
necessary to know whether Phyllis understands herself to be a representative of all those
ideological structures that doomed her husband’s family.
Though nothing about this scene is particularly violent, Daniel’s use of words like
“suffering,” “tormentor,” and “cruel” suggest his intention to degrade. As the
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transgressor, Daniel knows he’ll garner judgment: that he’ll be perceived as the brutally
empowered half of their relationship. He even asks, “if the first glimpse people have of
me is this, how do I establish sympathy?” (6-7). What this language suggests is that
readers will “sympathize” not with him, but with Phyllis: that we will read her as his
victim, and that we will pity her. In practically demanding that we perceive him as brutal,
Daniel portrays himself as sacrificing his own standing in the reader’s eyes. Because we
privilege dominance, however, this scene functions as false humility. Though readers
may judge him for his cruelty, they might nevertheless perceive that cruelty as a
manifestation of a kind of strength. Conversely, though readers may feel that Phyllis has
been mistreated, Daniel’s presentation of her as a victim obscures any sense of her as an
active participant in her own symbolically charged suffering. Phyllis lacks dimensionality
not just because she is underdeveloped in the novel, but because her development
suggests that she is merely an object to her husband’s whims.
Having set up this dynamic – Daniel as cruel but worthy of respect; Phyllis as
weak and unwitting – in the relatively subtle aggression of the novel’s first sex scene,
readers are inclined to see it manifest all the more in the overt violence of later scenes.
Though Phyllis’s participation in orchestrating these occurrences becomes increasingly
apparent, however, Daniel never acknowledges her as anything but his victim. The
novel’s most explicit scene of sexual abuse finds Daniel and Phyllis driving Susan’s car
to Boston, having just visited her at the mental hospital after her suicide attempt. It is
raining, and their son Paul is sleeping in the backseat. As the scene unfolds, Daniel hints
at the abuse we’re about to witness. He recalls that Phyllis’s father “tried to bring himself
to ask…about the bruises his wife saw on his daughter’s upper legs; he mumbled and
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cleared his throat, but I pretended not to understand, and he gave up” (57). Though we’re
never shown these bruises directly, this intimation calls us to imagine how they might
have come into being. And in introducing them to us via his wife’s parents, Daniel
accentuates the extent to which we see Phyllis as a child-victim.
Yet Phyllis’s actions in this scene are arguably quite deliberate. When Daniel
shifts back into the third person to depict himself “grop[ing] for the wiper switch,” their
“car veer[s] for a moment, and a horn bl[ows] behind them.” In the split second of this
event, Daniel observes “that Phyllis clutche[s] the armrest of the door with her right hand
and extend[s] her left back over the seat to protect the baby.” But just as importantly,
Phyllis “glance[s] at him to see if he had seen” (56). When Daniel notes Phyllis’s fear,
then, she notes his observation of it. Though she’s depicted – and largely taken – as a
victim, she is keenly aware of the power dynamic between them. From this space of
awareness, Phyllis remarks, “‘oh, Daniel, I wish I could hold Susan and hug her and kiss
her and be her friend….Maybe when she’s better she could come and live with us for a
while. We would really love her and make her happy. The baby would love her’” (56).
Taken out of context, this could sound merely sweet, but in the context of the observation
Phyllis registered moments before, it’s incongruous. Such childlike exuberance is
arguably meant to convey her naïveté, but following as it does Phyllis’s awareness of
power, it seems folly to take this moment at face value. Instead, it seems reasonable to
assume that Phyllis encourages Daniel’s perception of her as weakly feminine. Though
Daniel never registers her behavior as manipulative – and neither do critics – Phyllis’s
naïveté seems a bit too well timed not to be calculated. And if it is calculated, then we
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can assume that she welcomes what follows, a thought which – though disturbing –
affords Phyllis far more power than either Daniel or critics are inclined to grant her.
Considered in such terms, the scene that follows seems inevitable from the
moment of Daniel and Phyllis’s mutual recognition. Daniel asks: “‘will you do me a
favor?....Take your bell[bottom]s off,’” adding, “‘I’m not being funny. I mean it….Come
on, Phyllis. Right now….Take them off’” (58). Daniel states his desire first as a request,
and then as an order. Phyllis initially resists, which leads critics to see her as unwitting
even when she does comply. I suggest, however, that her resistance is part of the power
play between them. It is necessary to Daniel’s arousal – and more importantly to the
catharsis offered to Daniel via the scene – that Phyllis resist, and so she does. In that vein,
Phyllis says: “‘I don’t think that’s right. I don’t want to do that,’” to which Daniel replies:
“‘But I want you to, Phyllis.’” When she does not immediately comply, “Daniel gently
depresse[s] the accelerator and sa[ys] nothing” (58). From here, Daniel moves into a
subtle and sexually charged form of verbal torment. He begins “quietly explain[ing] to
her the mechanical problems of the car: there was considerable play in the steering, the
front wheels were unaligned, the brakes were worn and the tires slick. He glance[s] at the
speedometer and inform[s] Phyllis that they [are] doing eighty-five miles an hour” (5859). Though the scene goes on to include physical abuse (in the likely form of a burn
from a cigarette lighter), we don’t see that abuse directly. Instead, this exchange stands as
the most visible representation of Daniel’s dominance, and of Phyllis’s willing unbeing.
In the moments before Phyllis complies, she adds one more comment to their
dialogue, this time not in resistance but in demonstration of her awareness of the origin of
Daniel’s violence. She says of the Isaacson family: “‘you’re all such big deals…You’re
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all such big deals of suffering’” (59). Having demonstrated that she’s aware of the source
of Daniel’s demands, Phyllis is ready to meet them. She “unbuckle[s] her belt and
unzip[s] her fly and arching her back off the seat pull[s] her bellbottoms down.” Daniel
returns to a tone of requests and not orders, saying almost politely: “‘all the way off,
please,’” to which Phyllis replies with quiet willingness, “lifting her knees, [and putting]
the heels of her boots on the seat.” As Daniel watches, Phyllis “unzip[s] her boots, pull[s]
them off, drop[s] them on the floor, and pull[s] the pants over her ankles….Then she
look[s] at him and pull[s] her underpants off” (60). It would be easy to assume that
Phyllis’s compliance is merely a matter of force: that Daniel gives her no choice if she
wants to protect both herself and her child. And indeed, the next moments find her in
tears. As “Daniel [takes] his foot off the gas pedal and turn[s] on the windshield wipers,”
we read: “Phyllis [is] crying. She r[uns] her fingers up through her hair and h[olds] her
ears and crie[s].” She does not, however, resist. The tears come not as a mark of
opposition, but as a sign of submission. She does not even – as Melanie does – “avert
herself”: Phyllis “look[s]” at Daniel in the moments before taking off the last of her
clothes (60). She is not in control in this scene, but there is little textual evidence to
suggest she has a sincere objection to that fact.
Phyllis’s response after Daniel regains control of the car further suggests her full
participation in the sexual encounter. Daniel “[instructs] Phyllis to kneel on the seat
facing her side of the car, and…bend over as far as she c[an], kneel[ing] and curl[ing] up
like a penitent, a worshiper, an abject devotionalist” (60). As she obliges, she asks, “‘like
this?’” with “her voice muffled by her hair.” By requesting confirmation that she’s in the
position he wants her in, Phyllis implies an investment beyond the preservation of safety.
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Daniel is no longer speeding, and Phyllis has already met his demands, yet she continues
to engage with him. “‘That’s fine,’” Daniel responds, “running his right hand over her
buttocks” in response to which she “shiver[s] and the flesh of her backside tremble[s]
under his hand” (60). This moment is depicted in graphic but subtly consensual language.
Once again, nothing about Phyllis’s actions suggests resistance.
In the next moment, however, Daniel becomes overtly violent, and we’re given no
insight into Phyllis’s reaction. Returning to the third person, Doctorow writes: “Daniel
leaned forward and pressed the cigarette lighter. His hand remained poised.” Though
there’s no way to speak to Phyllis’s compliance in this moment, it is important to note
that her modeling of vulnerability – her willingness to subordinate herself to her husband
in this scene – does little to assuage Daniel’s aggression, which again suggests that the
external consequences of unbeing do not manifest in Daniel. Having hinted at but not
performed this act of violence, Daniel leaves the scene, moving metafictively away from
Phyllis and towards the reader by asking, “do you believe it? Shall I continue? Do you
want to know the effect of three concentric circles of heating element glowing orange in a
black night of rain upon the tender white girlflesh of my wife’s ass?” (60). Though
Daniel refuses to offer insight into Phyllis’s complicity, he deliberately involves readers
in the violence he commits against her. If we read on, Daniel suggests, then we want to
watch; thus we are, in a manner, like him. What he doesn’t allow for is that we’re also
like Phyllis: that the agency we demonstrate in continuing to read is similar to that
demonstrated by Phyllis in continuing to stay, for which reason readers share in the
precarity she models. In this small way, Phyllis’s submission is externally influential.
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Though she is read largely as agentless, Phyllis’s unbeing ironically becomes
almost too much to bring Daniel relief, as if justice can only be enacted on a resistant
body, and Phyllis’s has become – though Daniel never overtly acknowledges it as such –
too willing. During a less sadomasochistic encounter in their home following the car
scene, for example, Daniel makes clear Phyllis’s sustaining sexual desire. He writes that
as Phyllis becomes more and more aroused, he “[does] not break [his] rhythm, which [is]
insolently slow,” and that in response “she purse[s] her lips and the effort [is] as if she
[is] half whistling in pain or amazement” as she “shiver[s] her way through one come
after another” (169). As pain and pleasure commingle, Daniel does what he calls, “the
cruel thing”: he “pull[s] back.” He then writes: “she h[angs] from my neck whimpering
into my mouth. At the peak of her distraction I slowly s[ink] it back in, and this [is] the
stroke that t[akes] her beyond her limits of character and physical integrity” (169). After
this encounter, however, Daniel is not content merely to have satisfied Phyllis; he wants
her to have registered his technique as “cruel.” He notes: “leaning over her sleepy smiling
eyes I c[an] not find here the education recorded, no impression of the cruel thing, the
cruel thing, and that it is always the cruel thing that mixes the tears of our eyes, the breath
of our lungs” (169). Daniel’s ability to think of Phyllis as his naïve and unwitting victim,
then, relies on her perceiving herself that way. In acknowledging pleasure within pain –
and by not acknowledging his “cruelty” – Phyllis undermines Daniel’s ability to view her
reductively as naïve, which apparently undermines his catharsis in turn.
Dissatisfied by her playing along, Daniel wants Phyllis’s unwitting submission,
and during a trip to Riverside Park, he gains it by shifting his abusive attention from her
to their son. In what starts as a touching parent/child encounter, Daniel begins to toss
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baby Paul playfully in the air. He recalls: “Phyllis smile[s] and out of the corner of my
eye I c[an] see an old lady with a cane stopping for a moment in her walk to smile at the
attractive young family.” Though we might assume this moment to be a positive, healing
one, being perceived as a normal family man enrages Daniel, and his playful game
becomes dangerous. He writes: “I thr[o]w my son in the air a little higher and he
screeche[s] a little louder and I ca[tch] him….I [toss] my son higher and higher, and now
he laugh[s] no longer but crie[s] out.” Daniel is not deterred by the fear he sees on Paul’s
face. Though he says that he “can’t bear to think about this murderous feeling,” he
concedes that he “enjoy[s Phyllis’s] fear” (130-31). Phyllis’s opposition here exposes the
limits of her willing precarity. Though she consents to offering her body, she resists
Daniel’s attempts to victimize their son. Yet Paul – who cannot choose – functions as a
contrast to his mother, illuminating the degree to which Phyllis’s unbeing is voluntary.
This scene likewise makes the common reading of Daniel as healthier and more
empowered than either his sister or his wife all the more disturbing. While both Susan
and Phyllis willingly bear the physical burden of history on their own bodies, Daniel
projects it onto the bodies of others, and here he projects it onto the body of a helpless
child. In perceiving Daniel as stronger than both his sister and his wife, critics imply that
they see more strength in a need to threaten others than in a willingness to accept one’s
own precarity, or to help another work through his. Viewed instead in terms of shadow
feminism, Phyllis’s unbeing takes on a disturbing nobility. If she helps heal Daniel, his
sins will not be visited upon his son (as his father’s were visited – though in a different
way – upon him). Like Lucy’s decision to stay on at her farm, this motive is unsettling.
Yet it serves as evidence that Phyllis’s unbeing is well reasoned.
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Despite the abuse of the scene with baby Paul, there are some indications that the
symbolic justice both Susan and Phyllis facilitate works to heal Daniel. Levitt, for
example, claims that Daniel “is no [Biblical] Daniel to save his people, but perhaps, he
comes to realize, he can save himself and his own wife and son” (101). There are
occasions when Daniel is kind to Phyllis, and we might conclude that, like David Lurie’s
need to rescue Lucy, Daniel’s need to seek retribution has been quelled by Phyllis’s act of
unbeing. Daniel writes, “my wife c[omes] back while I [am] ill with the flu and she
t[akes] care of me. I [want] to cry when I [hear] the front door open.” He’s clearly still
wary – saying, “I [am] waiting for her to make one false move of solicitation” – yet he
remarks with self-awareness: “since she’s come back I have not worked on her” (168-9).
Yet though he concedes without apparent resentment: “forgiving me turns her on, I have
no other explanation for the fact that she keeps returning,” Daniel concomitantly notes
that “small premature age lines have appeared at the corners of her eyes. Her face has
thinned out and her thighs have got slimmer. Suffering does fine work with the chisel. I
am finding her admirable, which disturbs me” (168). So though he does not “work on
her,” he still takes pleasure in her suffering.
Moreover, Daniel continues to connect Phyllis’s body with the political crimes
done to his parents, and he continues to garner pleasure from watching even small
amounts of suffering play out on that body. This association stands to offer catharsis, but
it fails to do so. As Fowler contends, “Daniel cannot forgive…[his] personality is by turns
vicious, vulgar, shocking, agonized” (48). After her return, for example, Daniel notes
with satisfaction that Phyllis is “way down.” Watching her, he observes “a gesture she
has with her long light hair, taking the loose strands falling past her cheek and tucking
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them behind her ear.” And he further recalls that “to make it all perfect, from where I
stood her head was just under the poster of the Isaacsons” (169). His pleasure in this
scene seems untempered by the work of Phyllis’s unbeing. Though Harter and Thompson
argue that Daniel is ultimately “liberate[d] from the past,” which “allows him belatedly to
assume manhood and identity” (47), I contend that – unlike David’s – Daniel’s allegiance
to the dominance of sovereignty has not been undermined, which is ironic in that Daniel
had far fewer reasons to be invested in the first place. I maintain that Daniel never lost
“manhood,” that instead his resistance to vulnerability is demonstrative of a wealth of
constructed manhood and a loss (or denial) of inherent humanity.
Finally, though Phyllis’s unbeing is arguably elective, we are never given
indication that she attains a significant form of re-being. Perhaps her subordination is
limited precisely because she derives pleasure from it – which cannot be said of the other
women considered in this project. Phyllis does not forsake privilege, as Erica and Lucy
do, nor does she refuse complicity in sovereignty, as we see with Susan, Erica, Sihem,
and Lucy. Thus – in terms both of its internal ramifications for herself and its external
ramifications for Daniel – Phyllis’s self-abnegation accomplishes very little. Though I
maintain that Phyllis demonstrates far greater agency in her precarity than we see with
Daniel, her unbeing amounts largely to a pleasurable performance of submission.

Daisy
Like Lucy, Daisy Perowne in Ian McEwan’s Saturday volunteers her body against
her father’s wishes in an effort to dispel violence. In keeping with the move towards
domesticity seen throughout 9/11 literature, Saturday portrays a single family as a way
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into contemporary politics. The setting, as Barbara Puschmann-Nalenz describes it, is
“the ‘community of anxiety’” that arose “after…the terrorist attacks in Madrid and before
the bombings in London” (199). Specifically, the novel takes place in London on 15
February 2003, which holds the significance of having seen the largest protest in world
history.25 The novel’s protagonist, Henry Perowne, encounters protesters on several
occasions throughout his day, blurring the spheres of public and private. The personal
affairs of the Perowne family thus function allegorically, forcing readers to consider
alongside Henry the ethical and moral concerns that attend matters of privilege and lack,
west and non-west, terrorism and counter-terrorism.
The novel’s climax involves a literal intrusion of the public into the private space,
as an encounter Henry has earlier in the day leads to two men forcibly entering his home,
and (among other intrusions) ordering his daughter, Daisy, to strip. Ultimately, the family
overpowers the leader, Baxter, and is spared further violence. Tammy Amiel-Houser
observes that – in no small part because of the novel’s pseudo-heroic ending – critics
largely take McEwan to task “for producing a contemporary update of the common
Western fable of the privileged male hero” who is “faced with violen[ce]” but who
ultimately “overcom[es] his opponents, thus restoring order and stability” (129). As
Amiel-Houser concedes, this reading is shortsighted. I argue this is so because (among
other reasons) Perowne does not “overcome” Baxter on his own. He and his son, Theo,
do ultimately catch Baxter off guard – causing him to fall down the stairs and sustain a
brain injury that requires surgery – but I contend that they are in a position to do so not
by virtue of their plotting, but because of the subservience displayed by both Daisy and
25

Though gatherings took place all over the globe, London’s witnessed an estimated one million protesters
speaking out against the impending war in Iraq.
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her mother, Rosalind.26 While Henry resists Baxter’s invasion – continually imagining
ways to dominate the scene – his daughter intuits the wisdom of compliance, and when
Baxter holds a knife to Rosalind’s neck and orders Daisy to strip, she undresses quickly,
saying, “‘I’ll do anything you want. Anything’” (227). The repetition of the word
“anything” in her promise to Baxter conveys the degree to which Daisy is willing to
submit herself sexually to protect her family, and the ensuing scene functions as her
unbeing: smaller in scope than either Lucy’s or Phyllis’s, but a striking example of the
degree to which singular moments of submission stand to undermine aggression. In her
being, Daisy is privileged in ways not dissimilar from Erica in the previous chapter: she
has both health and wealth enough for Baxter’s struggles to be foreign to her. Yet in her
willing sexual subservience, Daisy undermines the privilege her position carries with it,
humbling herself to Baxter in ways Henry consistently thinks he should, but never does.
I explore Henry’s ambivalence to vulnerability before offering a look into Daisy’s
decisive, self-exposing form of unbeing. Puschmann-Nalenz contends that Saturday
“raises…more than two hundred years after Kant and the Age of Enlightenment…[the
subject] of free will in moral choices versus contingency” (189). Though critics almost
exclusively focus on how agency manifests in Henry – ignoring it as it appears in other,
less privileged characters – the unbeing Daisy resigns herself to during the invasion can
be seen – through the lens of shadow feminism – as a strong example of “free will
[within] a moral choice.” Daisy’s compliance is especially apparent in contrast with her
father, who – though far more willing to admit culpability than either David or Daniel –
resists the precarity of privilege while concomitantly obsessing over it. Henry
26

Though I don’t discuss Rosalind with any depth, she remains calm throughout the encounter,
surrendering to Baxter’s violence in similar ways to Daisy, in spite of which she is rarely mentioned in
critical explorations of the novel.
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experiences Paul Gilroy’s postcolonial melancholia in a number of ways, demonstrating
an awareness not consistently seen in the privileged men of this chapter.27 As Elizabeth
Wallace observes, Perowne expresses discomfort with such things as his luxury car
(which he continually reminds himself that he deserves for all of his hard work, thereby
demonstrating guilt over his possessions), his relationship to Baxter (to whom Henry
feels responsible because he, Henry, has been much more advantaged), and his wealth
(which contrasts sharply to the poverty of the people he witnesses in the park right
outside his window).28 Henry does not take his privilege for granted, nor does he take
total credit for it. Though he benefits from affluence – and he actively resists losing it –
he acknowledges that his success is not built merely of hard work, but also of chance.
Though Henry is aware of his own vulnerable position, however, he does not
submit to it. Indeed, his first inclination in the various encounters he faces throughout the
day is to hold himself responsible for the consequences of economic and genetic
disparity. After a minor accident in which Baxter’s car scrapes his, for example, Perowne
critiques his own behavior towards Baxter, thinking, “he could have been friendlier….he
should have relaxed, from a position of strength, instead of which he was indignant and
combative” (114). Similarly, of street vendors in the park outside his home, we read that
Henry “vaguely feels…that he owes them an apology. One day he’ll buy something from
them” (148). So too, during Baxter’s break-in, Henry feels “responsible. He humiliated
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In Postcolonial Melancholia, Paul Gilroy claims that until the nations responsible for colonization face
and grieve their own capacity for destruction, guilt and fear of reciprocity will linger on for those whose
governments have taken the liberty of establishing a hierarchy of human worth on behalf of the world.
28

On the way to his car, for example, Perowne passes a street sweeper, and, “as the two men pass, their
eyes meet briefly, neutrally….For a vertiginous moment Henry feels himself bound to the other man, as
though on a seesaw with him, pinned to an axis that could tip them into each other’s life. Perowne looks
away” (73).
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Baxter in the street in front of his sidekicks….He used or misused his authority to avoid
one crisis, and his actions have steered him into another, far worse” (219). According to
Amiel-Houser, Saturday “resonate[s] with Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics of Otherness, with
its emphasis on the self as infinitely responsible toward the ever-strange and
incomprehensible Other” (128). Indeed, Henry exhibits a noblesse oblige sense of
responsibility, though it manifests more in the form of guilt than of action.
While his guilt demonstrates his understanding of precarity, Henry finds the quest
for dominance to be biological and not, therefore, something that should necessarily be
overcome. In this way, his Enlightenment-inspired logic leads to a secondary reaction of
justification, which overwhelms his willingness to be vulnerable. This is arguably the
reason that Henry’s acceptance of precarity rarely leads to personal sacrifice. He notes:
“self-interested social organisms find it rational to be violent sometimes” (88). So too, of
a squash game, Perowne contends that beneath civility, “there’s only the irreducible urge
to win, as biological as thirst” (115). And of ordering lobster in a restaurant, he advises:
“the key to human success and domination, is to be elective in your mercies” (128).
Henry privileges the willingness to overcome his inclination towards vulnerability, and
that privileging both leads to and informs his response to Baxter’s invasion.29
Holding an acceptance of vulnerability alongside a resistance to it proves
problematic for Henry. Postcolonial guilt mixes with Enlightenment rationality to muddy
his response to both, leaving him philosophically irresolute and somewhat paralyzed in
actual response. For example, moments after his original encounter with Baxter, Henry
29

We see his privileging of dominance again when Henry encounters women wearing burkhas later in the
day. From the position of his Mercedes S 500, he observes “three figures in black burkhas emerge from a
taxi on Devonshire,” and “he can’t help his distaste, it’s visceral. How dismal, that anyone should be
obliged to walk around so entirely obliterated” (124). He cannot see in their choice to adhere to the
mandates of their religion and culture anything but absolute “obliterat[ion].”
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“feel[s] a rising unease…a disquiet he can’t yet define, though guilt is certainly an
element.” Interestingly, this awareness is followed by acute consciousness of “his left
knee creak[ing] as he stretches…When will it be time to give up this game? His fiftieth
birthday?....Get out before he rips an anterior cruciate ligament, or crashes to the parquet
with his first coronary.” Between his psychic and bodily “unease,” Henry “suddenly feels
his own life as fragile and precious” (103). Guilt yields to feelings of vulnerability, then,
and neither emotion is comfortable for Perowne. We likewise see guilt and precarity
collide when Baxter first enters the Perowne home, having forced his way in with
Rosalind at gunpoint. Upon recognizing Baxter, Henry immediately “tries to see the room
through his eyes,” noticing “champagne, the gin and the bowls of lemon and ice, the
belittlingly high ceiling and its mouldings, the Bridget Riley prints flanking the
Hodgkin…the cherry wood floor beneath the Persian rugs, the careless piles of serious
books, the decades of polish in the thakat table.” Having observed anew his own
affluence, Henry thinks: “the scale of retribution could be large” (213). His awareness is
seemingly constant, but Henry is just as constantly unwilling to act on it by ceding
anything but mental space to the guilt he feels.
While Henry grapples with but does not surrender to guilt, Daisy’s willingness to
degrade herself can be read as evidence that – like Lucy Lurie and Phyllis Lewin – her
understanding of precarity is not merely theoretical. Even before we meet Daisy,
McEwan establishes her as playful, comfortable with the vulnerability of her own
sexuality. Perowne notes, for example, that “it would be easier for him if her poems
weren’t so wanton – it isn’t only wild sex they celebrate, but restless novelty, the rooms
and beds visited once and left at dawn” (189). Even in her state of being, then, Daisy
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demonstrates a preference for risk-taking over measured control. She makes that
preference clear before the break-in, when she insists to her father that, politically
speaking, resistance to the potential threats of Hussein-led Iraq will only make Great
Britain less safe. Of the impending Iraq War, she asks Henry, “‘do you think we’re going
to be any safer at the end of all this? We’ll be hated right across the Arab world’” (194).
In ironic response to her pleas for pacifism, Henry is “adversarial,” with “poison in his
blood…and fear and anger, constricting his thoughts” (195). Until her unbeing models its
sanative effect, Daisy’s insistence on surrender provokes not understanding but hostility.
Despite the ambivalence he expresses throughout the day – “he’s a dove with Jay
Strauss, and a hawk with his daughter” (198) – the aggression Henry exhibits in this
conversation with Daisy marks his thoughts during the home invasion as well: we see
him analyze how he might overcome Baxter throughout the encounter. He observes, for
example, that Theo “stands with his arms crossed, still staring tensely into the ground,
possibly calculating,” and that “his forearms look strong.” So too, he contemplates
“act[ing] alone, wrestl[ing] Baxter to the floor and trust[ing] the others will pile in,” or
“hit[ting] Baxter hard in the face with a clinched fist and hop[ing] that Theo will take on
Nigel” (221). But moments later, we read that “when Henry imagines himself about to
act, and sees a ghostly warrior version of himself leap out of his body at Baxter, his heart
rate accelerates so swiftly that he feels giddy, weak, unreliable” (221). Though he seems
to buy the media representation Faludi observes – that it is men’s duty to save women
from terrorism – Henry wavers when it comes time to perform such principles. This
leaves him open to the lessons of vulnerability his daughter is about to teach. Aggression
and resistance – which arguably got the Perowne family into this potentially catastrophic
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situation – will not be the tools that help them out of it. This aspect of the domestic
narrative also works in terms of Saturday’s political allegory and its implications for
national sovereignty. Aggressive western practices may have brought 9/11 about, but
those same practices have done little to overcome the threat it embodied.
Conversely, Daisy models precarity from the beginning of the invasion. Her first
words to Baxter, for example, are calm, measured, and subservient: “‘if you leave now
and never come back I give you my word we won’t phone the police. You can take
anything you want’” (222). Similarly, when Baxter punches her grandfather, Daisy
attends to his bleeding, after which Henry observes: “looking after her grandfather has
helped her” (220-21). Though we never gain access to her thoughts, Daisy’s actions
indicate a focus on caretaking and submitting, and not on retaliation. That focus is most
apparent, of course, when Baxter and Nigel order her to strip. Daisy’s method of
undressing makes clear her commitment to unbeing. The scene finds Daisy “pulling off
her tights with an impatient gasp, almost tearing at them, then throwing them down”
before quickly “pulling off her black sweater and chucking that down too.” Even stripped
down to her underclothes – “white, freshly laundered for the journey from Paris” – we’re
told that “she doesn’t pause,” and that “in one unbroken movement she unhitches her bra
and hooks off her knickers with her thumb and lets them fall from her hands.” Finally,
once undressed, she “glance[s] at her mother, but only briefly. It’s done. Head bowed,
Daisy stands with her hands at her sides” (226). Though no doubt profoundly humiliated
by this violation, Daisy’s unbeing is resolute. Moreover, her actions are in keeping with
her political assertions from earlier in the evening. In their discussion before the invasion,
Henry accuses Daisy of being blind to “genocide and torture, the mass graves, the
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security apparatus, the criminal totalitarian state” saying that though it opposes invasion,
“the iPod generation doesn’t want to know” what’s actually happening at the hands of
Saddam. Daisy demonstrates here not merely that she is aware, but that she is willing to
live her resistance to aggression by facing torment herself.
Of significance are Daisy’s family members’ varied responses to her willingness,
which are in keeping with gendered norms and which serve as evidence of the strength
and value of vulnerability. For example, Rosalind “is shaking badly as Baxter leans over
her shoulder and steadies his fidgety hand with its blade against her neck. But she doesn’t
turn away from Daisy” (226, emphasis mine). Despite the horror of watching her
daughter be violated, Rosalind stays present in the moment. This response contrasts with
Theo, who is “so stricken that he can’t bear to look at his sister. He keeps his gaze fixed
on the floor.” We read that Daisy’s grandfather “too is looking away.” While averting
one’s eyes is no doubt respectful, it also serves as a way of avoiding the reality of the
situation. In looking away, Theo and Grammaticus demonstrate their extreme discomfort
with the vulnerability Daisy models. In his ambiguity as a sometimes-hawk/sometimesdove, Perowne does not maintain contact like Rosalind does, but neither does he look
away. Once Daisy is undressed, Henry realizes that he “hasn’t seen his daughter naked in
more than twelve years,” and yet “he remembers this body from bath times, and…it is
above all the vulnerable child he sees” (226, emphasis mine). Though he erroneously
associates her well-reasoned submission with childhood, this is the first indication we
have that Henry recognizes something profound in Daisy’s actions: that he is struck by
her willingness to accept her own precarity so publicly.
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The depth of her vulnerability is made all the more evident when we become
aware – alongside Baxter and Henry – that Daisy is pregnant. Daisy’s precarity is thus
even greater: through her unbeing, the secret of her pregnancy has been exposed.
Interestingly, though, the fact that she is with child changes the dynamic of the encounter.
When Baxter realizes that Daisy is expecting, he averts his gaze from her body – focusing
instead on her poetry manuscript and seemingly abandoning his apparent plans for sexual
assault. “‘Well, well. Look at that!’” he says, “pointing with his free hand across the table
at Daisy’s book.” Instead of raping her, then, Baxter demands that Daisy read her own
poetry to him. Daisy initially consents to this new order, “tak[ing] the book” from him.
As she attempts to read, however, we see that “all her resolution is gone. She closes the
book. ‘I can’t do it,’ she wails. ‘I can’t’” (228). Though she is willing to degrade herself
sexually to protect her family, she balks at this unorthodox demand.
What critics credit as Daisy’s salvation in this scene is her grandfather’s coded
suggestion that she recite not her own work, but Matthew Arnold’s poem, “Dover
Beach.” Baxter believes this to be her poetry; thus she never exposes herself in writing.
Roland Weidle summarizes the scene as it is generally read, suggesting that “when Daisy
recites Matthew Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach’ to the thugs, Baxter and Nigel, the poem has
such a strong effect on the intruders that they do not carry out their original intention to
rape her” (67, emphasis mine). Ultimately, then, Arnold’s work (along with Daisy’s
grandfather’s hints to read it) is credited with “‘convert[ing]’ Baxter and lead[ing] to the
final happy ending,” and also with “generat[ing] understanding, compassion and empathy
in Perowne for Baxter and his plight” (67). Kathleen Wall offers Arnold even greater
praise, concluding (despite textual evidence throughout the novel as to how easily
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Baxter’s mood can be swayed) that “the recitation of ‘Dover Beach’ astonishes and calms
an angry man determined to rape Daisy Perowne and probably kill her family, and makes
him hopeful about a cure for the disease that is shortening his life and promising a
horrific death” (757). Like Weidle, Wall credits the poem with the lenience Henry
ultimately takes on Baxter, arguing that it “prompt[s Henry] to prod the family into
agreeing not to press charges and to get Baxter into a humane facility rather than into an
inhumane prison” (785). Despite her willingness to strip and face the likelihood of being
raped in front of her family, then, and despite reciting poetry naked while her mother is
held at knife-point (she does not dress again until well after the reading), Daisy is not
assumed to play much of a role – beyond the fact of her pregnancy – in Baxter’s decision
to back down, nor in the changes her father experiences after the encounter.30
I argue that critics neglect to recognize the profundity of Daisy’s role in the
positive outcome of the invasion because female self-abnegation is largely invisible, and
when it is seen, it is read as victimhood. To make it more visible, I find it helpful to
consider Daisy’s two possible scenarios – being raped and reading her poetry – beside
one another, which exposes the significance of her willingness to yield to sexual
advances. This is important because without such contrast, her submissiveness may
appear inconsequential, so accustomed are we to seeing women perform sexual
willingness. Daisy’s resistance to Baxter’s demand for a reading is telling because it
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Amiel-Houser does concede that “Daisy’s body of flesh and blood and her body of words and rhymes
become interconnected,” and that “they become the catalyst that alters the chain of events in a surprising
way” (139). And she likewise suggests that “Daisy’s loving speech is an appeal to [Baxter], suggesting
through Arnold’s poetics, as well as by her own ‘varied tone’ and exposed and confessing body, the
promise of life, of faithfulness and honesty” (146). Yet she virtually glosses over the scene in which Daisy
strips, saying only that “the scene begins when Baxter forces Daisy to take off her clothes,” and that “she
does so in quiet panic, exposing a hitherto unknown pregnancy” (139), and attributing none of the
evening’s non-lethal outcome to Daisy’s actions.
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indicates that she is possessed of agency. This, in turn, makes it clear that – though we
might be inclined to take her compliance with his sexual demands as an indication of her
powerlessness – Daisy is agented, and she’s aware of that fact throughout the encounter.
Her preference for offering her body over her work reveals much about her identity as a
contemporary British woman. As with Phyllis and Lucy, sexual compliance seems an
available form of unbeing for Daisy. Her choice to strip, and to offer herself bodily to the
invaders, is just that: a choice. If it weren’t a choice, she’d have been equally submissive
to Baxter’s demand for her poetry. Once we recognize this, it becomes evident that Daisy
acts in opposition to the doctrine of resistance that is integral to the illusion of
sovereignty at work in the British government’s decision to join the U.S. in invading Iraq.
In keeping with her opposition to the pending invasion of Iraq, Daisy refuses to deny her
own inherent vulnerability. Like Lucy, Daisy uses her position as a woman-citizen to
model for her nation the power subservience can have during precarious historical times.
While her willing unbeing in this scene has power, we don’t see enough of Daisy
in its aftermath to know whether or not it leads to a significant re-being. What we do see
is the degree to which her embrace of precarity undermines the political ambiguity that
has kept Henry paralyzed. Indeed, her vulnerability is ultimately more powerful than
Henry’s apparent faith in the Enlightenment rationality that legitimates both personal and
national sovereignty. During the attack, it first appears as though Daisy’s vulnerability
will make Henry more inclined towards aggression. When Henry thinks of Daisy’s
pregnant state – “the overwhelming fact of it” – for example, he concludes, “it’s time to
act” (232). In the aftermath of the encounter, however, Henry becomes more and more
compassionate towards Baxter, agreeing to operate on him out of a desire to save his life
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and resolving not to press charges for the invasion. According to Amiel-Houser, “the
break-in, combined with Daisy’s reading and Baxter’s unexpected exhilaration, work
together to shake up Perowne’s subjectivity, opening him to experience the wonders of
the Other’s enigmatic singularity and so, finally, to acknowledge his involuntary debt to
Baxter” (139). I would argue, though, that as Lucy’s did for David, Daisy’s performance
of precarity works to teach Henry how to respond to such a “debt”: what it looks like to
move beyond recognition of guilt and towards a lived form of reparations.
Puschmann-Nalenz describes Henry’s post-invasion practice of compassion as a
desire “to atone for his feelings of superiority, which made him ‘act unprofessionally,
using his medical knowledge’ (111) to humiliate Baxter earlier in the day and secure his
own escape” (200). But she attributes that desire to “his interest in and enthusiasm for the
medical profession” (201). I suggest that Henry’s position as a surgeon influences his
thoughts throughout the day, and that therefore it cannot be responsible for the shift he
undergoes after the invasion. It seems necessary that this scene would have some impact
over Henry, and it would be easy to assume that it would be the opposite of what we see:
that Henry would be filled with rage towards Baxter for having humiliated and terrified
his daughter. That his reaction is so counter to anger suggests that something more
meaningful to him than a poem he’s rarely heard has had an impact. We get hints at what
that might be with his preoccupations at the end of the day. Standing in his bedroom after
successfully operating on Baxter, Henry finds that it’s “harder…to recall, or to inhabit,
the vigour of his row with Daisy…. A woman bearing a child has her own authority.”
Already, then, Henry’s resistance to the ideas Daisy put forth in their argument is
weakened, and he grants her an “authority” he himself cannot possess. Though his newly
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tentative stance is no doubt a product of a number of influences, I argue that Daisy –
perhaps the most overlooked – is likely the most substantial.
In an interview with Helen Whitney, McEwan said of the terrorist attackers on
9/11: “what those holy fools clearly lacked, or clearly were able to deny themselves, was
the ability to enter into the minds of the people they were being so cruel to. Amongst
their crimes, is, was, a failure of the imagination, of the moral imagination” (207). If
Baxter’s invasion of the Perowne home metaphorizes both the attacks of 9/11 and the
invasion of Iraq – and if we conclude that Baxter lacks the “moral imagination” to intuit
the impact of his behavior over this family – Henry’s ultimate response to him
undermines the cycle of blind aggression, acknowledging the pain of Baxter’s existence
in generous and dynamic-altering ways. Thus I maintain that Daisy’s unbeing – which
takes the form of her willingness to absorb Baxter’s violence for her family’s sake –
works to teach Henry a new way of being outside of his sovereignty-driven willingness to
dominate. Just as Lucy models vulnerability for David, and Phyllis strives to do so for
Daniel, Daisy teaches Henry to subvert his allegiance to dominance in deference to a
recognition that our very bodies are always already vulnerable, and that seeking to deny
that fact (as Henry does in his first encounter with Baxter and as the United States and
Great Britain do in their invasion of Iraq) only increases the depth of our risk. At least
externally, then, Daisy’s unbeing is profoundly successful.
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CHAPTER III: ANTI-SOVEREIGN SILENCE
I cannot muster the 'we' except by finding the way in which I am tied to 'you,' by trying to
translate but finding that my own language must break up and yield if I am to know you. You are
what I gain through this disorientation and loss. This is how the human comes into being, again
and again, as that which we have yet to know.
~ Judith Butler, Precarious Life

Though in ways more abstract than her life or her sexuality, a woman’s voice is
foundational to identity, and in an array of literary texts from the twentieth century, it is
often voluntarily sacrificed. Here the distinction between willing and forced submission
is especially important, in that the degree to which women are denied agency is a
prominent theoretical discussion. In this chapter, I look at Leda Helianos of Glenway
Wescott’s Apartment in Athens, Rosa Burger of Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter,
and the unnamed “Barbarian Girl” of J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians. The
shifting power structures of empire prove a revelatory context for considering the
transgressive potential of self-silencing; thus these novels all engage the fallout of
colonization. They portray sovereignty – the benchmark of imperial rule – as it manifests
and is resisted in, respectively, Germany’s World War II occupation of Greece, the
middle years of South African apartheid, and the bitter decline of an unspecified empire.
In withdrawing their voices – sometimes literally and other times figuratively, by ceding
their influence – the characters I consider revoke their consent to the travesties done
either in their name or to their fellow citizens. I argue that the silence performed by these
women functions as the verbal equivalent of a hunger strike: they subvert power by
refusing to participate in demands for it.
In unbeing, these characters withdraw their participation from unconscionable
political circumstances. And in re-being, they take up their voices again when it becomes
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possible to do so without bearing complicity in oppressive narratives of sovereignty.
Butler explores self-silencing in Precarious Life, though she assumes it to be a selfprotective – and not a self-abnegating – gesture. She writes that “it would be heinous” to
be thought of as “treasonous”; therefore, people whose opposition to the status quo might
position them to be read as such often “[fail] to speak, or [speak] in throttled ways, in
order to sidestep the terrorizing identification that threatens to take hold” (xx). Though
Butler’s larger concern is forced silence – which she calls a “strategy for quelling dissent
and limiting the reach of critical debate” (xx) – she likewise contends: “it is precisely
because one does not want to lose one’s status as a viable speaking being that one does
not say what one thinks” (xx). So for Butler, silence is a means of preserving the ability
to speak for some later point. I argue that the women of this chapter are just as deliberate
in their silence as Butler suggests, but that their motive is not protection of their
“viability” as speakers, but rather sacrifice of that viability in favor of the opportunity to
affect political change. In any threatening circumstance, we have, according to Thomas
Crocker, “a choice between competing narratives deployed by competing ways of seeing
the world.” We can either “accept the dominant script” of mandated sovereignty, or we
can “accept the challenge of narratively constructing a new way of [being]” (306). Within
their respective political landscapes – each turbulent with demands for power – these
characters “accept [that] challenge.” They “refuse to speak,” and in so doing, they refuse
to participate in the injustice inherent to sovereignty’s “dominant script.” To grasp the
power of their refusal, it is important to read – amidst the cacophony of violence – as
deeply into silence as we can manage.
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Leda
The youngest character I explore in this project is the complex, often mute Leda
Helianos, of Glenway Wescott’s critically-neglected World War II novel, Apartment in
Athens. Despite her youth and her relative inexperience, Leda stands to reveal a great deal
about the subversive potential of those in positions of profound vulnerability. As the
youngest member of the Helianos family, Leda is ten years old when the German Captain
Kalter takes possession of her family’s home, and, by proxy, the family itself. She is
described throughout the novel as psychologically troubled, and we’re told that the war is
largely to blame for her affliction. Yet Leda’s silent surrender is too complex to conclude
that she is merely a victim of that conflict. Instead, I argue that study of her character
exposes the power of silence in settings where the voice is used predominantly to
manipulate and coerce. In her unbeing, Leda demonstrates her resistance to occupation,
and in her ultimate re-being, she proves that her resistance was of value.
Psychologists working in the subfield of trauma have begun to identify the
influence of war over children as a neglected field of research. Though Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) as it manifests in combatants, prisoners of war, and victims of
World War II concentration camps is well documented (Berntsen and Rubin 127), little
data exists regarding its appearance in children, who, for various reasons, are especially
vulnerable to the trauma of warfare. This field of study stands to expose not how
combatants – trained aggressors invested in the narrative of sovereignty – handle trauma,
but how it is met by children, especially female children, who I argue are as far removed
from the dominance mandate as it is possible to be. I suggest that Apartment in Athens is
well positioned to offer such insight. As World War II remains the conflict that resulted
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in the highest number of civilian casualties, victims of that war offer researchers the
greatest opportunity to understand this issue.31 Leda exposes the traumatizing effects of
warfare on children. Yet she also demonstrates the degree to which those effects can be
undermined by a refusal to participate in them. Leda’s youth complicates the trajectory of
being, unbeing, and re-being that I trace in characters throughout this study. Because she
is so young, Leda’s unbeing is, in some ways, her being: she has no time to form an
identity before the war. For Leda, then, being is itself subversive, which is made all the
more apparent when she demonstrably attains re-being after the war.
The absence of data on the trauma non-combatants face is a result of what literary
critic James Campbell terms “Combat Gnosticism,” the privileging of the combatant’s as
“a qualitatively separate order of experience” (203). Those who live through war without
waging it are granted little authority. If they speak about warfare, few listen. Dorthe
Berntsen and David Rubin observe that because of such privileging, the vast majority of
those whose reactions have been studied were adults at the time of their trauma (128).32
Indeed, according to Joshua Barenbaum, Vladislav Ruchkin, and Mary Schwab-Stone,
“children under war-time duress are largely a voiceless population whose rights and
needs are often subordinate to those of soldiers, and the necessities of war” (41, emphasis
mine). This privileging is a clear result of our conditioned preference for aggression over
vulnerability. Combatants are – by nature of both their training and their survival instinct
31

In a 2006 American Psychological Association study, Dorthe Berntsen and David Rubin sought to
evaluate the long-term impact of PTSD in children of World War II who were exposed to the German
occupation of Denmark. In the resulting paper, Berntsen and Rubin cite the civilian death toll of that war as
over forty million, with nearly twenty million children orphaned: numbers not seen in any war before or
after (127).
32

So too, a 2004 study conducted by Joshua Barenbaum, Vladislav Ruchkin, and Mary Schwab-Stone
concentrated on the impact of warfare on child development. Barenbaum, Ruchkin, and Schwab-Stone
assert that “the first literature on the effects of war on children dates largely from World War II, and is
sparse...Not until the 1980s was more systematic enquiry conducted” (42).
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– inherently invested in sovereignty. By listening exclusively to their voices, any notion
of voluntary submission in the face of warfare is absent. The voices of mothers, for
example, have long been discounted in wartime discourse, as have those of medical
workers, pacifists, and men who are medically unqualified to fight. Accordingly, the
voices of female children are entirely missing from this discussion. And with Leda, that
voice is missing: she is largely silent. Seen in this context, however, her voicelessness
appears transgressive. If even in speaking, Leda would not have been heard, then perhaps
the most subversive thing she could do is withhold voice.
On the surface, Wescott offers no shortage of textual evidence to support the
Helianos family’s assumption of Leda’s powerlessness. We read that “she had never been
a clever child” (3), and that her dimness deepens upon Germany’s invasion, after which
“her infant character took on a strange aspect, as if she drew all the confusion and
intimidation in with her breath, absorbed it through the pores of her skin in an
unwholesome damp” (3). Having internalized the occupation, Leda “rarely spoke, sitting
and watching things without a word for hours at a time” (4). Already silent, then, she one
day observes “eight or ten bodies l[ying] on the pavement, machine-gunned” (6) in the
aftermath of a protest against the German occupiers, which leads her to grow even more
detached, and “for two and a half days she would not, or could not, move or speak or eat
or sleep” (5, emphasis mine). Wescott’s vacillation here – that she either “would not” or
“could not” make use of her voice – affords the possibility of agency. Yet her family
concludes that Leda is a “poor inferior offspring” (7) and, on several occasions, that she
is “subnormal.” She is not considered possessed of agency before the war; after it she is
presented as more object than human.
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Via sibling comparison, however, we can begin to understand the gendered nature
of Leda’s response, and the degree to which her silence might be read as strategic. Her
brother Alex turns to revenge in the aftermath of their older brother’s death at war. Alex
“had taken the news of [Simon’s] death on Mount Olympos very quietly, but after
that…he began to talk only of growing strong enough to kill at least one German” (3).
Wescott uses voice here to mark Alex’s shift: he is “quiet” before Simon’s death, but
verbally aggressive after. Unlike his sister, then, Alex has a goal – a perceived purpose –
of vengeance, which we’re led to admire because such a goal is in keeping with
narratives of national sovereignty, and because aggression does not leave him as
paralyzed as his sister, who silently “shrank” (4) during the occupation. The juxtaposition
of silent Leda and outraged Alex is telling, as it makes apparent Leda’s ability to
circumvent sovereignty. As we saw with Saturday’s Daisy – who submits until Baxter
demands that she read her poetry aloud, at which time she resists, demonstrating that she
possessed the ability to resist all along – Leda regains voice when doing so allows her to
care for her family. That she is able to speak makes it clear that she has had the capacity
to do so from the outset, and that, therefore, her silent form of being is a choice.
Leda’s voicelessness is a reaction to her status as a young female citizen of
occupied Greece, and it is read as weakness even by her parents. But in a country at war –
a country that has, indeed, lost the war and been stripped of its sovereignty – we might
ask if it is a weakness to “shrink” from one’s circumstances, to refuse to participate in the
scramble for power. I suggest instead that Alex’s aggression is troublesome in that it
demonstrates his absorption of the anger and violence of warfare. In being effectively
colonized, Alex develops a desire to colonize others. While this adherence to sovereignty
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might serve him if he were a combatant, it seems impossible that it could serve him as a
child. We’re not given insight into Alex’s behavior after the occupation ends. Yet in
becoming central to his being, anger sublimates the other, natural impulses of childhood
such that it becomes difficult to imagine how Alex will ever – even after the occupation –
act on anything other than aggression.
Considered in this context, Leda’s withheld being could be described as a
temporary refusal to exist: a refusal to develop under the tyranny of warfare. Relevant to
any discussion of Leda’s identity is the body of research conducted in recent decades by
theorists, psychologists, and philosophers to understand the relationship between physical
space and the process of individualization. In an introduction to Apartment in Athens,
David Leavitt discusses the relevance of the novel’s title to its themes, claiming that “it
so perfectly captures the novel’s claustrophobia. Wescott may be our greatest poet of
confinement” (ix). Indeed, nearly all of the novel’s narrative occurs inside the apartment;
thus while very few of the more dramatic elements of war are depicted, the German
occupation of Greece remains a heavy presence. We are shown that occupation
intimately, via the occupation of the four small rooms formerly belonging to the Helianos
family and, for the bulk of the novel, possessed by Kalter. In The Poetics of Space,
Gaston Bachelard claims: “our house is our corner of the world. As has often been said, it
is our first universe, a real cosmos in every sense of the word” (4). For Leda, then, it is
not merely rooms that are occupied; it is her “universe.” Furthermore, J. Gerald Kennedy
claims that the “process of orientation, of situating ourselves in space and coming to
know the surrounding environment, seems indispensable to the recognition of the self as
a self” (8). In light of such theoretical examinations of space, I contend that the trauma of

134

wartime occupation of one’s physical space might result, for children, in two disparate
reactions. The child’s identity could be subsumed by violence, as we see with Alex, or
the child could, as Leda does, refuse to develop self-identity, resisting the form of being
imposed by violent occupation when that being will likely result in either a desire for
dominance or a case of learned helplessness. In silently unbeing as a form of being, Leda
avoids responding to aggression altogether, thereby forestalling aggression’s power.
The deliberate and subversive nature of Leda’s silence is obscured by the
invisibility of her trauma, which makes it easy to overlook the ramifications of selfabnegation as they appear in Apartment in Athens. For the most part, Leda’s suffering
bears no resemblance to the dramatic or heroic trauma often attributed to wartime. The
closest Leda comes to actually witnessing death are the “eight or ten…machine-gunned”
protesters (who are already dead when she sees them), and Kalter, whose pistol shot she
hears from the next room when he takes his own life. In fact, the family decides that, if
they survive to see the war end, they won’t talk about the experience of Kalter’s
occupation, as “it was too far below the level of what other people recognized as
courage” (35). This is especially true of Leda, who is not seen as “courage[ous]” even by
her own family. Only one other character demonstrates a similar lack of resistance to
Leda, and she is depicted as cowardly. Mrs. Helianos meets this woman at the market one
day, and the woman says sadly, “‘I pray, every day, for my little children doomed to
die…I pray for them to die faster’” (153). Mrs. Helianos resists this vulnerability,
encouraging the woman towards a more hopeful sentiment. Like this mother, however,
Leda seems to embrace the state of subdued despair that permeates occupied Greece.
Indeed, she cedes to it entirely, which makes possible her eventual re-being, and which
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likewise undermines Kalter’s authority in the home, possibly even contributing to his
suicide, by virtue of which the family’s autonomy is restored. None of these effects is
visible, however, as long as Leda is dismissed as “subhuman.”
I argue that the mere diagnosis of PTSD perpetuates the degree to which Leda is
dismissed. Of Leda’s apparent recovery at the novel’s end, Ira Johnson concludes: “the
ordeal after the death of her father is…the catalyst that works as a shock-treatment on
Leda, curing her schizophrenia and restoring her speech” (148). Johnson’s diagnosis is
outdated, yet it is indicative of the lingering assumption that something in Leda is simply
broken and needs to be fixed. And indeed, when considered in light of contemporary
diagnostic criteria, Leda’s is a clear case of PTSD. According to Berntsen and Rubin, for
a child to be diagnosed with PTSD, s/he must “have experienced, witnessed, or been
confronted with an event that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury of
him- or herself or others…[and] have responded to the trauma with intense fear,
helplessness, or horror” (127-8). After Leda accidentally stumbles upon the “sickening
wall against which [Athenian protesters] had been knocked” (6), she returns to the
apartment, with, we are told, radically decreased functionality. In the following days,
Leda is described as “a small sleepwalker” who “sat no matter where all day long” and
“lay all night long breathing with her mouth open and staring straight ahead” (5-6). In
terms of the criteria stipulated by Berntsen and Rubin for PTSD diagnosis, the sight of
the massacred protesters would have proven traumatic. And Wescott’s depiction of
Leda’s subsequent “sleepwalker” behavior seems an expression of the prolonged impact
of the experience. Leda likewise exhibits the “helplessness” attributed to PTSD. Even
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hearing her parents discuss their plight causes Leda to “cry in her silent, passive fashion”
(5).33 That she has been disturbed by what she has witnessed is clear.
Yet it seems important to note that the symptoms of PTSD are reflective only of a
passive response to warfare. Though potentially much more destructive, Alex’s learned
aggression is not included here as symptomatic of trauma; Leda’s arguably harmless
silence is. Far from wanting, as her brother does, to “kill…German[s]” – a response that
is likely to be lauded for its devotion to sovereignty and not, therefore, considered a
demonstration of trauma – Leda seems to want only solitude. PTSD, then, is but one
manifestation of traumatic stress: one that in our deference to dominance we perceive as
illness, thereby neglecting that it allows one to circumvent demands for violence. I take
no opposition with claims that Leda has been traumatized, but I call for a reading of her
introversion that yields space for strength. I argue that Leda’s ability to create solitude by
withdrawing into herself in the midst of the horrors of World War II demonstrates her
resilience, positioning her for successful re-being in that war’s aftermath.
By behaving in ways contrary to the means of dominance enacted by German
occupiers, Leda resists the sovereignty-seeking selfhood Alex develops when he
internalizes warfare. Her unbeing can best be seen, then, in terms of its internal
manifestations. To understand her actions – and to differentiate them from more
traditional pacifism – it is necessary to grasp the gravity of the occupation over Leda’s
developing identity. Wescott writes: “[Leda] had a kind of placidity, never the least
hysterical alarm” (7). Leda is detached. She does not resist; she silently cedes even her
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Leda was likewise “apt to be panic-stricken if she had any sort of open space around her or distance
stretching away before her. She preferred enclosures and hiding-places” (136), exactly the kind of
“universe” crucial to Bachelard’s self-space relationship.
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own reaction. Kennedy claims that “the extent of one’s psychic involvement in our
identification with a given place affects – and is affected by – the symbolic meanings
associated with that site” (6). Thus Leda’s ability to identify the apartment as a home in
which she could find safety would have been challenged by its occupation.
The space in which Leda must establish her individual identity, then, is already,
by force of war, occupied. It is now the enemy’s home, too. Though it could be said that
no member of the Helianos family has a place once Kalter enters their lives, if we
consider the criticality of place to a developing sense of self, Leda and Alex are the
family members most vulnerable to the occupation. It’s difficult to read strength into such
a position. Yet in a military occupation – wherein the usurpation of the property of others
becomes the primary motive – Leda’s relinquishment of self and surroundings works in
overtly oppositional ways to the machinations of warfare. In the development of his
being, Alex longs to defend Greece, thereby mimicking the behavior modeled by German
occupiers. Leda, however, makes no moves towards resistance, seeming utterly willing to
cede her home to Kalter, and Greece to Germany. Given the irrelevance Greek resistance
had, isn’t a form of being that rejects the example set by warfare preferable?
Another aspect of Wescott’s construction of Leda that makes it possible to read
her character as ironically empowered despite her silence is her name. According to
Johnson, “the name Leda is intended to call up mythical overtones,” as Leda is “a symbol
of Greece, deprived of all reason by…violation, but still alive in her sensitiveness to the
emotional atmosphere” (144). Here, Johnson refers to the Greek mythology of Leda, who
is raped by Zeus in the form of a swan, and who is impregnated as a result with Helen, on
whose beauty is placed the blame for the Trojan War. William Butler Yeats is largely

138

responsible for the revival of the Leda myth in the twentieth century, as his 1924 sonnet
“Leda and the Swan” offers a brief telescoping of that history from the rape itself to the
resulting war, and, ultimately, Agamemnon’s death at the hands of his wife – Helen’s
twin sister Clytemnestra – upon returning from Troy. Yeats writes: “A shudder in the
loins engenders there / The broken wall, the burning roof and tower / And Agamemnon
dead” (lines 9-11), suggesting that the violence done to Leda might be seen in relation to
the death of Agamemnon decades later. Considered in this context, the occupation of
Leda Helianos is charged with the potential for far-reaching consequences.
Yet the suggestion is not merely that Leda’s role is incidental. In the closing
stanza, the reader is asked:
Being so caught up,
So mastered by the brute blood of the air,
Did she put on his knowledge with his power
Before the indifferent beak could let her drop? (12-15)
Here – though Leda never speaks in the poem, never asserts her perception of the rape or
its aftermath – the speaker calls us to ask if Leda may have understood the power given
her in the event, or have grasped its long-term consequences. That “Wescott intends
[Leda] as a symbol of Greece” (Johnson 144) encourages readers to ask the same
question of Leda Helianos’s silent response to Kalter’s occupation. In this context, I
argue that Leda “puts on” some of the “power” that appears to belong entirely to Kalter,
that her silence appears an effective and calculated strategy when considered in terms of
the Yeatsian take on Leda’s power in the aftermath of rape.
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As Halberstam contends, “what looks like inaction, passivity, and lack of
resistance” can sometimes be viewed instead “in terms of the practice of stalling the
business of the dominant.” Far from mere uselessness, failure can be read, Halberstam
goes on to suggest, “as a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and
discipline and as a form of critique” (88). We need not read Leda’s silence as
powerlessness, nor her refusal to be according to the aggressive examples set before her
as a sign that she isn’t a keen observer of the situation at hand. Mrs. Helianos suggests
this herself, thinking after her husband is imprisoned that “their children, even wild Alex
and witless Leda, had more sense of self-preservation than he” (238). Though she thinks
of her daughter as “witless,” Mrs. Helianos recognizes by the end of the occupation that
Leda is possessed of some ability to survive that she and her husband lack. Though she
clearly suffers from PTSD, then, Leda likewise conveys a wisdom and intentionality not
reflected by the rest of her family: though she is dismissed as “subhuman,” she is
potentially empowered to, in Halberstam’s terms, “stall the business of the dominant.”
Though her self-abnegation is largely an internal process, Leda’s unbeing has at
least one possible external manifestation: Kalter’s suicide. Though Kalter has plenty of
motives for ending his life, Leda’s interactions with him in the weeks before his suicide
are noteworthy, and suggest the possibility that her submission contributes to his death.
Though Leda is mute at nearly all turns until Kalter is gone, she demonstrates an apparent
fondness for the German officer. Shortly after his occupation of their apartment, we are
told that Leda “was fascinated by Kalter, and she soon lost all her fear of him; then little
by little…began showing signs of liking him (39). Upon hearing Kalter’s approach of an
afternoon or evening, Leda “would slip quickly into the corridor and stand smiling up at
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him, seductive, like a tiny courtesan,” and “sometimes she took his hand, or reached out
her small grimy hand to give his fine uniform a sort of envious, luxury-loving stroke”
(39). In response to her silent but open behavior, Wescott asks if “there [was] more
cleverness in her retarded little mind than they had given her credit for,” suggesting that
perhaps Leda was “seductive in order to be on the safe side.” And indeed, her strategy is
effective: “Leda was the only one of them…whom the [major] regarded with favor” (39).
Though still a child, Leda joins the women of my second chapter in intuiting the sexuality
of vulnerability. Not only does she submit to the subjugation of identity required by the
occupation, she carefully reads the situation, anticipating the potential benefit of sexual
subordination, as well, and approaching the German officer with that benefit in mind.
Though there’s no way to know if Leda’s openness with Kalter contributes to his
unbeing, it seems possible enough to warrant mention. At any rate, Leda’s performance
of precarity has more transgressive potential than Alex’s impotent desire for revenge,
which stands no chance of leading to Kalter’s relinquishment of the apartment.
In addition to the possibility that she influences Kalter, Leda’s silence is, in at
least one small way, heard. Bachelard claims: “over and beyond our memories, the house
we were born in is physically inscribed in us” (14). If the house of our early memories
has such significance, it seems certain that a child in Leda’s position – living in a home
that has been occupied by force, and in which her family is subsequently relegated to the
status of servants – would face a problematized identity construction. Yet in Mr.
Helianos’s letter to his wife, he writes, “‘I do not believe that the children of Greece are
irremediably, incurably sick; not all of them. They are like Leda…She is not really
psychopathic, I have decided. She is only horror-stricken and paralyzed by fright, and no
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wonder’” (235). The recognition that there is not something irredeemably flawed about
his daughter – that her behavior is a reasonable reaction to trauma – implies that the
distress brought on by the German occupation will not permanently disable the Greek
people. In allowing for the temporality of Leda’s silence, Mr. Helianos takes a step
towards seeing his daughter not as broken, but as profoundly resilient.
And indeed, most of the novel’s hopeful ending is a result of Leda’s re-being.
Shortly before Kalter’s suicide, Leda is deeply silent and demonstrably withdrawn. She
utters not words, but the occasional “ghostly cry” (162). After he is dead, however –
when Greece remains occupied, but the Helianos household no longer is – we see Leda
use her voice thoughtfully and productively when her ability to do so has the power to aid
her family. We first see this shift in Leda’s relationship to voice when the children return
after Mrs. Helianos has learned of her husband’s death. Mrs. Helianos tries to stand, but
is unable to hold herself up, and we read that “the little one with her cloudy but good
instinct rose to the occasion, drew closer, and tried to bear more weight” (249). Shortly
thereafter – despite being locked in a closet by Alex when he goes for the doctor – Leda
breaks free and goes in search of a neighbor, calling, “‘Maria’s mother! Maria’s
mother!’” until she finds her and “explain[s] the emergency quite clearly” (253).
Importantly, Leda’s aggressive use of her previously silent voice does her no harm.
Wescott writes, “apparently Leda’s miraculous effort had tired her, but that was all; she
did not fall into her apathy or her tearfulness” (254). Having come into being
transgressively, Leda’s re-being – itself a hopeful reflection of the change in their living
quarters when that occupation ends – is a restoration of voice. Once her silent form of
unbeing no longer stands to undermine the occupation, Leda has no problem re-being in a
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traditionally empowered – vocal – way. In developing her identity now, Leda is arguably
more likely than her brother to live a happy, functional life.
Wescott’s portrayal of Leda Helianos – and of her response to the occupation of
her childhood home – is a haunting example of the extent to which warfare can decimate
the non-combatant. Bachelard writes, “the poet well knows that the house holds
childhood motionless ‘in its arms’” (8). For Leda and Alex, childhood itself is occupied.
Yet Apartment in Athens also serves as an example of the lessons to be learned from
decimation. Bachelard goes on to say: “a house constitutes a body of images that give
mankind proofs or illusions of stability” (17). For Leda, those “illusions of stability” are
shattered. But in their ruins we stand to discover a way of being that exists outside of
wartime mandates of dominance. In silently resisting being, Leda resists the aggression
that is modeled by Germany’s occupation of Greece. And she becomes a model herself:
demonstrating how not to internalize demands for sovereignty at a permanent cost to the
self. Whether or not this modeling contributes to Kalter’s death – and thus to the
relinquishment of the family’s apartment – Leda’s silence contrasts with Alex’s
aggression to circumvent the internal psychological effects of warfare.

Rosa
Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter is based on the family of real-life attorney
Bram Fischer: a white member of the illegal South African Communist Party who
represented Nelson Mandela in both the Treason and the Rivonia Trials. Fischer was tried
and sentenced to life in prison for his activism, and Lionel Burger – the character
Gordimer bases on him – dies in prison, leaving his daughter, Rosa, to struggle with
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questions of duty and responsibility in a nation to which she has lost a great deal. The
context of Rosa’s struggle is apartheid rule; Rosa’s being is a product of the privilege
granted her under apartheid combined with the reactionary ideologies of her antiapartheid parents. Her unbeing, then, is a reaction not just to apartheid rule, but to her
parents’ methods of opposing oppression. Of particular significance is an encounter she
has with a black man who is beating a donkey. Though Rosa is horrified by the violence
she witnesses, she knows that her ability to intercede is a product of her privileged
position, and that doing so would undermine the small bit of authority not denied the man
by racial oppression. She decides, therefore, not to act, and as she drives off she realizes
that she must “defect” from South Africa, as she “can no longer live in Lionel’s country.”
This moment is the final instigator for Rosa’s unbeing: in leaving, she carries her
silence in this encounter through to her relationship with South Africa at large,
abandoning her father’s active form of resistance. For Lionel, the only acceptable way for
a privileged white South African to live under apartheid is to rally all of one’s energies to
oppose it: to use voice unsparingly. While Lionel’s anti-apartheid struggle can be defined
as an aggressive use of voice, Rosa struggles in her unbeing to find a form of resistance
that opposes apartheid without relying on the privilege on which speech like Lionel’s
depends. She finds that form in self-silencing. Though critics read her departure from
South Africa in these terms, I argue that even in her silence and exile, Rosa never
abandons the fight against apartheid. Instead, in her unbeing, she joins that fight by
refusing to benefit from inequity. And in her re-being, Rosa joins Leda in reclaiming her
voice: she returns to South Africa to take up the work that her parents began. Yet even
within her re-being, the formative threads of voluntary silence can be found,
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differentiating Rosa’s passive form of resistance from the sovereignty-oriented form
modeled by Lionel and Cathy Burger.
Her silence differs from the other characters discussed in this chapter in that it is a
product of both Rosa’s gender and her privileged – and not her oppressed – racial status.
As such, Rosa’s actions are more in keeping with those of Disgrace’s Lucy Lurie, who
voluntarily submits to black South Africans. Both Lucy and Rosa find themselves in a
culturally liminal space – constructed not by them, but in some ways on their behalf – the
hardships of which they are willing to endure bodily. We’re conditioned to recognize
Lionel Burger’s approach to fighting oppression: resistance is a tool of both domination
and opposition. In his death, Lionel is all but canonized by the anti-apartheid movement
in South Africa for his life-long activism, which was loud and aggressive and unyielding,
and which is therefore perceived as heroic. But just as no one recognizes Lucy’s
submission as heroic, Rosa’s silent and yielding activism goes unobserved. Like the
suffering endured by the Helianos family, Rosa’s self-abnegation is “too far below the
level of what other people recognized as courage” (35). Yet careful reading of Rosa’s
actions reveals within her silence a unique and resolute example of unbeing, and a rebeing that is itself a new (and newly submissive) form of unbeing. Rosa makes herself
new once – and then again – in her struggle to find not heroism, but a way of life that
circumvents the culminative effects of misused power. I claim that by leaving South
Africa when her voice cannot be used without conveying the authority of her race
(unbeing), and later by coming home to quietly pick up her family’s legacy of activism
on her own terms (re-being), Rosa resists complicity with apartheid rule.
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Understanding Rosa’s childhood is central to understanding her pre-abnegating
state of being, and the responsibility she perceives herself to bear as a white South
African. Burger’s Daughter opens with a young, newly menstruating Rosa waiting
outside of a prison to deliver items of comfort to her political-prisoner mother. Her first
way into citizenship is thus via routinized opposition. Rosa is expected to rise above the
trauma of the occasion to fulfill the role of activist: Lionel “knew that his schoolgirl
daughter could be counted on in this family totally united in and dedicated to the
struggle” (12). The horrors of apartheid are the backdrop for Rosa’s childhood; she is not
sheltered from them. For example, she recalls overhearing that after a raid the apartheid
government “sent a black policeman to pick up the brains [of black protesters] with a
shovel” (44). Lionel and Cathy Burger make no effort to hide such trauma from their
young daughter. Consequently, though Rosa acknowledges that “perhaps it was…a
sickness not to be able to ignore that condition of a healthy, ordinary life: other people’s
suffering” (73), she nevertheless accepts that to her family “the real definition of
loneliness” was “to live without social responsibility” (77). Rosa bears that responsibility
in the form of her devotion to the communist party, which she maintains after her
mother’s death and her father’s incarceration. But as Kelly Hewson asks, “what is the
meaning of any kind of commitment if there is no self to commit?” (59). Arguably,
Rosa’s childhood is as occupied as Leda’s early life, though for Rosa the occupying force
is not a warring nation but an ideology. Her unbeing is a process of finding herself within
her role as both recipient and opponent of apartheid privilege, which she does not by
speaking, but by falling both literally and figuratively silent.
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Like Leda, the relinquishment of voice is accessible to Rosa because she thinks of
nothing – even life and freedom – as solidly hers. Having opened with an adolescent
Rosa standing outside the prison that holds her mother, Burger’s Daughter closes with
Rosa herself imprisoned, having returned to South Africa – where she is assumed to be
“her father’s daughter; she might try anything, that one” (177) – after her period of selfimposed exile. Rosa has been taught by Lionel and Cathy that “imprisonment [is] part of
the responsibilities of grown-up life” (54); as her lover Conrad says, “you’re not scared
to…go to prison….you will, won’t you. Sooner or later” (50). She is raised amidst both
the horrors of apartheid and the single-purposed struggle against those horrors, “breathed
it as children must fill their lungs indiscriminately out of mountain air or city smog,
wherever they happen to be pitched into the world” (111). As such, she has no trouble
making herself vulnerable to these realities, saying critically to Conrad: “you never got
beyond fascination with the people around Lionel Burger’s swimming-pool; you never
jumped in and trusted yourself to him, like Baasie and me, or drowned, like Tony” (117).
Rosa “jump[s] in.” In both her unbeing and her re-being – in self-silencing by defecting
and regaining voice by returning home – Rosa demonstrates that she is born of this nation
at this time: that she is always already vulnerable.
Because Rosa demonstrates comfort with precarity at every step of her
development – being, unbeing, and re-being – her agency is questioned. Karen Halil, for
example, contends that “Rosa only ‘becomes’ a revolutionary subject at the end of her
journey” (32). Her conduct along the way is seen as neither “agent[ed]” nor
“revolutionary.” Halil reads Rosa’s time in Europe as empowered, however, suggesting
that her journey “disrupts Western societies’ configurations of women’s ‘places’”
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because “women traditionally have been relegated to silence” while men “have had the
privilege of inhabiting the public realm, wielding political power, and claiming absolute
right to reason.” Halil considers Rosa’s voluntary exile in terms of “the traditional male
quest,” suggesting that she “becomes the traveler-hero, goes abroad, enjoys sexual trysts,
tells stories, and explores the public world.” In so doing, Halil argues, Rosa “ reclaims
her body and her desire, steps out of the spaces of silence, and finds her voice” (32). The
notion of Rosa needing to “[find] her voice” to be agented – to “[go] abroad” and
“[enjoy] sexual trysts” – is in keeping with liberal feminism’s narratives of agency.
Rosa’s abandonment of the fight to end apartheid – a fight not for her own freedom, but
for that of others – is seen as her sole empowered act, as it leads her towards selfpossessed pleasure and away from the burden of responsibility. In this way, Halil reduces
Rosa’s unbeing to an act of self-protection and obscures its potential political power.
Readings like Halil’s reflect the problematic assumptions of liberal feminism. In
her life in France – where she “finds her voice” in masculine terms – Rosa ignores
atrocities in favor of freedom, becoming an accomplice to the systems of power against
which her family struggled. I argue that though the actual act of leaving South Africa is
politically important, Rosa’s activities in Europe are not. As I go on to assert, they are
diversions meant to occupy her as she performs her real work of silent absence from
South Africa. Yet those diversions are the activities we’re encouraged to see as Rosa’s
most agented. Similarly, Halil reads Rosa’s unbeing critically, arguing that she “cannot
keep intact any notion of personal interiority or private space” because of which she
“loses access to her body and her agency.” Halil likewise asserts that the onset of Rosa’s
menstruation is “overshadowed by the social co-ordinates of the moment” such that
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“Rosa’s body is made public territory. She is transformed into a place where South
African politics are mapped and can be traced” (35, emphasis mine). I argue, however,
that, Rosa’s body is not “made public territory” by social forces. Instead, she makes it so,
“tracing” her nation’s political landscape onto her own body via her embrace of precarity.
I argue that we see agency and opposition not in her hedonistic pursuits while in
Europe, then, but in the other stages of Rosa’s evolving sense of self, each of which
reveals some form of transgressive vulnerability. To begin with, Gordimer demonstrates
the subtle degree to which the vulnerability of Rosa’s being disrupts the sovereignty of
apartheid. In the novel’s opening scene, Rosa’s female body functions symbolically. She
recalls that her first menstruation “began just after [her] father had made [her] go back to
bed after [her] mother had been taken away” (115). Her mother’s incarceration is the
catalyst for Rosa’s burgeoning womanhood such that when we meet her, Rosa stands
amongst the families of other political prisoners while “the internal landscape of [her]
mysterious body turns [her] inside out.” This development is tied to broader political
events as well. She recalls that “at twelve years old what happened at Sharpeville was as
immediate to me as what was happening in my own body” (115), and that “in 1956 when
the Soviet tanks came into Budapest I was [Lionel’s] little girl, dog-paddling to
him…reaching for [Lionel] as a place where no fear, hurt or pain existed” (115). It is as a
feminine political being, Halil argues, that Rosa “dismantles the concept of a Cartesian,
stable subject” (31). For Rosa – as a daughter of racially privileged communists –
political and personal vulnerability are always already interconnected. Her being is a
product of the political landscape of her nation-state. Yet like Leda Helianos, that being is
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inherently and transparently vulnerable, and because she does little to resist that fact,
Rosa undermines the illusion of sovereignty even before the silence of her unbeing.
And indeed, even before her unbeing, many of Rosa’s political activities involve
silence. For Rosa, silence is not powerlessness; it is choice. Far from an agentless child of
imprisoned activists, Rosa perceives herself as well-versed in “cunning” and
“concealment.” She recalls of a lover that when they made love, “he [did] not know that
the essence on his tongue in the bitter wax of [her] ear chamber, the brines of mouth or
vagina were not [her] secret. For [Rosa] to be free is never to be free of the survival
cunning of concealment” (142). Indeed, her words throughout the novel are tightly
controlled, strategic at every turn. We read that “Marisa’s name was not mentioned
before a third person” (144), and that Rosa “didn’t mention to Orde Greer who [her
father’s biographer] was” (145). Finally, to Afrikaaner Nationalist Brandt Vermeulen,
Rosa is a “mistress of her own silences” (183). Even in being, then, silence is a tool.
Moreover, amongst her family and peers, Rosa’s use of silence is unique. Rosa’s
father, for example, does not struggle with the ethical questions that plague his daughter.
In language Gordimer borrowed from Bram Fischer’s own trial, Lionel Burger proclaims
at his sentencing: “‘there will always be those who cannot live with themselves at the
expense of fullness of life for others’” (27). Both the heroism Lionel evokes and his
choice to make one final public statement indicate that he remains invested in active
opposition through speech. Rosa, however, lacks her father’s certitude about the tactic of
aggressive resistance. She has lost her entire family to a cause and approach determined
not by her, but on her behalf. Much of Rosa’s life has been a process of learning to live
with consequences not of her making, consequences that have led her to be, by her mid-
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twenties, “the last member of the family of five” (33). Her relationship to voice is far
different from her father’s – far more cautious – largely because Rosa has seen the ways
in which his vocally aggressive tactics have failed. That her use of voice is cautious is all
the more reason to assume that both its presence and its absence are purposeful.
Rosa perceives the occasion that first prompts her unbeing – Lionel Burger’s
death – as concomitantly devastating and “free[ing].” That occasion occurs when, “in the
second month of the third year of his life sentence, Lionel Burger develop[s] nephritis as
a result of yet another throat infection and die[s] in prison” (37). Bram Fischer died of
cancer, but Gordimer’s choice to have Lionel Burger suffer from chronic throat infections
works well as a symbol for a voice silenced by imprisonment. Lionel never voluntarily
relinquishes voice; he is forced by the nation-state, and by his failing body, to do so. This
symbol is made more complex, however, as Lionel’s imprisonment also traps Rosa. Thus
his silencing results in her empowerment, which she in turn uses to self-silence. Rosa
thinks repeatedly, “now you are free,” and she is struck by “the knowledge that [her]
father [is] not there ever, any more, that he [is] not simply hidden away by walls and steel
grilles” (62). Rosa is no longer bound to the Burger family or its code of ethics. Richard
Peck argues that the moment of Lionel’s death marks a “growing recognition that [Rosa]
has a choice” (73). The decisions she makes from this point forward, then, mark a new
era in her relationship to the nation-state: her era of silent unbeing, which is arguably just
as effective at undermining apartheid as her father’s vocal resistance.
Rosa’s unbeing first manifests in the form of “a monstrous resentment against the
claim…of blood, shared genes, the semen from which [she] had issued and the body in
which [she] had grown.” She recalls “stand[ing] outside the prison with an eiderdown and
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hidden messages for [her] mother,” realizing that since “Tony is dead…there is no other
child for [her mother] but [her].” And she notes that while Lionel was in prison, “[her]
studies, [her] work, [her] love affairs” were made to “fit in with the twice-monthly visits
to the prison, for life, as long as he lives – if he had lived.” Ultimately, Rosa concludes:
“I have no passport because I am my father’s daughter….And now he is dead!....and I
knew I must have wished him to die; that to exult and to sorrow were the same thing for
me” (62-63). This resentment is made further apparent when her father’s comrade Dick
tries to comfort Rosa, saying, “some of us will still be around when it happens. Too late
for Lionel, but you’re here,” in response to which Rosa falls silent. Observing this, Dick
touches her comfortingly, “afraid he ha[s] made her weep” (108). Rosa later concedes
that though Dick assumed she “was overcome at the thought of [her] father,” she was
instead “filled with the need to get away as from something obscene” (111). It is arguably
Dick’s faith in the communist party’s ability to affect change that Rosa reads as
“obscene,” as she is no less invested in seeing “it happen.” Her resentment isn’t with the
cause; it’s with the method. She senses that the role of communist-activist is impotent.
Though her anger causes her to interrogate the assumptions behind her parents’ way of
opposing apartheid, it does not make her abandon their cause.
Having begun to question her parents’ activist approach, two events further
instigate Rosa’s unbeing. The first is a dead man on a park bench, whom Rosa assumes,
for a period of time, to be alive. Because of this assumption, Rosa and the others eating in
the park take no notice of the man’s presence. This proximity to death – and the fact that
she was oblivious to it – causes Rosa to question her family’s ideologies; she asks, “the
change from life to death – what had all the certainties I had from my father to do with
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that?” And she thinks, “when the hunger ended…when there were no rents extorted and
no privately-owned mansions and cosy white bungalows, no white students in
contemplative retreat where blacks could not live….one would be left with that” (80). For
all its devotion to ending suffering, nothing in the communist party’s creed tackled death.
Here Rosa becomes aware that though they counter the demands for sovereignty made by
the apartheid government, activists still resist the basic vulnerability of humanity: that we
die. Injustice can be overcome; death cannot, but the party finds ways of obscuring that
fact. Conrad tells Rosa, “among you, the cause is what can’t die. Your mother didn’t live
to carry it on, others will. It’s immortality. If you can accept it….The same con, the
future in place of the present” (52). Through this event, Rosa confronts vulnerability on a
new level, recognizing that it will persist even when apartheid crumbles.
The second – and even more integral – event that initiates Rosa’s unbeing is the
beating of the donkey. It is in this scene that Rosa begins to model profound silence.
After giving a woman a ride to an unfamiliar part of town, Rosa approaches “a gang of
black children” to ask for directions, and they respond by throwing stones at her car
(207). What they see when they look at her is not the daughter of civil rights devotees,
but a white woman. This is a reminder to Rosa that her suffering does not negate her
complicity in apartheid rule. Still lost, Rosa encounters a donkey-cart, about which she
notices “something strange,” making out first “a woman and child bundled under sacks,”
and then “a driver standing up on the cart in a wildly precarious spread of legs in torn
pants.” Finally, she sees the driver “[arch] back with one upflung arm…and [lurch] over
as if he ha[s] been shot,” and the donkey “draw its four legs and head down towards the
centre of its body in a noose, then fling head and extremities wide again” (208). The
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concomitant movements of man and donkey are repeated again and again, which Rosa
notices incrementally such that her comprehension of the beating unfolds with the scene.
As she watches, Rosa recalls that she “didn’t see the whip,” she “saw agony.
Agony that came from some terrible centre seized within the group of donkey, cart, driver
and people behind him. They made a single object that contracted against itself.” In her
perception of this scene, then, the abuser and the abused become one, as do the trapped
onlookers, abuser and abused in their own right. Rosa continues, “I saw the infliction of
pain broken away from the will that creates it…cruelty gone beyond control of the
humans who have spent thousands of years devising it” (208). The “cruelty” Rosa sees
here is no more about the man beating the donkey than it is about the apartheid
government. In this moment, the beating is indistinguishable for Rosa from:
The entire ingenuity from thumbscrew and rack to electric shock, the infinite
variety and gradation of suffering, by lash, by fear, by hunger, by solitary
confinement – the camps, concentration, labour, resettlement, the Siberias of
snow or sun, the lives of Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, Kgosana, gull-picked
on the Island, Lionel propped wasting to his skull between two warders, the
deaths by question, bodies fallen from the height of John Vorster Square, deaths
by dehydration, babies degutted by enteritis in ‘places’ of banishment, the lights
beating all night on the faces of those in cells. (208)
She sees suffering. And she does not intervene. Rosa notices that the donkey “[doesn’t]
cry out,” which leads her to ask herself, “why didn’t the donkey give that bestial snort
and squeal of excrutiation I’ve heard donkeys give not in pain but in rut?” Having
registered the donkey’s learned helplessness, Rosa shifts her attention to “that rag of a

154

black man” who “was old, from the stance of his legs, the scraggle of beard.” As she
begins to grasp the thread that runs from this scene to all suffering, Rosa ceases action
altogether. Her “car simply fell away from the pressure of [her] foot and carried [her] no
farther” (209). She does not stop the abuse. Instead, she becomes a willing accomplice to
the man’s cruelty. Her silence is an act of profound unbeing. And it is the sole reaction by
which Rosa could demonstrate her own agency without denying the driver’s.
In choosing silence, Rosa disrupts the cycle of dominance better than she could
have had she disrupted this one particular manifestation of it. Susan Barrett observes that
this scene – “the only direct act of violence described in Burger’s Daughter” – is not an
example of “white [South Africans] against black [South Africans] but of a black man
beating a donkey.” Indeed, in this novel, violence against blacks is always offered to
readers secondhand, which is troubling, though it makes this scene stand out for its
undiluted emotional resonance. Barrett goes on to assert that “much of the horror of this
passage comes not from the brutality of the man and the suffering of the donkey but
because Rosa is powerless to intervene” (117). It seems inaccurate to categorize Rosa in
this interaction as “powerless,” as once she returns her awareness to the political structure
of the moment, she acknowledges: “I had only to careen down on that scene with my car
and my white authority. I could have yelled before I even got out, yelled to stop.” She
could, she notes, have used her voice to “deliver them over to the police, to have him
prosecuted…to take away from him the poor suffering possession he maltreated.” She
knows that simply by intervening she could have effectively defined this man’s life,
removed this moment in which the man is the perpetrator of abuse from a context in
which he is its victim. She could, in short, have “put a stop to it” though only “at that
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point I witnessed” (209, emphasis mine). Her qualification here – that she could only
have stopped the pain at the “point [she] witnessed” – is key to her choice not to act. And
it’s key, too, to the danger of acts of aggression in general: they respond merely to
specific circumstances and not to their context, yet their impact is far-reaching. Instead,
Rosa leaves, saying, “I don’t know at what point to intercede makes sense, for me.” And
she confesses: “if somebody’s going to be brought to account, I am accountable for [the
man], to him, as he is for the donkey.” This becomes the final event in Rosa’s
incremental unbeing. After this, she finds a way to leave South Africa because she can no
longer “live in Lionel’s country” (210). By not using her white authority to stop the
man’s violence, Rosa deliberately and profoundly silences herself.
Her silence in the scene with the donkey continues throughout her departure from
South Africa – Rosa “[says] goodbye to no one” (190) – and it goes on, too, in France,
where Rosa’s nationality is invisible. She observes: “if I’d been black that would at least
have given the information I was from Africa. Even at a three-hundred-year remove, a
black American. But nobody could see me, there, for what I am back where I come from”
(231). Once in Europe, then, her silence is physical, as well: her body offers no insight
into her origin. In that physical silence, on her first day in Paris, a black man tries to
pickpocket her, but as with the donkey, Rosa says nothing (234). In that state of
surrender, Rosa travels to Nice to stay with her father’s first wife, Katya. Having gone
through the painful process of unbeing, Rosa longs to remake herself in terms of the
villagers she meets, of whom she reflects: “it’s as if nothing has ever happened – to them,
or anybody. Or is happening. Anywhere. No prisoners in Soviet asylums, no South
Africa” (287). If this is the form her re-being is to take – if she wants to construct herself
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anew at a remove from the tragedies of her nation – she must unlearn the lessons of a
lifetime spent opposing apartheid rule: must, in effect, pretend that “nothing has ever
happened.” And she does so for awhile, finding pleasure in the release from
responsibility. Ultimately, though, escapism is not where her unbeing leads.
Rosa’s exile in France is the period of time that Barrett reads as Rosa’s most
empowered. Halil reads it similarly, contending that Rosa’s “movement to France is
necessary to her development as a speaking subject” (40), which both privileges speech
and implies a lack of agency in Rosa’s previous actions. Halil claims that “to know and
fulfil [sic] her own desires, [Rosa] must remove herself to other rooms, houses, and
countries” (36). In France, she does exactly that, taking a married professor as a lover. Of
this new reality, Rosa tells herself: “Bernard Chabalier’s mistress isn’t Lionel Burger’s
daughter; she’s certainly not accountable to the Future….‘This is the creature that has
never been’” (304). To her, this freedom is always “mythical” (304), not real. We see this
manifest in subtle differences between Rosa and Bernard, who talks about his
vulnerability in London – where his first language was not primary – and the discomfort
it caused. Rosa recalls feeling at peace with that sensation. She says, “‘I’ve always been
surrounded by…languages I don’t understand’” (267). Vulnerability is the atmosphere in
which Rosa thrives. Thus the hedonisms of France are not manifestations of her unique
power; they are moments when that power becomes irrelevant. I argue, then, that the
strength of Rosa’s time in France lies merely in her absence from South Africa.
What ultimately initiates Rosa’s re-being – restoring in her a desire to use voice –
is ironically the call for Black Consciousness levied by several of the novel’s
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characters.34 We first encounter the rhetoric of Black Consciousness before Rosa’s
defection, when she hears at a party that “because the problem is white racism, there can
only be one valid opposition to balance it out – solid black unity” (164). This rhetoric
seems to persuade Rosa. I would argue, however, that she is not convinced that she has
no role in South Africa’s politics, but that her role is a subordinate one. She encounters
Black Consciousness once more in France, when she runs into Baasie, whom she knew as
a brother when she was a child. Until this chance meeting, Rosa doesn’t know what
happened to Baasie, though she does know that “his father was found dead in a cell after
eight months in detention” (142). After receiving – in front of him – public recognition
for her father’s sacrifices, Baasie calls her late at night, full of rage. Lionel Burger is seen
as a South African hero for dying in the struggle to end apartheid, while Baasie’s father is
unknown. This call impacts Rosa deeply; she perceives herself to be “dissolved in what
[she] heard from him, the acid” (330). She felt sisterly love upon seeing him again; he felt
the bitterness of having suffered invisibly. This conversation renews in Rosa the sense of
complicity that initiated her unbeing. Yet she realizes that while her unbeing could be
accomplished through silent defection, her re-being will require a renewed use of voice.
Thus Rosa returns to South Africa, quietly taking up the activism of her parents,
as well as medical work with children hurt by police brutality: “teaching them to walk
again.” Once more, Halil reads Rosa’s actions as insufficient, observing that her “role in
the revolution when she returns to South Africa is secondary, for, as a physiotherapist,

34

Barrett claims that the Black Consciousness movement “refused all collaboration with whites and
criticized them for speaking in the place of…blacks.” Addressing the complications this brought about for
white South African writers, Barrett cites Michael Chapman, who writes: “should they enter the black
consciousness they will stand charged with colonial appropriation: should they permit the black figure its
silence…white Africans will stand charged with perpetuating the myth of the empty land” (398). In Rosa,
we see Gordimer struggle to account for this dilemma.
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Rosa provides ‘palliative’ care for the survivors of the Uprising in contrast to the
primary, ‘healing’ care her father provided as both doctor and revolutionary” (33). Rosa’s
re-being does not mirror her father’s heroism. She regains voice, but not to perpetuate her
own sovereign selfhood. She does not seek authority, even in activism. Instead, her rebeing inspires her to pursue “palliative care” because she has concluded:
No one can defect.
I don’t know the ideology:
It’s about suffering.
How to end suffering.
And it ends in suffering. (332)
The path to “end[ing] suffering” is not dominance, but suffering. Rosa maintains her
devotion to self-abnegation even in her return to South Africa, and to subversive politics.
In her re-being, Rosa is willing to accept even more vulnerability than she
suspects her father would have been comfortable with for her. During the backlash to the
1970s protests, Rosa reflexively asks Lionel: “you used me as a prison visitor, courier,
whatever I was good for…but would you have seen yourself watching [my brother] and
me, hand-in-hand, approaching guns?” (349). She cannot know his answer, but she does
know her own. She acknowledges that representatives of the threatened apartheid
government could appear “from behind the big old syringa trees with the nooses of wire
left from kids’ games in the branches,” that they could “put a Russian or Cuban machinegun at [her] back, or…a scythe or even a hoe.” Yet despite these threats, Rosa “slept the
way [she] had when [she] was a child, thick pink Waverley blankets kicked away, lumpy
pillow punched under [her] neck.” She longs to tell Lionel: “anyone may…come in the
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door and [look] down on me; I [won’t] have stirred” (352). Rosa knows she is vulnerable.
But in her re-being, she makes no effort not to be. It is in this period of her life that her
own arrest comes. Rosa’s re-being thus brings her full circle; her silent self-abnegation
leads her to the same political prisoner status as her parents. Though her self-abnegation
has no immediate external manifestation, her willing silence moves beyond heroism and
towards a recognition of the inherent harm of action in some contexts. Rosa seeks not to
solve racial injustice – for doing so would require embodying the authority that initiated
and sustained it – but to cede from participation in that injustice. In both her unbeing and
her re-being, Rosa seeks not to intercede, but to quietly subvert.

The Barbarian Girl
Finally, silence plays a profoundly subversive role in Waiting for the Barbarians,
J.M. Coetzee’s portrayal of an unspecified empire’s outpost at the end of an era of
colonization. Here we see the interaction between that outpost’s long-time Magistrate and
a woman who has been tortured by other representatives of empire. Though we know less
about the woman’s internal process of self-abnegation than we do about Leda’s and
Rosa’s, I argue that the external ramifications of her unbeing – in other words, the effects
of her silence on others, as well as on the dominant power structure – are unprecedented,
making her self-abnegation one of the most generative examples we see in this project.
As a legal enforcer of colonial rule, the Magistrate is a clear representative of the
“masculine-imperialist ideological formation” (Spivak 2204). Yet using little other than a
startling degree of silence, the tortured woman initiates in him a drastic example of
Spivak’s process of “unlearning” such that the Magistrate is forced to come to terms with
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the vulgarity of the empire’s power, and the degree to which he is complicit in it. As he
unlearns – willingly sacrificing more and more of his long-held privilege – the Magistrate
comes to be viewed as the empire’s enemy. And powerfully, in the wake of the woman’s
silence, he seems to embrace this position.
The woman who initiates the Magistrate’s process of “unlearning” – referred to
by the Magistrate as “the girl” and by critics as “the Barbarian Girl” – demonstrates an
even more profound level of voicelessness than the other characters of this chapter. As
we never know the Barbarian Girl’s name (just as we never know the Magistrate’s), she
remains representational: we think of her in terms of her ethnicity – via a reductive and
racist moniker – and her gender, and not her individuality.35 She suffers tremendously,
and it is important to note that she has no choice about the torture she faces. She and her
father are brought in for “interrogation” by Colonel Joll, a colonial investigator sent to
quell a supposed “barbarian” uprising. The Girl’s father is “‘questioned longer than
anyone else.’” A guard recalls that “‘his daughter was with him: she tried to make him
take food.’” She was “‘also questioned’” and “‘sometimes there was screaming’” (29).
We know little else except that “‘they broke her feet,’” which the guard believes they did
in front of her father. I argue that the torture she undergoes is a part of her being, her
existence as a young, female, colonized other. That she goes on to choose unbeing – to
move from involuntary precarity to voluntary silence – is therefore momentous. The
Barbarian Girl doesn’t mimic the demands for sovereignty modeled for her by imperial
forces. She makes no effort to shift from colonized to colonizer. Instead, she claims
vulnerability as her own, learning how to use it subversively.
35

Though the assumptions inherent to the label “Barbarian Girl” are deeply problematic, I make no attempt
to refer to this character otherwise, not merely because we’re given no other option, but because that title’s
degradation is indicative of the degree to which she exists in a state of subordination.
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She begins to perform her unbeing when she meets the Magistrate in the days
following her father’s death at the torturers’ hands. Despite his efforts to draw her out,
she refuses to speak, steadfastly resisting questions regarding the torture she’s faced:
when asked, she “shrugs and is silent” (29). Hania Nashef contends that “the arrival of
[the torturers] forces the magistrate to get engrossed in an alleged barbarian insurgency”
(22). This makes his opposition to torture sound inevitable, as if risking his livelihood is a
default reaction to the empire’s activities. Arguably, however, compliance would have
been the most automatic reaction; the Magistrate could have found himself “engrossed”
only so much as it took to support Colonel Joll. I argue, therefore, that it is the Barbarian
Girl’s passivity – and not Joll’s aggression – that leads to the Magistrate’s ultimate selfabnegation. Though the Magistrate never uses his power as inhumanely as Joll does –
thus the stakes of his allegiance to empire are lower – he is a way in to the sovereign
imperial system, an access point through which silence and submission might speak.
From the beginning, the Magistrate’s presence seems to affect the Barbarian Girl
very little, while hers undermines his entire existence – an ironic dynamic given that he
is, by all accounts, the more empowered of the two. Indeed, it is often in their moments
of intimate contact that he is confronted with new insights into the imperial system: he is
able to see what was – before her silent influence – invisible to him. Though the
Magistrate’s loss of authority is most often read in negative terms – Nashef contends, for
example, that the “process” the Magistrate undergoes is “invariably one of degradation” –
it results in a profound and arguably voluntary shift in his use of power. In the wake of
his relationship with the Barbarian Girl, the Magistrate yields the authority afforded him
within the system of oppression, using his position within the empire to subvert its aims.
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That this shift is instigated not by demands for dominance on the part of the Barbarian
Girl – but by her avoidance of it – is indicative of vulnerability’s power.
Before the Girl comes into his life, the Magistrate is not merely complicit with
racial injustice; he is an active part of the empire’s government, and he has well learned
privilege. Prior to the supposed threat of an uprising that brings the colonial interrogators
to the outpost – thus before the girl is left wounded and vulnerable – the Magistrate
describes himself as “a country magistrate, a responsible official in the service of the
Empire” (8). He says, “I believe in peace, perhaps even peace at any price” (14). Indeed,
his role within the empire’s legal system is to righteously uphold peace without thought
to “price,” especially where “price” means cost to the colonized. As Bijay Danta
observes, the Magistrate “derives much needed security from his routine, which includes,
among other things, inspection of the city gates….His station is peaceful….His primary
work is keeping peace in the border” (23). He “do[es] not want to see a parasite
settlement grow up on the fringes of the town populated with beggars and vagrants” (37).
Though he does not participate in torture, then, the Magistrate subscribes fully to the
narratives of sovereignty that fuel imperialism, and he feels that as the outpost’s legal
authority, it is his duty to sustain those narratives.
We see his allegiance to the legalities of sovereignty in the Magistrate’s first
interaction with the Girl, to whom he says authoritatively: “we do not permit vagrants in
the town” (26). Despite his loyalty to the system he represents, however, the “security”
(Danta 23) he finds in his role is undermined almost immediately by the girl, whom he
finds “kneel[ing] in the shade” – “straight black eyebrows” and “glossy black hair” –
“muffled in a coat too large for her, a fur cap open before her on the ground.” He returns
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throughout the day to watch her begging, while she remains oblivious to his presence.
From the gatekeeper, the Magistrate learns that the Girl is “‘blind,’” and that “‘[Colonel
Joll] brought [her] in. She was left behind’” (25). Feeling simultaneously responsible for
her in light of the torture she’s faced and willing to exploit her vulnerability for his own
gain – motives not, in terms of Spivak’s “complicit intellectual” (“Subaltern” 2197), all
that different from one another – he “offer[s her] work,” saying: “‘I need someone to
keep these rooms tidy…The woman who does it at present is not satisfactory.’” Nashef
maintains that the Magistrate’s interest in the Girl begins as “an act of pity” (24). Yet
even in making this seemingly benevolent offer, the Magistrate allows for its underlying
implication: he notes that the Girl “understands what [he is actually] offering.” At the
outset, then, his intentions for her are self-serving. Having heard both his actual and his
implied offer, she “sits very stiff, her hands in her lap,” silent. Eventually, the Magistrate
asks, ‘Are you alone? Please answer’” to which she “whisper[s]” merely: “‘yes.’” Then –
as she silently “tugs at her coat” – it occurs to him that “the distance between [himself]
and her torturers…is negligible.” With this realization, the Magistrate “shudder[s]” (27).
She is already changing his self-perception: in the stillness created by her silence, he
begins to grasp the disturbing reality of his relationship to empire.
The political context for these early interactions between the Magistrate and the
Barbarian Girl is important, as they meet at a particularly intense moment of imperial
aggression. We read: “news arrived from the capital that whatever might be necessary to
safeguard the Empire would be done, regardless of cost,” and the Magistrate notes: “we
have returned to an age of raids and armed vigilance” (38). This demand for sovereignty
in the face of potential threats stands in stark contrast not just to the Barbarian Girl’s
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subordination, but to the Magistrate’s increasing uncertainty. We see this at work when –
after moving the Barbarian Girl in with him – the Magistrate goes on a routine hunting
trip, and his “pulse does not quicken” when he encounters a ram. Indeed, he notes with
surprise: “it is not important to me that the ram die.” As he struggles to understand his
newfound ambivalence, he observes “an obscure sentiment lurking at the edge of [his]
consciousness.” Looking “inward,” the Magistrate discovers that what “has robbed the
hunt of its savour” is the impression that it is “no longer a morning’s hunting but an
occasion on which either the proud ram bleeds to death on the ice or the old hunter
misses his aim” (39). Far from being willing to do “whatever might be necessary” the
Magistrate finds himself stilled, “suspended in immobility,” aware of the consequences
of his potential actions over the ram. He later tells the Girl, “never before have I had the
feeling of not living my own life on my own terms” (39). This, I argue, is the
Magistrate’s first taste of self-imposed vulnerability. He hesitates to act out of aggression,
but the precarity of that hesitation is a sensation with which he is not yet comfortable.
The Magistrate finds his interactions with the Girl just as fraught as this moment
with the ram, noting that with her, “it is as if there is no interior, only a surface across
which [he] hunt[s] back and forth seeking entry” (42). Indeed, though her passivity
extends to the quasi-sexual intimacy they share – he notes that she silently accepts all that
is expected of her, “her body yield[ing]….to everything” (30) – he lacks the drive to
consummate his relationship with her. And tellingly, he becomes concomitantly unable to
fulfill the duties of the empire. To understand this dynamic, it seems helpful to imagine
the Magistrate’s response if the Girl had argued with him when he asked her to leave, or
had resisted his invitation, or had made demands of her own. Were any of these the case,
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we might imagine that his desire to master the situation would be intensified. In the face
of her silent unbeing, however, that desire – like his desire to kill, or to penetrate –
dissolves. In her submission, she gives him nothing to dominate, and his desire to do so
disappears. Emenuela Teglu acknowledges this, contending that the Magistrate’s
“reactions when faced with a body that is in his power to do whatever he wants with…are
the first signs of his awakening” (72). His frustrated search for a point of “entry” leads
him to ask: “is this how her torturers felt hunting their secret, whatever they thought it
was?” In turn, the Magistrate begins to “feel a dry pity for them: how natural a mistake to
believe that you can burn or tear or hack your way into the secret body of the other” (42).
Here, then, he grasps the futility of dominance: Colonel Joll’s tactics – horrifyingly
limitless though they are – could never truly expose the Barbarian Girl. And with this
acknowledgment, the Magistrate understands further the lack of distinction between
Joll’s torture and his own soft exploitation. He notes: “the girl lies in my bed, but there is
no good reason why it should be a bed. I behave in some ways like a lover – I undress
her, I bathe her, I stroke her, I sleep beside her – but I might equally well tie her to a chair
and beat her; it would be no less intimate” (42). Like his inability to kill the ram, then, the
Magistrate’s uneasy relationship to sex with the Girl is merely one symptom of his
newfound inability to function as a colonial figure.
Likewise indicative of the Barbarian Girl’s erosion of his virulence – and of the
fact that it is her silence that so affects him – is the Magistrate’s repetitive use of the word
“blank,” which I claim is a visual manifestation of the silence that spreads from the Girl
to the Magistrate. The idea of blankness is first used by the Magistrate when he tries to
penetrate the Girl, at which time he notes: “these bodies of hers and mine are diffuse,
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gaseous, centreless [and] also flat, blank. I know what to do with her no more than one
cloud in the sky knows what to do with another” (33). It’s also present when he tries to
recall her face while making love to a prostitute at the inn. He “ha[s] a vision of her
closed eyes…filming over with skin. Blank, like a fist beneath a black wig” (41-42). He
fails to remember once more on the morning after she uses his hand to achieve climax
(43), and again when he cannot bring to mind the image of her sitting in the space beside
her father, before torture disfigured her (46, 47). It is not merely the barbarians in general
whose features he easily forgets, as the Magistrate notes: “I can remember the woman
with the baby [who died], even the baby itself,” and “I can remember the bony hands of
[the girl’s father]; I believe I can even, with an effort, recompose his face.” Instead, the
absence is specific to “the space beside [her father], where the girl should be,” but where
now, in the Magistrate’s mind, there is only “a blankness” (46). It’s as if, to him, she
never existed in her unbroken state. We might anticipate that his inability to imagine her
face would lead to an increased ability to disregard her humanity, but instead, it tortures
him. Her absence in his mind – arguably a product of her profound silence – leads to the
Magistrate’s unbeing, her blankness ultimately infiltrating him and causing his own.
The blankness that the Girl inspires increasingly undermines the Magistrate’s
ability to exert control. For example, during his ritual of massaging her feet, the
Magistrate recalls: “I lose myself in the rhythm...I lose awareness of the girl herself.
There is a space of time which is blank to me” (28). So too, he confesses: “often in the
very act of caressing her I am overcome with sleep as if poleaxed, fall into oblivion
sprawled upon her body, and wake an hour or two later dizzy, confused, thirsty” (30).
Though she appears to remain unaffected by his attention, the Magistrate is increasingly
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undone by her silence. He begins their relationship with an assertion that “until the marks
on this girl’s body are deciphered and understood [he] cannot let go of her,” but he finds
his conviction fading as he tries – and continually fails – to perform such “decipher[ing].”
Interestingly, then, he thinks of her torture wounds as something of a voice, a text to be
“deciphered.” But like the Girl herself, they yield nothing. “‘What did they do to you?’”
he asks, but his “tongue is slow” and he “sway[s] on [his] feet with exhaustion [while]
she gives no sign that she has even heard [him].” He tries to demand: “‘tell me,’” but he
cannot. His “lips are at the hollow of her ear, [he] struggle[s] to speak; then blackness
falls” (31). Like the blankness he sees when he tries to recall her face, the Girl’s silence
silences him, undermining his intention to “decipher” (possess) her.
Similarly, despite her willing submission, the Magistrate and the Barbarian Girl
share only two moments of sexual intimacy. In these, voicelessness extends beyond the
withdrawn use of speech into an emptiness that can infiltrate others. On the first occasion
– when she uses his hand to achieve orgasm – the Magistrate finds himself unable to feel
pleasure, just as he is unable to shoot the ram. He confesses, “I experience no excitement
during this the most collaborative act we have yet undertaken. It brings me no closer to
her.” What most disturbs him, though, is that it “seems to affect her as little. I search her
face the next morning: it is blank.” Once more, she is silently unaffected. He finds this
fact “disquiet[ing],” and he wonders: “‘what do I have to do to move you?...Does no one
move you?” With this question comes new comprehension as, “with a shift of horror [he]
behold[s] the answer…offer itself to [him] in the image of a face masked by two black
glassy insect eyes from which there comes no reciprocal gaze” (43). The “two black
glassy insect eyes” are those of Colonel Joll, “masked” and reflective because of the
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sunglasses he wears. Seeing himself through those eyes marks a step in the Magistrate’s
process of unlearning. He tries desperately to convince himself that “there is nothing to
link [him] with torturers, people who sit waiting like beetles in dark cellars,” and he
insists: “how can I believe that a bed is anything but a bed, a woman’s body anything but
a site of joy? I must assert my distance from Colonel Joll! I will not suffer for his
crimes!” (43-44). In their early encounters, then, the Magistrate is unwilling to cede to his
new glimpses of self for fear of where such admissions might lead. The Girl’s silent
unbeing is revelatory, but not yet destructive.
The second moment of sexual intimacy – and their sole occasion of penetrative
sex – occurs during the journey to return her to “her people” (57); thus it takes place in
the liminal space between the Magistrate’s world (the outpost) and the Barbarian Girl’s
(which, because of colonial expansion, is no longer definable). She wakes him in the tent
they share, and he recalls that “she is warm, swollen, ready for [him]; in a minute five
months of senseless hesitancy are wiped out and [he is] floating back into easy sensual
oblivion.” Finally, then, sex brings the kind of “easy” release it brought before the Girl,
or before the complications of the Magistrate’s new awareness. When he wakes after,
however, “it is with a mind washed so blank that terror rises in [him]. Only with a
deliberate effort can [he] reinsert [him]self into time and space: into a bed, a tent, a night,
a world, a body pointing west and east” (62). What starts off as pleasure turns into
disorientation; the blankness brought about by the girl’s silence shifts in this moment to
the Magistrate’s own “mind.” This transference suggests that the clarity with which he
perceives his place in the power dynamic has been effaced. He has unlearned another
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piece of his privilege. The Barbarian Girl’s unbeing becomes, thus, a weapon: a tool that
is effective against domination when counter-domination would almost certainly fail.
In the wake of this vulnerability-inducing transference of blankness, they come
upon the Barbarian Girl’s people, and the Magistrate tells her: “‘I wish to ask you very
clearly to return to the town with me. Of your own choice.’” To this offer, she responds
clearly and decisively: “‘no. I do not want to go back to that place’” (70). Brief though
this moment is, I read it as a kind of re-being for the Barbarian Girl. Like both Leda’s and
Rosa’s reclamation of voice, the Girl’s speech here makes clear that she has possessed
the ability to speak all along; that her silent unbeing was a choice. As further evidence
that she attains re-being, we’re told that the Barbarian Girl returns to her people with a
new form of strength. Of her changes, the Magistrate observes: “she adapts without
complaint.” Though he assumes at first “that she submits because of her barbarian
upbringing,” he concedes: “what do I know of barbarian upbringings?” Ultimately, he
realizes that while he still “see[s] her as a body maimed, scarred, harmed, she has perhaps
by now grown into and become that new deficient body, feeling no more deformed than a
cat feels deformed for having claws instead of fingers” (54-55). Perhaps, then, her rebeing is a reclamation of her body not as damaged, but as newly whole.
The Magistrate makes his own unbeing apparent as he watches the Girl ride
away from him on a stranger’s horse, at which sight he observes: “these are the people
being pushed off the plains into the mountains by the spread of Empire. I have never
before met northerners on their own ground on equal terms…What an occasion and what
a shame too to be here today” (71). In the aftermath of her silence – which provokes the
Magistrate’s own unbeing, or, in Nashef’s terms, his “becoming” (25) – he feels not
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heroic at having reunited her with her people, but ashamed to be returning her blind and
with broken feet. His appreciation for being on “equal terms” with her people also speaks
to the Magistrate’s ability, finally, to penetrate her the night before. Though we are led
(because of his long-term sexual relationship with a prostitute) to assume that the
Magistrate is comfortable with sexual power, his inability to penetrate the Girl at the
empire’s outpost suggests otherwise, just as his ability to do so on neutral territory
suggests a shift towards an equality not endorsed by imperial rule. Discussing Spivak’s
articulation of the subaltern’s silence, Vincent Leitch says, “in every utterance, [Spivak]
urges us to hear the faint whisper of what could not be said” (2196). Whether or not the
Magistrate can ever quite hear “what could not be said,” he does intuit – through their
disorienting intimacy – the power of the Girl’s subjugation. The process of unlearning
does more than lessen his hold on power. In subtle ways, it redistributes that power, such
that the girl’s moment of re-being marks the Magistrate’s unbeing. While as Nashef
observes, “the girl remains…undecipherable” (26), the Magistrate unlearns his devotion
to sovereignty. He then becomes an instrument for undermining the empire.
Having witnessed her re-being and begun unbeing himself, the Magistrate leaves
the Barbarian Girl and makes the journey back to the outpost, where he finds he has been
stripped of his imperial power. Where the Girl’s journey starts with forced submission
and leads to voluntary unbeing, then, the Magistrate’s starts by choice – via her influence
– and leads to force. In contrast to his newfound discomfort with sovereignty, the newly
arrived colonial officer tells the Magistrate: “‘[war is about] compelling a choice on
someone who would not otherwise make it’” (49), to which the Magistrate responds: “‘I
wish that these barbarians would rise up and teach us a lesson, so that we would learn to
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respect them’” (50). He is imprisoned and tortured for comments like this – indications
that he has unlearned power – yet he continues to make them. Ironically, then, the Girl’s
silence inspires speech in the Magistrate.
As his comfort with vulnerability increases, the Magistrate’s assumptions about
the relative values of strength and weakness fall away. He notes upon his return to the
town that he feels “a faraway tinge of exultation at the prospect that the false friendship
between [himself] and the Bureau may be coming to an end” (75). The government
official who has been sent to replace him accuses him of “‘hav[ing] been treasonously
consorting with the enemy,’” to which the Magistrate replies: “‘we are at peace here…we
have no enemies…Unless I make a mistake…Unless we are the enemy’” (76). He finds
these statements thrilling, and he concedes: “I am aware of the source of my elation: my
alliance with the guardians of the Empire is over, I have set myself in opposition, the
bond is broken, I am a free man. Who would not smile?” (76). That he perceives freedom
in his newly disempowered state indicates that for him, the value of sovereignty has at
last been subverted. Stripped of the power vested in him by colonial rule, the Magistrate
is free of the requirement that he act out of a desire for self-protection.
Yet he worries that his subversive “joy” is “dangerous” (76), and indeed it goes
on to cost him a great deal. The representatives of empire sent to replace him devote
themselves to torturing the Magistrate. As they do, the Magistrate “wonder[s] how much
pain a plump comfortable old man would be able to endure in the name of his eccentric
notions of how the Empire should conduct itself.” What he learns, however, is that his
“torturers [are] not interested in degrees of pain.” Their torture is not practical: not
engaged in for the purpose of gathering information, the justification offered to excuse its
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use. Instead, the empire is “interested only in demonstrating…what it means to live in a
body, as a body, a body which can entertain notions of justice only as long as it is whole
and well” (113). I argue that they engage in this cruelty not to advance sovereignty, but to
punish the Magistrate for having abandoned it. So too, I argue that they punish him
because – just as the Barbarian Girl’s passivity reveals to the Magistrate his own
complicity – the Magistrate’s active resistance to sovereignty reveals the inhumanity of
the new representatives of empire. Having been humbled by the Girl, the Magistrate is
vulnerable enough to submit to the trauma of torture. And in that vulnerability – though
we never know if he is successful – the Magistrate possesses the potential to initiate the
process of unlearning in others. Colonel Joll and his cohort may be set on a path of
precarity by the Magistrate’s example of submission. Indeed, perhaps even their
willingness to abandon the outpost at the novel’s end is a sign of submission.
Though we can only speculate as to the Barbarian Girl’s influence beyond the
Magistrate, we know its full measure within him. He appears to get little that he wanted
from her: despite her willingness, their intimacy is rare and strained, she chooses to return
to her people instead of staying with him, and he loses his position and is imprisoned by
the empire as a result of his allegiance to her. Yet Waiting for the Barbarians closes with
a kind of optimism that springs from the Magistrate: from his newfound compassion,
from the guilt that fuels a heightened awareness of others. When he thinks of the Girl’s
father, for example, he thinks of “any father who knows a child is being beaten whom he
cannot protect,” and he concludes with remorse: “I should never have allowed the gates
of the town to be opened to people who assert that there are higher considerations than
those of decency.” He holds Colonel Joll and the empire at large accountable – saying,
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“they exposed her father to her naked and make him gibber with pain; they hurt her and
he could not stop them” – yet he yields to the burden himself, admitting that the torture
took place “on a day I spent occupied with the ledgers in my office” (79). Once he makes
space for his own culpability, the Magistrate’s sense of responsibility cascades, leading
him to think about life in newly empathetic and markedly vulnerably ways. “We crush
insects beneath our feet,” he observes, “miracles of creation too, beetles, worms,
cockroaches, ants, in their various ways” (105). Likewise, he whispers to Colonel Joll the
distinctly anti-sovereign sentiment: “‘the crime that is latent in us we must inflict on
ourselves….not on others’” (160). As Nashef observes, the Magistrate is undone by the
realization that “the darkness within the self should undergo a transformation rather than
being exteriorized and imposed on the other.” And indeed, in the wake of the Barbarian
Girl’s silence, the Magistrate faces the “darkness within the self” on new terms. We read:
“I finally give way and sob from the heart like a child. I sit in a corner against the wall
and weep, the tears running from my eyes without stop” (107). The humiliation he faces
is external. The newfound grief and willing precarity that lead him to yield to it, however,
are profoundly internal, and are, therefore, likely to remain long after the torture has
ended. Here, then, we see a measure of the Barbarian Girl’s impact on the Magistrate: he
can no longer look past the damage and the danger of domination.
The Magistrate’s unlearning undermines his entire concept of justice, a concept
on which, it’s worth noting, his career has been built. Of justice, he now thinks: “once
that word is uttered, where will it all end?” It would be “easier to shout No!” he contends,
“easier to be beaten and made a martyr” because “where can that argument lead but to
laying down our arms and opening the gates of the town to the people whose land we
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have raped?” (106). As Nashef allows, then, by the novel’s end the “magistrate becomes
receptive to the existence and suffering of others” (30). So too, his unlearning culminates
in his ability, finally, to see the Girl. As he realizes there will be no justice short of selfabnegation, the Magistrate finds himself able to picture the Girl more clearly than he has
ever done before. He imagines her “wearing a round cap embroidered in gold. Her hair is
braided in a heavy plait which lies over her shoulder.” To this manifestation of her, he
imagines himself saying, “‘I have never seen you looking so lovely,’” to which, in his
mind, “she smiles” and he notices, “what beautiful teeth she has, what clear jet-black
eyes.” He continues this fantasy, noting that she “[holds] out to [him] a loaf of bread, still
hot, with a coarse steaming broken crust,” in response to which “a surge of gratitude
sweeps through [him].” In his mind, he asks the Girl: “‘where did a child like you learn to
bake so well in the desert?’” This offering metaphorizes all that the Barbarian Girl has
given to him: silently, she has made something with impossibly insufficient tools and
offered it freely. But of course, when he “open[s his] arms to embrace her” he “come[s]
to…with tears stinging [a] wound on [his] cheek” (107). The irony here is that at last he
is open to her, but she isn’t there. He learned these lessons too late for them to change his
interactions with her. He cannot approach her as the person he has become. Though her
impact on him is far-reaching, he cannot, therefore, alter her.
Waiting for the Barbarians closes with the former Magistrate restored to a kind
of unofficial leader status, though his leadership no longer hinges on sovereignty. The
new representatives of empire have abandoned the post: they believe it will be overrun by
barbarians at any time, though it’s worth noting that if their fears are realized, it will be
because of their own aggressive tactics. The Magistrate considers leaving too –
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“resigning [his] post [and] buying a small market garden” – but he decides against that
pleasure because in his absence “someone else [would] be appointed to bear the shame of
office, and nothing will have changed” (136). Not only does he see the outpost as a
“shame,” he is now willing to “bear” it himself. As the Magistrate reflects on the officers
who’ve left, he observes: “one thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire:
how not to end, how not to die” (131). Thus he acknowledges the danger of sovereignty,
of self-protection at any cost. Though he is once more a representative of empire, the
Magistrate no longer holds to the tenets of imperialism.
In recalling the Girl, the Magistrate thinks she should have stopped his failed
attempts at intimacy, that she should have told him: “‘if you want to love me you will
have to turn your back on [the empire] and learn your lesson elsewhere.’” The Barbarian
Girl never actually asks the Magistrate to do so: she never, in fact, asks him for anything
at all. Instead, he imagines their conversation, which means that this call for the
abandonment of power comes only from him. He realizes: “I was not, as I liked to think,
the indulgent pleasure-loving opposite of the cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie that Empire
tells itself when times are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when harsh winds blow”
(132-33). I argue that the Magistrate is not that “lie” now. Now he waits, humbled, void
of comforts, with the others who’ve been left behind. They are vulnerable to what is to
come. And as they wait, “in the shelter of [their] homes, with the windows bolted and
bolsters pushed against the doors, with fine grey dust already sifting through roof and
ceiling to settle on every uncovered surface,” the Magistrate “think[s]” not of his own
imminent demise, but “of our fellow-creatures out in the open who at times like this have
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no recourse but to turn their backs to the wind and endure” (150). In his newfound
willing precarity, his own discomfort bears little relevance.
The Barbarian Girl’s silence is so profound as to leave her feeling ethereal even
when she’s present. We are not granted access to her post-abnegation self – as we are
with both Leda and Rosa – thus our understanding of her re-being is as intangible as the
Magistrate’s understanding of her life altogether. Yet we see as monumental a re-being in
the Magistrate as in any of the privileged characters of this project. Indeed, where neither
Leda nor Rosa can be said to bring about the external consequences of self-abnegation,
the Barbarian Girl’s subversion of the Magistrate is astonishing. And though his power is
more diluted than Joll’s from the outset – and his use of it far kinder – the Magistrate
nevertheless works to maintain sovereignty one day, and not the next. The late-empire
setting of the novel’s end may not be “the scene [the Magistrate] dreamed of” (152), but
it is a magnificent one in terms of the revolutionary external potential of silence.
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CHAPTER IV: (UN)CONCEIVED MOTHERHOOD
Child sacrifice to either the patriarchy of religion or the patriarchy of the state has been long
endorsed, as we see in Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac, or in the sacrifice – in any nation with a
military force – of young men at war.
~ Martha Minow, “Child Endangerment, Parental Sacrifice”
No matter what I may be doing, in my heart is the wish for children and knitting. God, I never
asked better than to boil some good man’s potatoes and toss up a child for him every nine months
by the calendar.
~ Djuna Barnes, Nightwood

Having examined female sexuality in my second chapter, I look here at women
and motherhood. I see this chapter as necessarily distinct from the one focusing on sex
because – though these issues are biologically connected – the expectations placed on
women by various nations with regards to sexuality differ vastly from, and sometimes
even directly oppose, those placed on them regarding their duties as mothers. Despite
these differences, however, both a woman’s sexuality and her maternal responsibilities
are regulated by her nation-state. And as with life, sex, and voice, the stakes for selfabnegation within motherhood are high, and the potential for subversion profound.
Motherhood differs from the other themes I’ve explored in that someone else – a child –
is subject to acts of abnegation. Indeed, in this chapter both an infant and a fetus are
sacrificed. Though I explore those deaths in depth, my interest is maternal abnegation,
which I define as the destruction not of a woman herself, but of her role as a mother.
Motherhood is something all cultures encourage – or even expect – women to
pursue. Yet women are often not afforded the tools necessary to do so successfully. As
Lynne Huffer asserts, “under patriarchy, to be a woman is to be a mother” (15). Women
are responsible for sovereignty in that they are expected to provide and care for the
bodies necessary to sustaining it, for which reason Dorothy E. Roberts contends that
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“motherhood is virtually compulsory for women: no woman achieves her full position in
society until she becomes a mother” (34). That this dynamic – which I call the
motherhood mandate – hinges on hypocrisy is obscured by the invisibility of motherhood
as a practice. In Of Woman Born, Adrienne Rich writes, “we know more about the air we
breathe, the seas we travel, than about the nature and meaning of motherhood” (11). It is
a practice in which most women engage – and as a practice, it is rife with power
struggles, political complications, biological imperatives, and cultural assumptions – yet
it goes largely unremarked upon in most academic and political spheres. Jocelyn Fenton
Stitt and Pegeen Reichert Powell claim of American women, for example, that “despite
the fact that roughly 80 percent…will have children at some point during their lifetimes
(this statistic leaves out adoptive mothers, so the percentage of women actively caring for
children is…higher), issues facing mothers are still seen as the marginal problem of a
subgroup” (3). The sacrifices that a woman makes to the institution of motherhood are
invisible; we are only aware of them when they are not made, or when they are made in a
way that is untranslatable to us given the sovereignty-maintaining motherhood mandate.
This chapter focuses on two women who respond to the motherhood mandate via
maternal abnegation. The first – Sethe Suggs of Toni Morrison’s Beloved – adheres to
that mandate, but in so doing, finds herself trapped by expectations she cannot fulfill. The
second – Mary Metcalf Crick of Graham Swift’s Waterland – refuses the mandate. Both
Sethe and Mary respond to their circumstances by unbeing in ways that undermine the
constructed being-ness of nationalistic womanhood. In these texts – set respectively in
Reconstruction-era United States and 1940s-1980s England – women sacrifice their
children and their potential for children in response to ideologies governing their culture,
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and within settings where the domestic is made political (i.e., in ways that demonstrate
that their romantic, self-protective, and maternal choices are irrevocably tied to the state).
Making use of maternal theory, I examine the bind into which various cultures put
mothers and would-be mothers, and the lengths to which they must go to adhere to the
simultaneous mandates of their gender and their nationhood.36 Via the lens of maternal
theory, the transgressive potential of maternal abnegation becomes evident, but so does
its potential for failure. Where Sethe’s unbeing proves revolutionary, Mary’s – which by
traditional measures would be considered far less tragic – offers little beyond despair.
Thus this project closes with an example of self-abnegation that leads not to re-being, but
to further loss. Far from calling us to question submission’s merits at large, however, this
final example makes clear the risk of vulnerability as an approach: that it might not work,
and that when it fails the suffering is immense. Mary’s failed unbeing thus reveals in
contrast just how radically subversive most of this project’s acts of submission are.
Maternal abnegation has the potential to be powerful precisely because a
woman’s choices are not merely personal; they are tied to the political structures of
maternity vis-à-vis the state. Mothers – to be fully considered such – must be willing to
sacrifice their children to the interests of the state. They must be willing to send their
children to war, to expose them to the inhumanity of slavery, or to enforce upon them
laws and regulations not in their genuine best interests. This makes ironic our horror
when mothers sacrifice their children to any other purpose: the children’s own interests,

36

Paula Gallant Eckard claims that “maternal theory” focuses on “the physical, psychological, social, and
cultural dynamics affecting the maternal experience” (2). Maternal theory is a relatively new field of study,
a fact that indicates that though the mother/child relationship is central to our development as a culture, it is
not valued in an intellectual way. Eckard contends that “maternal subjectivity, which presents the
experiences of pregnancy, childbirth, breast-feeding, and motherhood from the mother’s perspective, has
not had a visible place in the history of written culture” (23).
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for example, or those of the mother. The potential power of maternal abnegation is
further evident in the widely understood (though rarely discussed) binary of the “good”
versus the “bad” mother, which nation-states use to regulate motherhood. Sharon Abbey
discusses how “images of the ‘good’ mother…cull[ed] from religion, myth, fairy tales,
and the media” almost exclusively depict mothers as “heterosexual, married, white, and
middle class.” Additionally, good mothers “are devoted, loving, attentive, and selfsacrificing” (xviii). In regulating the behavior of mothers, nation-states successfully
regulate women’s identities. Diana L. Gustafson writes that “maternal…self-sacrifice
exacts enormous costs on a woman’s career aspirations, social life, and personal needs.”
Nevertheless, Gustafson notes, “accepting the inequitable burden of parenting labor and
selfless love is an expectation of the good mother” (26). To motherhood, then, women are
all but required to subordinate the self, and an unwillingness to do so functions as a
powerful refusal of the nation-state. This expectation is not placed on fathers, who are
asked primarily to “provide”: a task inherently removed from that of parenting itself.
In my experience of teaching novels that highlight these impossible expectations
– Beloved, Waterland, T Cooper’s Lipshitz 6, or Two Angry Blondes – complex maternal
characters are unpopular, receiving vigorous criticism from otherwise open-minded
students. Though they are adept at understanding the cultural limitations that various
othered groups face, students often seem unable to extend such understanding to mothers,
concluding semester after semester that various mother-characters are simply bad at their
most important (this qualification seems implicit) societal responsibility. Rich writes that
“most women in history have become mothers without choice, and [many] have lost their
lives bringing life into the world” (13). Because of these realities, student resistance
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surprised me at first. I underestimated the extent to which cultural mores regulate
motherhood. Roberts writes: “the duty imposed on mothers to protect their children is
unique and enormous. Mothers have an immediate and unavoidable duty to care for their
children from the moment of birth, if not from the moment of conception” (31). Roberts’s
use of words like “unique and enormous” is important here. In First- and Third-World
nations alike, there is no higher perceived duty for women than the act of good
mothering.37 As my otherwise compassionate students demonstrate, it’s easy to judge
mothers like Sethe and Mary: to conclude merely that they have failed without
considering either the motives for that failure or its potentially revolutionary outcome.
The figure of Antigone provides a model for examining such failures and their
outcomes. In Antigone’s Claim, Judith Butler examines various representations of
Antigone’s rebellion against the state, including her affinity for kinship over political or
legal allegiance and our seemingly contradictory perception of her (stemming from both
the etymology of her name and her childlessness) as “opposed to motherhood.” Butler
asserts that for Antigone, “symbolic positions have become incoherent” because she
“confound[s]…brother and father” and “emerg[es]…not as a mother but – as one
etymology suggests – ‘in the place of the mother’” (22). Butler establishes Hegel’s
conception of Antigone as markedly anti-authoritarian, saying that to Hegel, “Antigone
represents the law of the household gods” while “Creon represents the law of the state”
(5). In her being, Antigone adheres to state expectations for women. But in refusing to
obey Creon’s demand to leave her brother Polyneices unburied – a refusal we might
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Roberts goes on to contend that “most of the cases on omission liability, if not all, concern
mothers…who failed to care properly for their children…[C]riminal law is more likely to impose an
affirmative duty on mothers than on other classes of people. Mothers are far more likely to be punished for
failing to act than anyone else in our society” (32).
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describe as her unbeing – Antigone refuses to yield to the state. This is further
complicated by the fact that because she is caught in her transparent crime – because she
is buried alive as punishment, and because she chooses to kill herself instead of waiting
for her lover to rescue her – Antigone voluntarily sacrifices the roles of wife and mother
to which we would expect her, in her affinity for kinship, to endeavor.
Like the women of this chapter, motherhood is part of Antigone’s identity
structure; yet she is always already an outsider to it. Butler asserts that “Antigone figures
the limits of intelligibility exposed as the limits of kinship,” which “raises the question of
how it is that kinship secures the conditions of intelligibility by which life becomes
liveable,” but also “by which life…becomes condemned and foreclosed” (23). For
women, kinship establishes these conditions absolutely, dictating how a woman becomes
a mother, and thus how she becomes a woman. In not giving life (not becoming a
mother), Antigone perceives herself as not having lived (Butler 23). Thus it is not merely
that motherhood makes someone a woman, but that motherhood gives a woman life.
Huffer contends that “the mother is a symbol of beginnings; as the one who gives birth,
she occupies the place of the origin. Metaphorically speaking, everything begins with the
mother” (7). This gives the motherhood mandate an added imperative: women only
become women when they give birth; in delivering their children, they deliver themselves
as full manifestations of their potential. They create a new being who will be expected to
fulfill the role of citizen, but concomitantly, they fully realize the role of citizen
themselves for the first time. Antigone exposes and rejects this ideology. She
demonstrates an acceptance that – in not giving birth to a child – she failed to give birth
to herself as mother-citizen. Sethe and Mary mirror this rejection, though they do so to
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varying degrees of success. They refuse the motherhood mandate, and in so doing they
expose the impossible expectations placed on women regarding motherhood.

Sethe
In Beloved, Toni Morrison depicts a mother desperate to spare her children from
slavery, but with no means of doing so other than by killing them. Though Sethe Suggs is
stopped before her whole family is dead, she succeeds in killing her older daughter. In the
urgency of this moment, Morrison exposes the trauma of motherhood in a society where
not all mothers can meet the criteria set by national ideology for that role. I argue that
though Sethe’s actions are guided by her impossible role as slave-mother – and thus by
her relationship to the state – the action she takes is her own, the individuality of her
behavior evidenced by the shock of those around her. Her action is not merely one of
outward violence, but of inward sabotage: it may be impossible to grasp the depths of
Sethe’s personal sacrifice in killing her daughter. My interest lies in Sethe’s maternal
abnegation itself – which functions as her unbeing – and in how we read both its personal
and political ramifications. Though her action costs Beloved her life, it is possible to read
within Sethe’s maternal abnegation both personal and political redemption.
Critics have long searched Beloved’s pages for a sense of redemption from the
horrors of slavery. Despite the novel’s shattering narrative, most of its robust critical
response finds its retelling of the aftermath of slavery to be healing, with critics focusing
on its metaphysical or magical realist elements. Brooks J. Bouson contends that Morrison
pursues “a cultural cure both through the artistic rendering and narrative reconstruction of
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the shame and trauma story” (5).38 While critics overwhelmingly agree that the novel’s
primary subject is the trauma induced by the institution of slavery, they seem likewise
convinced that its function is sanative: that it endeavors not merely to expose the wounds
of slavery, but to heal them. What I find interesting is that the focus of such scholarship
remains on the degree to which Morrison’s actions (in creating the novel) are healing; yet
no one argues that Sethe’s are such. This is no doubt because it is painful to search for
redemption in the death of a child, or in a mother having deliberately brought about that
death. Allowing that Morrison’s novel is cathartic, however, I argue that Sethe’s choices
must be as well. Resistance to seeing those choices in such terms demonstrates our own
cultural conditioning vis-à-vis motherhood. Sethe’s action is untranslatable given the
limitations of liberal feminism. These are the terms in which I explore Sethe, and I do so
in an effort to view her as both agented and subversive of the state, which relies on
mothers to produce citizens who can in turn be counted on to maintain sovereignty.
I trace Sethe’s journey from her state of being as a married slave woman – during
which time she struggles to attain agency despite the radical degree to which it is denied
her – to her self-imposed process of unbeing – which she initiates by killing Beloved, an
act which ends not just her daughter’s life, but Sethe’s own sense of herself as a
successful mother. Ultimately, I argue that Sethe attains re-being, configuring meaning
for herself and her children outside of the motherhood mandate. Though her maternal
abnegation is fueled by her subscription to the motherhood mandate, that abnegation
likewise marks her resistance to those impossible standards. In ending Beloved’s life –
38

So too, Lisa Williams claims that Morrison’s multi-focal narrative structure “posits the healing nature of
both narrative and memory” (129). The climactic scene in which Beloved disappears is read as especially
redemptive, as it constitutes a kind of reenactment of the day Schoolteacher returned to claim the family.
Bouson says this scene is “often construed by critics as a therapeutic and self-healing reenactment of the
original trauma…in which the past is revised or reversed” (158).
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and in thereby refusing to allow her children to carry the burden of a sovereignty that
does not extend to them – Sethe abandons the impossible methods by which she has been
taught to pursue power. Halberstam claims that women who practice shadow feminism
“[refuse] the essential bond of mother and daughter that ensures that the daughter inhabits
the legacy of the mother and in so doing, reproduces her relationship to patriarchal forms
of power” (2). Sethe performs such a “refusal.” She ends life to avoid perpetuating her
own enslaved “legacy” in the life of her daughter. Halberstam further contends that “the
whole model of ‘passing down’ knowledge from mother to daughter is…invested in
white, gendered…hetero-normativity” (3). The expectation is that mothers will train their
daughters to take on the responsibilities of motherhood themselves; it is central to the
motherhood mandate that they do so, and perhaps it is the motive behind that mandate.
Sethe refuses to train Beloved to support the nation-state. Her resistance to motherhood
reflects a powerful abandonment of tradition: unable to “pass down” freedom to Beloved,
Sethe refuses to pass down anything at all.
As I establish in this chapter’s introduction, parental self-abnegation is the
purview almost exclusively of women, which renders mothers solely responsible for
replenishing the citizenship that maintains the illusion of sovereignty. We see this in
Beloved’s opening lines, as we read “124 was spiteful. Full of a baby’s venom. The
women in the house knew it and so did the children” (3). From the moment we meet “the
women in the house” – Sethe, Denver, and Baby Suggs – we watch them struggle against
the “spite” of the baby’s ghost, who appears to torment them out of anger with Sethe for
ending her life. Women remain the primary victims of hostility throughout Beloved, and
Sethe receives most of the blame, as the local African-American community shuns her –
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“step[s] back and hold[s] itself at a distance” (177) – in the decades after the tragic events
brought on by Schoolteacher’s arrival. Sethe’s husband, Halle, never makes it to Ohio,
and thus never faces the baby’s wrath. Even if he had succeeded in escaping, or if he’d
been directly responsible for Beloved’s death, he would likely not have received the same
level of rage from either his family or the community. Similarly, their sons, Howard and
Buglar, leave as soon as they’re able. We read that “first one brother and then the next
stuffed quilt packing into his hat, snatched up his shoes, and crept away from the lively
spite the house felt for them” (3). Even Paul D – himself a victim of the atrocities of
slavery – condemns Sethe, telling her before he leaves: “‘you got two feet, Sethe, not
four’” (165), thereby defining her unbeing as subhuman or animalistic. Paul D stays only
until he knows Sethe’s history, and then does not return until Beloved – the reminder of
that history – is gone. The women, however, seek no such escape. “124 was spiteful,” and
Sethe, Denver, and Baby Suggs are the objects of its malice. They implicitly agree to bear
the consequences of sins both of and not of their own making. Like the men around them,
they could fall apart – or leave out of fear or judgment – but they do not.
Paul D’s inability to understand Sethe’s decision – which is ironic given the depth
of his understanding of the enslaved being against which she reacts – seems a product
largely of gender roles. In her analysis of the subaltern, Spivak argues that “if, in the
contest of colonial production, the subaltern has no history and cannot speak, the
subaltern as female is even more deeply in shadow” (2203). If we allow that the victims
of slavery represent a subaltern group, then we might also allow that the voicelessness of
the subaltern applies especially to women, and, most of all, to mothers stripped of the
ability to mother. In terms of American history, only the enslaved child serves as a
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greater example of the subaltern than the enslaved mother. Yet this novel centers on a
woman’s choice, and to overlook that choice, or to assume (as critics of Beloved have
long done) that it was merely a product of fear – that it reflects no higher order thinking –
is to perpetuate the idea that Sethe is powerless. To explore this novel exclusively as a
cultural critique of slavery is to deny Sethe agency. It is only theoretically true that she
had no choice (only true in terms of academic consideration of runaway slave mothers).
What is literally true is that Sethe took her children to the shed to kill them, having
decided that death would be better than a return to slavery. She could imagine the life
Beloved would live as a slave-girl (and as a future slave-woman), and she chose against
that life. I argue that this choice is – along with her decision to run away from Sweet
Home – one of the most significant acts of agency Sethe ever performs. And it is as
profound an unbeing as any this project has to offer.
The burden of her choices can be understood via a conversation Sethe has with
Paul D, who asks if she might consider having his child. In response, we read that Sethe
is “frightened by the thought of having a baby once more. Needing to be good enough,
alert enough, strong enough, that caring – again…O Lord, she thought, deliver me.
Unless carefree, motherlove was a killer” (132). “Motherlove was a killer” for Sethe, of
course, not merely because she had to be “good,” but because being a “good” African
American mother under or in the wake of slavery was impossible. As Gustafson points
out, fulfilling the motherhood mandate is difficult enough in the comparatively secure
context of “contemporary western society,” where “the good mother…is charged with the
impossibility of rendering continuous, intensive care from birth to independence” (26).
While these terms no doubt apply to Sethe’s understanding of “motherlove,” it is further
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complicated by her proximity to the threat of slavery. Paula Gallant Eckard claims that
“motherhood in the slave community held much significance because it brought status to
women….[T]he mother-child bond was regarded as the most important and sacred
relationship within a slave family” (20). Ironically, this is true precisely because slave
women were not given the legal protection of marriage. Eckard argues that the
privileging of motherhood “lay in the fact that slave marriages were fragile institutions.
They were not recognized as legal, and any vows spoken were not binding. In slave
marriage ceremonies, preachers changed the vows to ‘until death or distance do you
part’” (20). Motherhood was thus upheld as the primary familial connection amongst
slaves, but it was not supported by the law. Being as a slave mother was a matter of
impossible contradiction. For a slave woman, producing children compensated for the
lack of legal recognition of marriage. Yet it likewise functioned as an inherent offering of
more slave bodies to the nation-state. This recalls Antigone’s dilemma. But where in
refusing to become a mother, Antigone refused to birth herself as a national citizen, a
slave woman could only refuse to perpetuate sovereignty at her own expense.
Moreover, even when slave women managed to meet the criteria for “good”
mothering, racist sentiment nevertheless assumed they were failing. Eckard writes: “it
was in the realm of sexuality and motherhood that the patriarchy delivered the most
oppression,” asserting that “women’s bodies were the terrain upon which the southern
patriarchy was erected” (12). Though slavery has been demolished by the novel’s end,
“the southern patriarchy” has not, and Beloved directs our attention to “women’s bodies”
such that we might come to understand what is sacrificed to patriarchy’s continuance.
Bouson argues that “Morrison exposes the shameful treatment of African-American slave
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mothers who, according to the racist constructions of nineteenth-century apologists for
slavery, were ‘more primitive’ than white women,” and less “‘attached’ to their
children’” (133). Thus we begin to see the contradictory and irreconcilable position in
which the nation-state placed slave mothers. And we see, too, the risk of assuming that
Sethe’s killing of Beloved is merely a result of her position as escaped slave: if we
conclude that her ability to kill her daughter is a result of her lack of agency, we risk
implying that it is, in turn, a result of an insecure attachment.
Instead, I argue that Sethe’s resistance is complex. Though we are conditioned by
narratives of sovereignty to think of violence as inspired by a desire for dominance,
Sethe’s utter submission to the mandate of good mothering drives the murder she
commits. Destructive as it is, however, her willingness to take this drastic action keeps
Beloved from life as a slave woman. Thus Sethe’s movement from being to unbeing is
perhaps the only way she can refuse aid to a sovereignty that exists at her expense, but in
no way for her. Jean Wyatt claims that throughout Beloved, Sethe “defines herself as a
maternal body” (211). Yet even this self-definition creates a contradiction, which we see
play out in Sethe’s vulnerability. Rich draws a distinction between two versions of
motherhood: “the potential relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction and
to children; and the institution, which aims at ensuring that that potential – and all women
– shall remain under male control” (13). This distinction is useful in teasing out the
jumble of resistance and submission that Sethe exhibits. If motherhood functions on two
levels – one that invests a woman with power, the other that strips it from her – then
neither embracing nor resisting motherhood can be simply self-abnegating or rebellious.
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Submission to the motherhood mandate is what leads to Sethe’s maternal abnegation, but
that abnegation ultimately functions as a refusal of the motherhood mandate.
In abandoning that mandate, Sethe refuses the notion that a child-citizen’s
interests are inherently in line with sovereignty. She sacrifices Beloved not on behalf of
the state, but in profound resistance to it. Sethe’s unbeing is a chosen reaction to the
impossibilities of slave motherhood, which I argue were intentionally constructed by the
state to be so. By conditioning citizens to blame mothers for their failure to protect their
children, nations established as necessary the racial inequities that, ironically, caused the
conditions that garnered blame in the first place. Sethe understands that no matter how
impossible it may be to protect her child, her role is to do so. Yet even her acceptance of
blame is a way of claiming her children as her own. She refuses to cede to the law – to
the idea that she must relinquish her claim to her children when a white man demands
that she do so – yet she is faced with just such a demand. When Schoolteacher comes to
return them to the status of slave, killing them (or attempting to) is the form her refusal
takes. Sethe does not even look up at the men who come. Instead – while “two boys bled
in the sawdust and dirt at the feet of a nigger woman holding a blood-soaked child to her
chest with one hand and an infant by the heels in the other” – Sethe “simply swung the
baby toward the wall planks, missed and tried to connect a second time” (149).
Agonizing though this scene is, Sethe’s unbeing protects her children from slavery,
refusing Schoolteacher’s assertion of ownership. We read: “right off it was clear…that
there was nothing there to claim” (149). Sethe has not bred black bodies for white men.
Despite its subversive outcome, Sethe receives no shortage of blame for her
action, and I argue that her acceptance of that blame in the form of guilt functions as her
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re-being. Morrison’s portrayal of blame – both its internal and external manifestations –
exposes the hypocrisy of a culture that claims to be invested in protecting women and
children all the while allowing them to suffer from laws that invest them with little
power, and blaming them for what comes of their subordinated status. When Paul D
criticizes Denver, and Sethe responds defensively, Paul D thinks, “risky…very risky. For
a used-to-be-slave woman to love anything that much was dangerous, especially if it was
her children she had settled on to love” (45). Yet cultural narratives demand that a mother
love her children, and that she channel that love into unparalleled protection (unless or
until the state wants to use their bodies in the defense of sovereignty). These demands are
made regardless of a woman’s ability to meet them. By sacrificing both Beloved and
potential future children with Paul D, Sethe owns the consequences of slavery over the
female body, and she channels those consequences – with deliberate intent – into actions
that we might otherwise find reprehensible (if we grant her agency) and powerless (if we
don’t). Moreover, in her re-being she demonstrates a commitment to mourning her
daughter. In her self-blame, Sethe becomes the only person willing to bear responsibility
for ending Beloved’s life. When Schoolteacher gives up – leaving Ohio without his
“property” – he does so out of a sense that Sethe is too destroyed to be of value, and not
because he grasps the gravity of his actions. No one else is going to accept responsibility
for Beloved’s death. Thus Sethe’s guilt works to humanize her daughter.
To understand the potential subversion of such humanizing guilt, we might look
at another of Beloved’s slave-mothers, Ella, who refuses to bear responsibility for the
harms done to her, or, apparently, to feel guilty for her unwillingness to care for the
product of those harms. We read that “she had delivered, but would not nurse, a hairy
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white thing, fathered by ‘the lowest yet.’ It lived five days never making a sound. The
idea of that pup coming back to [haunt] her too set her jaw working” (259). In declining
to take on the blame of white, slave-owning America, Ella refuses to perform the kind of
unbeing we see in Sethe. Through the lens of liberal feminism, Ella appears to exhibit
more consistent agency than does Sethe, who judges herself based on the impracticable
standards of white society for subaltern black mothers. What the juxtaposition of these
two mothers stands to offer, however, is insight into how re-being in the form of guilt
functions. No one mourns Ella’s child. The death of the “hairy white thing” – because
s/he was conceived in the most heinous way imaginable – goes unmarked. The efforts of
a society endeavoring to strip value from people of color have thus been effective, as
Ella’s half-black child is unloved and unvalued. This is not true of Beloved. Sethe loves
and values her, which can be seen via the burden of guilt she accepts as her re-being.
Beloved’s value is likewise apparent in the blame put on Sethe by others – such as
Paul D, Denver, the older Beloved, and members of the Cincinnati community in which
they all live – who respond to Sethe with fear and recrimination. Though their blame is
problematic, it demonstrates the external ramifications of Sethe’s unbeing: in holding her
accountable, others mourn Beloved. We see this first with Denver, who goes to jail with
Sethe for her sister’s murder, and who says “Beloved is my sister. I swallowed her blood
right along with my mother’s milk…I love my mother but I know she killed one of her
own daughters, and tender as she is with me, I’m scared of her because of it….[T]here
sure is something in her that makes it all right to kill her own” (205). Of her brothers’
fear, Denver goes on to say that Sethe “missed killing my brothers and they knew it. They
told me die-witch! stories to show me the way to do it, if ever I needed to. Maybe it was
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getting that close to dying made them want to fight the War….I guess they rather be
around killing men than killing women” (205). This passage demonstrates the fear
Sethe’s surviving children feel, and the blame they place on her for the events of that day.
It seems important to note that Denver has no memory of slave life, as she was
not born until Sethe had escaped from Sweet Home. She cannot understand the being of
slavery, and she lacks the perspective to grasp how much more victimized her mother has
been by those circumstances. Thus Denver blames Sethe for having “something in her
that makes it all right to kill her own” without acknowledging the complex motives for
her mother’s unbeing. In contrast, Denver never holds Halle accountable, though he fails
to protect his children even more than Sethe does. She writes, “my daddy was an angel
man. He could look at you and tell where you hurt and he could fix it too….We should all
be together. Me, him and Beloved. Ma’am could stay or go off with Paul D” (209).
Though she never met Halle, Denver puts all of the blame for her family’s suffering on
Sethe’s actions and none at all on Halle’s. And Sethe lets her. In her unbeing, Sethe
models a form of responsibility that embraces precarity. Sethe makes no attempt to
explain the fact that Denver is only free because of her maternal abnegation.
Like Denver, Beloved holds Sethe accountable for her current reality. This is
especially complex because of the ambiguous nature of Beloved’s existence: the
uncertainty of characters and readers alike over whether Beloved is a ghostly
manifestation of the dead child or an unrelated escaped slave. This debate fuels much of
the novel’s critical canon. Instead of assuming that she is merely a ghost, however – or
conversely that she is not a ghost at all – I will focus on the reality that remains stable
regardless of our reading of her origin: that Beloved is someone’s daughter, that because

194

of her race she has suffered unthinkable violence, and that she both longs for and feels
immense anger towards a mother whom she perceives as having failed to protect her.
Regardless of her origin, Beloved views Sethe as both a sexual object and a mother, and
with desire, passion, jealousy, and contempt. For example, we learn from Denver that it is
Beloved who chokes Sethe in the Clearing, but Beloved insists to Denver that she later
“‘fixed it…Didn’t I fix her neck?’” (101). This contradictory reaction to the woman who
represents her mother seems a product of both desperate love and righteous blame.
Importantly, once Sethe becomes convinced that she is Beloved’s mother – “once [she]
had seen the scar, the tip of which Denver had been looking at whenever Beloved
undressed” (239) – she seems willing to do anything to “pay” for her sins against the
child. After Sethe is fired from her job as a cook, she “play[s] all the harder with
Beloved, who never got enough of anything; lullabies, new stitches, the bottom of the
cake bowl, the top of the milk” (240). Sethe wants to explain to Beloved – to make her
understand that “if I hadn’t killed her she would have died and that is something I could
not bear to happen to her” (200) – yet she does not. This thought – that if Sethe “hadn’t
killed her she would have died” – makes clear both Sethe’s responsibility for Beloved’s
death and the distinction she draws pertaining to it. She “killed her” so that Beloved
would not “die.” While the blame Beloved places on Sethe may seem symbolic of that
held against all subaltern-like slave mothers who are powerless to protect their children,
Sethe’s silence in the face of that blame demonstrates power within precarity.
In the years after Schoolteacher finds them, Sethe “thought how little color there
was in the house and how strange that she had not missed it…It was as though one day
she saw red baby blood, another day the pink gravestone chips, and that was the last of it”
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(38-39). This melancholy, which arises for Sethe after her daughter is dead and buried,
exemplifies her inability to forgive herself. Morrison writes, “to Sethe, the future was a
matter of keeping the past at bay” (42), and the arduous struggle of doing so is a result of
the guilt she feels for her daughter’s death. Bouson argues that “Morrison dramatizes the
painful sense of exposure that accompanies the single shame event” (4). Sethe “would
trade places [with Beloved] any day. Give up her life, every minute and hour of it, to take
back just one of Beloved’s tears” (242). Thus Sethe has internalized the impossible
mandates of motherhood without allowance for the reality that child protection was
unattainable. When Sethe becomes obsessed with the older Beloved out of a desperate
desire to rewrite her infant’s death, Denver thinks that her mother “was trying to make up
for the handsaw; Beloved was making her pay for it” (251). But importantly, “it was as
though Sethe didn’t really want forgiveness” (252). Even if Beloved had offered
forgiveness, then, Sethe would likely not have accepted it. It’s easy to read such a refusal
as overly self-destructive: as demonstrative of a harmful (and unwarranted) sense of
responsibility. But Sethe’s admission of responsibility is her re-being: her devotion to
both accountability and Beloved’s worth when the nation – dismissive of Sethe’s agency
and unwilling to demand recognition of Beloved’s basic humanity – discounts both.
Though Beloved exposes us to some of the worst outcomes of slavery, it likewise
offers – to borrow the language of my previous chapter – a slave mother who is possessed
of voice at all. Eckard asserts that Beloved works to “restore the mother’s lost voice and
her diminished subjectivity” (32), claiming that “the maternal body in Beloved emerges
as a force that celebrates both the individual and a people and gives voice to [their]
experiences” (75). Arguably, Sethe’s voice is the ultimate manifestation of her re-being,
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as it serves as evidence that subaltern slave mothers might, in Spivakian terms, speak,
even if to the privileged ear their voices are untranslatable. This makes it all the more
important that we work to hear the voice within Sethe’s maternal abnegation in an effort
to understand its nuances. Out of a similar desire for the novel to converse with the
nation-state, Dean Franco suggests that we read it as a call for reparations, or recompense
“for slavery and Jim Crow social oppression” (428). He expands his definition of the
word “reparations” beyond economics to “restoration, spiritual healing, mending,
compensation, and reconciliation” (428). Though Franco allows that our current legal
structure does not lend itself to fiscal recompense, he still sees merit in considering “the
ethics and the value of reparations” (428). Perhaps that’s part of the external work of
Sethe’s self-abnegation: its ongoing call for reparations beyond what seems possible.
In response to critics who consider the novel revisionist, Franco points out that
“revising history means reconstructing a view of the past as well as recharting the future.
The dream that the novel makes ‘history come out right this time’ can only come true
when we acknowledge just what it is that characters in the novel and the novel itself
claim of us” (43). In my exploration of this text, I have a similar intent. I argue that, via
the lens of shadow feminism, we come to see a reconfiguration of Sethe’s sacrifice: a
glimpse of power, of re-being, within Sethe’s vulnerability and her maternal abnegation
that is obscured when we view her actions within the terms set by liberal feminism. Like
Franco, I realize that our current legal and political system will not allow the kind of
recompense necessary to ending the inequalities that relegate individuals to subaltern
statuses. In restructuring our view of the subaltern, however, a direct and consequential
form of recompense can emerge from subalterns themselves.
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Mary
Like Sethe, Mary Metcalf Crick – of Graham Swift’s Waterland – grapples with
the guilt of choosing to end her child’s life, and of inadvertently ending her reproductive
potential.39 We first meet Mary in her state of being, when she is the school-aged sole
child of a farmer father and a Catholic mother who died giving birth to her. We’re told
that Mary might have become a “distilled and purified version of her mother, had she
known at all what her mother had been like” (46-47). So like Sethe – who could only
recognize her own mother by a scar she was once shown – Mary is neither a product of
“passing down” (Halberstam 3) nor willing to pass down in turn. In her sexually playful
being, Mary demonstrates her understanding that she is a subject of desire, and that part
of the expectation placed on her is to meet that desire. But in her maternal abnegation – in
trying to jump herself into miscarriage and in visiting the “witch” Martha Clay, who
performs an unsanitary and ultimately sterilizing abortion – Mary begins to resist societal
expectations. Her unbeing starts with her abortion and evolves as Mary adopts nonmaternal roles, becoming first a chaste religious devotee and later a childless wife.
Through the process of unbeing, Mary accepts first acute and later lingering vulnerability.
During her long unbeing, Mary sometimes demonstrates great serenity. At other
times, however, submitting to her childless state seems to destroy her. Her arguably
disastrous version of re-being occurs when Mary surrenders to the longing for
motherhood that she’s long suppressed, deciding in her fifties that she will mother after
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Mary is somewhere between ten and fourteen weeks pregnant when she seeks out an abortion, for which
reason some readers may find my use of the term “child,” and my comparison to the infant Beloved,
offensive. I am aware of that risk, and I use the term with an understanding of the complexity with which it
will be read. I do so largely because Mary seems herself to consider her pregnancy with such weight, and
because my work is an effort to understand the perspectives not of critics (who might prefer that I use
“fetus” instead), but of the characters whose lives I’m attempting to consider in new light.
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all and – in an act of desperation – kidnapping a baby from a supermarket. Like Sethe,
Mary is harmed by the motherhood mandate: that it is virtually required of women
whether or not they possess the means for making or caring for children. And like Sethe,
Mary struggles to accept the circumstances brought on by her maternal abnegation.
Whereas Sethe finds her way to a re-being outside of the motherhood mandate, however,
Mary’s re-being amounts only to despair that leads her back into the motherhood
mandate. Here, then, in the final textual example of this project, the performance of
vulnerability fails to subvert mandates of dominance. Mary’s precarity is as profound as
the other characters who perform it here, yet it yields neither external destabilization nor
internal catharsis. Perhaps this is because the social context of wartime England would
have allowed a child born out of wedlock; thus Mary’s resistance to the motherhood
mandate functions differently than Sethe’s. For Sethe, social factors both demand that she
mother and leave her unable to do so. Mary, on the other hand, would have been met with
cultural and familial support had she chosen to marry Tom and raise the child with him.
Mary’s maternal abnegation is thus born more of a personal sense of responsibility than a
refusal to perpetuate sovereignty at any expense.
Like so many of the novels of this project, our understanding of Mary comes via a
masculine subject position. Waterland narrator Tom Crick is Mary’s future husband and
the father of her never-born child. Perhaps this drives critical response to the novel,
which focuses largely on Tom, and which disregards Mary almost entirely. Katrina
Powell points out that “in the scholarship surrounding Waterland, Mary Metcalf and all
women characters for that matter, have largely been ignored” (60). Yet motherhood
drives Waterland’s narrative, and as Powell contends, “Swift depicts…the significant
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women characters, except for the witch, Martha Clay, as mothers” (69). The novel opens
with Tom’s recollection of his father’s advice, which is to remember that “whatever you
learn about people, however bad they turn out, each one of them has a heart, and each one
of them was once a tiny baby sucking his mother's milk” (1). Thus I argue that the novel
leads us to see the characters within its pages in relation to the maternal.
It is especially striking that most of Waterland’s central characters – including
Tom and his brother Dick, their mother Helen, and Mary herself – are motherless. Mary’s
mother dies giving birth; thus Mary is raised by her farmer-father, for which reason “it
was her father’s milk – but, alas, never her mother’s – that Mary Metcalf grew up on”
(44). Likewise, we’re shown a recently bereaved Tom spying on his brother Dick from a
prone position on the frozen earth “only recently recovered from a bout of flu.” Yet we’re
told that he does not suffer from the cold, “so scornful [is he] of any discomfort the world
can muster after the loss of a mother, that he feels neither cold nor damp” (288). Not
merely motherhood, then, but maternal absence drives this depiction of the Fens and
gives its characters their identities. Despite the absence of critical dialogue on the topic,
Mary’s maternal abnegation occurs in the context of generations of motherless children.
When critics do consider the theme of motherhood, it is in large part to establish
Swift’s representation as outdated; thus those who focus on Mary do so to critique
Swift’s construction of her. Powell, for example, contends that “Metcalf’s desire to fill
the vacancy of her womb…is the traditional notion of woman” (69).40 Allowing that
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So too, Pamela Cooper claims that “like the always-already-lost body of the mother in Lacan's
formulation, the body of the heroine in historiographic metafiction is always already known--enjoyed as an
object of desire--within the repetitive cycles of discursive inscription…the heroine is implicitly
focalized…in terms of reproduction” (381).
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Waterland’s portrayal of mothers is consistent with English norms, however, we might
do well to ask whether it perpetuates or calls into question the motherhood mandate.
Powell implies the former, arguing that in his depiction of Mary’s desire for children,
Swift “constitutes woman-as-mother as the only alternative for naturalness and unity,”
and that “by representing Metcalf as a woman who desires maternity, Swift reinforces the
traditional notion of woman as mother” (103).41 I argue, however, that if instead of
perceiving Mary as an un-liberated embodiment of motherhood, we view Swift’s
portrayal of her as a glimpse into the demands placed on female bodies, we might come
to understand her acts of unbeing as attempts to undermine the motherhood mandate.
Even in the failure of Mary’s vulnerability, the performance of it functions as resistance.
Though her re-being amounts only to despair for Mary personally, she does affect
a kind of re-being in Tom, forcing on him the depth of vulnerability that she herself
voluntarily faced. Because of the kidnapping, Tom is asked to resign his teaching career,
and as he prepares to do so, he tells his high school students, “I do not expect you to
understand that after thirty-two years I have rolled you all into one and now I know the
agonies of a mother robbed of her child” (7). Tom thus associates his own feelings of
orphaned parenthood with the longing of a childless mother. We begin to see in this
passage the way Tom displaces the parent-child dynamic onto his teaching career, and
specifically onto one student, Price. After Tom is informed of his forced retirement, he
takes Price for drinks and, when the bartender asks if Price is of age, Tom asserts that he
41

As I discuss later, Powell connects procreation to storytelling – and both of these to the patriarchy –
arguing that “by sending [Mary] to the asylum, Swift re-emphasizes that telling stories is crucial to
controlling reality” (75). She likewise claims that “Metcalf’s inability to tell stories to fill the void of her
barren womb (without child, without story)…renders her unable to cope with reality,” arguing that “by
representing [her] subjectivity as he does, Swift in turn privileges the male act of story-telling” and “limits
Metcalf’s agency by representing her as refusing to tell stories” (75).
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is, saying, “‘I should know. He’s my son’” (241). Though he never discusses this
moment, the weight of Tom’s desire to parent is unmistakable. Tom struggles with the
loss of his child and the potential for other children throughout his life, but the extremism
of Mary’s kidnapping takes away the substitute with which he’s made due, making it
impossible to suppress that struggle. Though it never proves transcendent, then, Mary’s
self-abnegation does cultivate external awareness.
The cultural critique inherent to her response to the motherhood mandate is also
apparent in the fact that, at each step of her existence – her sexual being, the stages of her
unbeing, and her failed and sorrowful re-being – Mary’s self-abnegation is tied to the
historical events of the time. This is especially significant because the backdrop for much
of Mary’s suffering is war, which of course leaves both children and parents orphaned.
Mary and Tom’s first sexual encounter is set against the backdrop of World War II. Tom
tells us that “one day in August 1942 (defeat in the desert; the U-boat stranglehold) we
first explored, tentatively but collaboratively, what we called then simply ‘holes’ and
‘things’” (50). So too, Swift conflates public sexual explorations with combat, depicting
Mary and Tom, along with their friends, “convened on the banks of the Hockwell Lode
and engaged in matters little affected by (and little affecting) the muffled noises-off of
world events” (181). Pamela Cooper contends that because Waterland is “written in the
aftermath of empire and self-consciously enmeshed with its legacies, [it] engages the
colonialist motifs of propulsion and escape with the aggrieved, derisive passion of a
postcoloniality enthralled by the imperialism it critiques” (372-73). Indeed, we see the
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complexity of such an “enthralled” state in Swift’s conflation of sexuality and warfare.42
While Cooper critiques this aspect of Waterland, however, I argue that it works to expose
the relationship between imperial rule and mandated female subordination. Just as nations
impose military might by using the bodies of young men as weapons, they likewise
impose patriarchal might over the bodies of women. That Swift does not depict Mary as
innocent or victimized is therefore transgressive. In her fulfillment of the woman-assexual-object trope, Mary willingly performs one part of the being that is expected of
her.43 She demonstrates little bodily shame, however, acting unabashedly on curiosity in
her encounters with Tom, Dick, and possibly Freddie. Mary thus exhibits an acceptance
of the expectation that she serve as an object of desire.
When she learns of her pregnancy, Mary tells Dick – whose feelings for her she
has, at the very least, encouraged – that Freddie is the father. She does so to protect him
from the knowledge that she’s been having sex with his brother, Tom. Dick kills Freddie
out of jealousy, implying that he might have done the same to Tom. In the wake of
Freddie’s death, Mary’s sexual curiosity dissipates. When she responds decisively to the
new circumstances surrounding her pregnancy, Tom thinks, “she must be braver than me.
No wasted emotions” (56). Indeed, he observes that “when she looks up she seems three
times older than me, as if she’s become a hard-featured woman with a past. Then I see
it’s because something’s gone from her face. Curiosity’s gone” (57). Tom wants to keep
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Powell claims that “Waterland articulates the functional mutuality of sexuality and imperialism, weaving
both the inscriptions of gendered anatomy and the rhythms of empire into the irresolute fabric of history”
(373).
43

When Freddie becomes especially forward during a moment of group exploration, for example, Mary
doesn’t flee, though the only other female in attendance does. We read that when “Freddie Parr leans
forward suddenly, pulls Mary’s right hand from her left shoulder, presses it against his swimming-trunks
and says: ‘There, you’ve had a feel…Shirley, with a look of fright, scrambles for her clothes, removes
herself to a distance, dresses hastily and hurries off on her bicycle, amidst jeers and cat-calls” (184).
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the child. He thinks: “so we’ve made a little one. And it’s on the way. But we love each
other, don’t we?....And love takes its course, doesn’t it? It means we’ll have to tell the
world….And then get married. It happens all the time” (262-63). He’s more than happy
to continue their paths of being: to parlay the sexual curiosity of youth into its next
incarnations: marriage and procreation. He’s willing to pass down patriarchy. And in his
devotion to prominent cultural ideologies, Tom accepts little blame; he clings to the
notion that no one is responsible for Freddie’s death. He asks desperately: “why can’t
everything happen by accident? No history. No guilt, no blame. Just accidents.” Tom
concedes, however, that unlike him, Mary isn’t in denial, that she “isn’t planning on any
self-escapology” (264). It is precisely Mary’s avoidance of “self-escapology” that I argue
drives the many manifestations of her unbeing.
Unlike Tom, Mary is unwilling to pretend that either her pregnancy or Freddie’s
death was an accident. And unlike Tom, Mary is willing to bear the consequences of
those events bodily. It takes Tom some time to understand what Mary has decided to do.
He fails to comprehend even once he finds her jumping to induce a miscarriage: when he
asks, she calls him “[s]tupid” again and again (292-93). In retrospect – with the
knowledge of all that her choice goes on to cost them – Tom recalls hauntingly: “I don’t
stop her” (293). Once he grasps her choice and its origins, Tom “understand[s]. Because
if this baby had never…Then Dick would never…And Freddie…Because cause,
effect…Because Mary said, I know what I’m going to [do]” (295). Though the jumping is
ineffective, Mary remains determined, deciding to get help from Martha Clay. As we see
other characters do to varying degrees in this project, Mary’s initial unbeing serves as
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payment, in this case for Freddie’s death. In accepting that she bears some responsibility,
suffering a consequence is, for Mary, a logical step.
Mary likewise accepts responsibility for her own suffering, owning her choice to
end her pregnancy. Powell distinguishes between Tom’s responsibility for the abortion
and Mary’s, saying that Tom “is careful to show that he has no control either in the
decision to [abort] or the act of abortion.” Yet Powell goes on to insist that Tom “evades
responsibility and control to show the ill-effects of a woman’s act of control” (65).
Powell sees Mary as burdened by her vulnerability in this situation. But even if it’s true
that Tom abdicated his responsibilities, portraying Mary as unduly hampered by
accountability denies the purposeful decisiveness she models at every turn. Ruddick
writes: “the complexity of maternal power is poignantly expressed in a woman’s
biological ability to give birth and, therefore, her ability to refuse to do so” (36). Though
Mary trades one vulnerability (pregnancy) for another (childlessness), the choice to do so
is hers. If in our analysis of her character we see it merely as a burden, we deny that there
is power to be found in the vulnerability of the maternal.
In her abortion – the first step of her unbeing – Mary claims that power. Though
abortion reads as liberating via the logic of liberal feminism, it functions differently here
because of Mary’s motive for submitting to it, and because of her reaction to having done
so. Insomuch as it frees Mary of one burden (raising a child), it imposes on her another,
far heavier one (childlessness). And it does so, again, in the tragic national context of
World War II. Mary and Tom go to see Martha Clay beneath a sky full of World War II
aircraft, which “were taking to the wing…leaving their scattered daytime roosts” just as
Tom and a “white-faced, numb-lipped” Mary, “catching every third breath,” traveled
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“from the Hockwell Lode to Wash Fen Mere.” As Mary makes her way from being to her
first act of unbeing, then, the planes are taking off for “Hamburg, Nuremberg or Berlin.”
And as Tom accompanies the determined though “white-faced” Mary, we’re reminded
that “all the brave pilots and navigators and gunners and bomb-aimers…had once sucked
mother’s milk,” and that “all the citizens of those doomed cities…once sucked mother’s
milk too” (299). Mary’s unbeing has as its historical backdrop the absolute unbeing of
countless lives; the destruction of World War II becomes emblematic of the small-scale
destruction happening to (and because of) Tom and Mary. But whereas the lives of the
soldiers are undone by military might – and arguably against the soldiers’ wills – Mary’s
unbeing is a deeply personal, self-abnegating refusal of the motherhood mandate.
Tom makes us aware of the difference between the military men (who lived to
“suck mother’s milk” and then to wage war) and his and Mary’s child, who never did.
Via this contrast, we might come to understand the relationship between the baby Mary is
carrying – whose life is mere moments from ending – and the historical events of the
nation. If warfare is an endeavor to which men who “once sucked mother’s milk” may
one day apply themselves, what might we make of Mary’s choice not to bring her child
into being? As a woman-citizen of a wartime nation, Mary is conditioned to protect the
interests of England. Yet as with Sethe’s decision to end Beloved’s life rather than
sending her back into slavery, Mary’s unbeing goes against what is expected of her. She
refuses to provide England with a child who might one day be forced to use his or her
body to sustain sovereignty. Though Mary herself does not indicate that she intends her
abortion to function as such, the conflation of intimacy with warfare makes space for
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such a reading. And the fact that Tom brings our attention to this conflation suggests that
he – and perhaps Mary too – benefits from considering her abnegation in this light.
Mary remains committed to maternal abnegation throughout the extremely
traumatic visit to Martha Clay. Tom, on the other hand, seems weak and powerless. Of
the journey itself, Tom writes, “twilight thickening….Right time to arrive at a witch’s.
Hold my hand, Mary. Hold on, Mary. Love you, Mary. Keep going, Mary. Are we going
to get there? (Do we want to get there?)” (301). Mary, meanwhile, consistently pursues
her plan. When Martha tells her, “‘Martha don’ wanna hurt you….But if she hurts you
anyways, you just put your hand over the candle. Right over the flame,’” we see Mary
“blink” (306) her willingness in response. Mary’s power here lies in her precarity: she
willingly submits to the invasive care of this strange woman in this unnerving setting.
While Tom has to be given a task with which to divert himself throughout the ordeal,
Mary has only a “flame” to distract from her pain. She thus demonstrates both absolute
certainty and utter vulnerability in her visit to the witch of the Fens.
This is Mary’s first act of self-abnegation, and it might have been her last had
circumstances been different. Because of the unhygienic, arguably brutal abortion
methods of Martha Clay, however, this one choice ends not merely that pregnancy, but
Mary’s ability to conceive. In the days after the abortion, Tom learns via the gossip of
townsfolk that Mary has been “taken to hospital. Very nearly – Septi-thingummy of the
womb….Bless us, what’s happening to the world. (A world war’s happening to it.)”
(316). Like the townspeople, Tom’s dad struggles to understand why Tom and Mary
didn’t merely get married. He asks Tom, “but if you, I mean, if she was– Why didn’t you
just–? Not such a bad match – even starting it the hard way…So why?” (317). Henry
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Crick’s question makes clear the degree to which Mary had another choice, a choice that
would be more in keeping with the ideological governances of the time. Thus it is evident
that Mary didn’t end her child’s life to escape the burden of raising him or her; she did so
out of a willingness to bear the burden of responsibility over Freddie’s death.
Just as the abortion can be read as a consequence of Freddie’s death, Mary’s
cloistered state might be read as a consequence of the baby’s. Though the townspeople
speculate that Harold Metcalf is responsible for Mary’s withdrawal, Tom knows that
Mary has chosen those conditions, which represent what I argue is the second phase of
her unbeing. Tom tells his students: “your history teacher (frightened witness to his wifeto-be’s resolve) knows…that Mary locked herself away of her own free will” (118).
Though townspeople, parents, and readers alike portray Mary as a victim and attempt to
attribute power to the men around her (Tom, Harold), adult-Tom offers insight into
Mary’s ownership of these decisions. During her three years of “self-imposed cloister”
(41) after learning of the heavy consequences of her abortion, Mary seems to believe that
if she becomes religiously devout – choosing to abandon the material world altogether –
then she might find a way of re-being outside the mandates of motherhood.
While Mary performs unbeing, Tom engages in a form of culturally condoned
being as a soldier in the Second World War. Upon seeing Mary again after the war, Tom
“expects to find – and accept – a nun, a Magdalen, a fanatic, a hysteric, an invalid.” Yet
at their reunion Tom finds instead “a woman (no girl) who impresses him with her
appearance of toughness,” and who seems to have “made the decision to live henceforth
without any kind of prop or refuge.” Upon reacquainting with her, Tom “realizes that
though this three-year separation has fostered the illusion that, should they reunite, he
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would be a prop to her…it is quite the opposite: that she will be a prop to him; that she
will always be…stronger than him” (120). Mary consistently demonstrates pragmatism:
facing her pregnancy, facing her culpability in Dick’s murder of Freddie, facing her
abortion (while Tom sits on the porch plucking feathers from a duck), and facing her
infertility. Mary is devoted to “liv[ing] without any kind of prop or refuge.” Just as
women are left to bear the wrath of the baby-ghost in Beloved, pragmatism is the domain
of women throughout Waterland. In continuing to reject her state of being in favor of an
acceptance of vulnerability, Mary becomes more (and not less) equipped to bear reality.
Nevertheless – and unlike the other characters of this project with the exception of
The Book of Daniel’s Phyllis, whose submission fails largely because it’s a product of her
search for pleasure – I read Mary’s unbeing as a failure. The voluntary precarity of her
abortion leads to her involuntary loss of fertility, and Mary abandons her attempt at pious
withdrawal from society. She then enters her third manifestation of unbeing: a nonprocreative marriage, which she appears for decades to have parlayed into a successful
re-being. Tom and Mary happily reunite after their respective periods of “payment,” and
Tom finds in Mary’s first kiss upon his return that “they are still lovers in spirit.” But
immediately after the kiss, Mary looks Tom straight in the eyes and says, “‘you know,
don’t you, that short of a miracle we can’t have a child?’” (122). She does not look away.
Though it is likely to cause her more suffering, Mary resolves to face childlessness from
within the typically procreative structure of marriage. Though Powell contends that
Mary’s marriage to Tom functions as an attempt to “protect Metcalf from her tendency to
act on her [sexual] curiosity” (67), Mary’s curiosity dissipates before the abortion, with
Freddie’s death. Instead, then, I argue that by entering the bonds of heterosexual
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marriage, Mary chooses to inhabit a subject position whose full role she can never fulfill.
Unlike Sethe, she meets the other criteria for a “good” mother: she is white, solidly
middle-class, and heterosexual. But Mary is painfully othered by infertility. In her choice
to live within the bonds of a non-procreative marriage, we see something akin to Sethe’s
resistance-within-submission. The deliberate nature with which Mary confronts each
choice – when viewed through a lens that exposes the agency liberal feminism denies her
– makes apparent the depth of her self-abnegation.
This final phase of her unbeing lasts for over thirty years, throughout which time
Mary performs stoic pragmatism with regards to her childless state; it appears that she
has attained re-being. Powell applies the motherhood mandate to Mary, saying that as her
“womb no longer designates maternity, she is subject to displacement within society”
(62), and indeed – in ways that recall Disgrace’s Lucy – Mary makes every effort to
accept her “displacement.” That effort is especially apparent in the context of Tom’s
attempts to romanticize or redeem the situation as fantasy, which itself is evident in the
language he uses to discuss their history together. We read, “once upon a time there was a
future history teacher and a future history teacher’s wife for whom things went wrong,
so…they had to make do. And he made do…by making a profession out of the past…But
she made do (so he thought) with nothing” (126). Though there is less societal pressure
on Tom to father than there is on Mary to mother, Tom finds a symbolic way to parent.
He says, “once upon a time there was a history teacher’s wife who, for quite specific and
historical reasons, couldn’t have a child. Though her husband had lots: a river of children
– new lives, fresh starts – flowed through his classroom” (127). Mary could have pursued
paths to symbolic parenthood as well, but she doesn’t. The contrast between her reaction

210

to infertility and Tom’s is thus apparent. Mary endeavors to embrace the precarity of
childlessness despite the perception that it makes her less of a woman.
Importantly, Mary could have actually (and not just symbolically) become a
mother. Tom allows that they could have adopted – and he approaches his wife with this
idea on numerous occasions – but he says that Mary refuses “for the simple and
intractable reason, so the husband supposed, that to adopt a child is not the real thing, and
his wife was not a woman to resort to make believe.” Ironically, immediately after
establishing Mary’s devotion to realism, Tom returns to fairytale language, adding: “once
there was a history teacher’s wife who, as if to prove that she could live without children,
chose to work with old people” (127). Though Tom’s reading of her motives may well be
accurate, it seems likewise possible that Mary suffers the unbeing of childlessness not
because she can’t have “the real thing,” but because childlessness is a consequence that
she wants to accept. Indeed, Tom’s narrative tics undercut his claims. The recurrent use
of “once upon a time,” and “once there was” – as well as his frequent description of
himself in the third person (“so the husband supposed”) – suggests a distancing of his
interpretation from reality, a recognition that he’s making this up. Unlike Tom, however,
Mary holds “no illusions.” Tom notes: “it’s real, this coming of things to their limits, this
invasion by Nothing of the fragile islands of life.” Yet he says that in response to that
invasion, Mary “become[s] a practical person, a realistic person” (341). Mary
pragmatically bears the consequences of her being and her unbeing. Indeed, her unbeing
manifests as attempt after attempt to accept and model peace in precarity.
Nevertheless, in carefully reading Swift’s account of the thirty-six years between
Mary’s abortion and her ultimate kidnapping of a child, I can find little evidence of a
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successful re-being. During those decades, Mary seems almost to stand still. Powell
contrasts Tom’s storytelling with Mary’s realism, saying that whereas Tom’s “means of
coping with the reality of the abortion is to tell stories,” Mary “is seen as insane” for
“refus[ing] to tell” them (66). Though Powell uses this distinction to critique Tom’s
narrative nature, it is telling in terms of Mary’s attempts at unbeing as well. If we connect
storytelling to the kind of patriarchal passing down that Tom’s narrative style aims for –
and of which Halberstam speaks (3) – Mary’s refusal to tell stories can be read as a
refusal to play a part in the maintenance of systemic norms. Powell touches on this,
saying that with Mary’s “decision to abort…to stop patriarchal lineage, the description of
Metcalf transitions from a ‘place of potential ripeness’ (Cooper 386)…to an empty
vessel” (66). Yet for Powell – who views Waterland in terms of liberal feminism – this
transition figures as disempowerment. In contrast, shadow feminism reveals that Mary’s
refusal of motherhood – her choice to end her pregnancy, withdraw from society, enter a
non-procreative marriage, and resist adoption – functions as a refusal to meet societal
expectations. Far from attaining re-being via that refusal, however, I argue that Mary
spends this time at a remove from being altogether. She maintains a marriage, and she
works for a period of time caring for the elderly, but her life during this period is marked
by neither significant event nor remarkable decision. Her many attempts at unbeing cost
her greatly, but they never lead anywhere beyond sustained despair.
Her disastrous final attempt at re-being comes when – at fifty-two years of age –
Mary proclaims that by God’s will she is “going to have a baby” (130), which she tries to
bring about by stealing an infant from a new mother at a supermarket. Powell contends
that – though Tom has spent his marriage believing that his wife is the stronger of the two
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of them – “Metcalf’s later insanity causes us to question whether Metcalf was ever
strong...Her independent decision is shown to ruin both of their lives and because the
abortion renders Metcalf infertile, she is responsible for ending the Crick family line”
(67). It is possible to read the kidnapping as a sign that Mary has gone insane; that’s
certainly how her contemporaries view it, as evidenced by her placement in a mental
hospital and Tom’s forced retirement. Just as Sethe is characterized as subhuman because
of her ability to kill her child, everyone around Mary assumes that the kidnapping is a
mark of mental illness, a deviation from the norms of society. Though she accepts this
diagnosis, however, closer examination of the behavior Mary exhibits leading up to,
throughout, and after the kidnapping reveals a woman who is acting more out of cultural
mandates than against them. I argue that Mary’s re-being fails precisely because she
cannot fully escape the motherhood mandate. Her attempts to remake herself outside of
its governance fail, and she yields to it in the end, which results in a decimation that is
neither redemptive nor of her making. Mary fails, then, largely because instead of finding
re-being possible, she desperately attempts to reestablish being.
Her attempt to restore being fails itself, however, hours after it begins, when Tom
comes home from teaching one day to find Mary mothering the child she’s kidnapped.
When Tom takes the baby from her, we read that he “cannot suppress the sensation that
he is pulling away part of his wife…tearing the life out of her” (267). Robert K. Irish
claims that here, “history's circularity is reinforced…Mary, whose curiosity for life died
with her aborted baby, receives new life when she acquires a new baby” (928). Mary has
attempted to “be” again – to adhere to the motherhood mandate – via this child, and
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without him, she returns to a final form of unbeing, this time not of her making. Because
she does not choose this motherless state, it cannot be read as transgressive.
The injustice of returning the baby makes Mary’s despair all the more apparent.
Tom concedes that, though Mary “hand[ed the baby] over, in a trance…it’s still there…in
her arms. Always will be” (312). Though traditional measures of justice would privilege
the baby being with his birth mom, there’s a sense of unfairness in Mary being forced to
give him back. Mary has lived in this childless state since her abortion at sixteen, and
she’s fifty-two here; she’s lived with infertility and loss for thirty-six years. In contrast,
Tom notes that the baby’s birth mother is “young. Still in her teens. She can’t be any
age….Only a kid” (313). Powell contends that “Metcalf’s infertility and insanity are
juxtaposed with the rightful mother’s natural instincts,” insisting that “Crick depicts this
woman” as “sane and natural,” and “her baby a sign of her fertility and therefore her
proper place” (73). But Crick’s depiction of the baby’s mother as “only a kid” calls this
into question, making the weight of Mary’s vulnerability all the more apparent.
Despite the injustice, however, Mary gives the child up to his mother with a
passivity that signals the failure of her unbeing. This passivity – which differs from the
type of submission in which I find power throughout this project – reflects and therefore
does not seek to subvert both legal and gendered expectations. Mary accepts her arrest
and her subsequent placement in a mental institution. Yet her passivity is not merely a
matter of allowing herself to be abandoned. Tom observes that Mary “is receding into the
obscure and irrecoverable distance” (328). This all works as evidence of Mary’s insanity.
As Tom prepares to leave her in a place that “smells of crazy old women” Mary “stares,
vigilantly and knowingly…at…frail, playground children. Her eyes are bright. They
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blink. Her arms hold nothing” (330). Mary now lives among “crazy old women.”
Banished for her inability to meet the motherhood mandate – and for her inability to
accept that failure – she now “hold[s] nothing.” I argue, however, that her acceptance
serves as a mark not of insanity, but of lucidity. Her attempts to parlay her vulnerability
into some survivable re-being have failed, but the grief she feels comes not because she
has escaped reality, but because she still faces it. Like Sethe, Mary does not seek escape.
Instead, she merely continues to grieve the children she has not had.
In struggling to understand exactly why Mary’s self-abnegation fails when
precarity proves transgressive for so many others, it seems helpful to note that her
kidnapping is fueled by Christianity. She recounts that “God came down to Safeways and
left…a gift, a free product. A babe in the bulrushes. He said, Go on, I command you.
Take. It’s yours” (311). As the kidnapping is the first time Mary’s actions are depicted as
driven by something other than her own agency, Christianity’s function in Waterland
seems worth considering. Indeed, it is impossible to extricate Mary’s story from Christian
narratives. Her name clearly recalls the virgin mother. So too, Cooper notes that “as a
nubile and sweetly inquisitive schoolgirl, Mary plays Eve to Tom's Adam and initiates
him into a prelapsarian haven of adolescent sex” (385). Powell focuses on Tom’s
portrayal of Mary as “sexually curious” in ways that tie it to Christianity.44 And it is
Catholicism to which Mary turns in her second act of unbeing, when the abortion takes
her fertility from her, and she “cloisters” herself away. Finally, Mary’s story calls to mind

44

Powell writes: “Crick describes Metcalf as the initiator, the Eve who tempts [Tom],” and she goes on to
contend that “both Adam and Crick shirk responsibility for their actions by placing the initiative on the
woman.” So too, she maintains that “Crick goes to much trouble to describe Metcalf as strong and curious
in a sexually aggressive manner. This initial description of Metcalf as initiator serves dual purposes: to
show how tragedy can result from a woman enacting control over her body and to show Metcalf ’s
transition from a strong woman to a weak woman as a result of her sexual curiosity” (64).
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Christian lessons of submission. Christianity fuels Mary’s self-abnegating subordination,
but it likewise leads to the failure of that very self-abnegation. Far from allowing Mary to
redefine herself in post-maternal terms, Christianity reinforces the structures governing
her status as a woman-citizen by offering models of female subordination by which
women should live. Perhaps this accounts for the failure of Mary’s attempts at re-being.
Mary embodies societal expectations for women. She is at turns experimental,
virginal, passive, contented, and mothering. Yet her ultimate failure demonstrates that
meeting these requirements simultaneously is impossible. Within the vulnerability of
attempting to do so, we see an obscured power begin to emerge. In his conflation of the
personal and the historical, Tom notes that we are historically against surrendering,
asking his students, “why is it that every so often history demands a bloodbath, a
holocaust, an Armageddon? And why is it that every time the time before has taught us
nothing?” (141). We never, he suggests, learn non-resistance. Mary models what nonresistance might look like. Sadly, however, the potential power of her precarity is
overcome by the insuppressible weight of Mary’s desire to mother. What limited success
her unbeing has can be seen in Tom, who attempts – in the wake of Mary’s failed rebeing – to teach his students the value of defeat. He tells them: “children…there can be
no success with impunity, no great achievement without accompanying loss…even
nature teaches us that nothing is given without something being taken away” (72). As he
faces defeat himself – childless, rejected from his life’s work, his wife in hospital – Tom
struggles to teach his students how to accept the inevitability of vulnerability. Despite her
suffering, Mary models the strength-in-defeat that Tom endeavors to teach.

216

Yet at the novel’s close, Tom feels not the transcendence of defeat, but emptiness.
He tells Price: “the end of the world’s on the cards again,” but he adds that this is “not
new.” He claims: “Saxon hermits felt it. They felt it when they built the pyramids to try
to prove it wasn’t true. My father felt it in the mud at Ypres. My grandfather felt it and
drowned it with suicidal beer. Mary felt it…It’s the old, old feeling, that everything might
amount to nothing” (269). The “emptiness” initiated by Mary’s inability to mother is
compared to that felt by others, including soldiers in combat. In this way, Mary is a
soldier, but in her refusal to mother, she surrenders, refusing to fight. She refuses, too, to
offer England a son who might one day go on to defend its sovereignty. Though her
refusal costs her greatly, she looks it in the eye throughout her life the same way she
looks Tom in the eye when she tells him they’ll never have children. Though Mary’s rebeing never brings a new reality about, then, her unbeing is powerful. Mary doesn’t need
students to serve as substitute children. She doesn’t drink herself to death over the trauma
she’s faced. She is stoic in her defeat. The tragedy of her suffering aside, her failure does
not call into question the potential merits of self-abnegation. Instead, it makes clear that
in taking the risk of precarity, one cannot predict whether one will find transcendence or
further despair. Thus Mary’s narrative makes apparent the bravery of trying.
In the context of Mary Crick’s stoic failure, the deaths of Susan Isaacson Lewin,
Erica, and Sihem Jaafari appear all the more startlingly empowered, as do the sexual
sacrifices of Lucy Lurie and Daisy Perowne, and the acts of self-silencing performed by
Leda Helianos, Rosa Burger, and Coetzee’s Barbarian Girl. Only Phyllis Lewin can be
counted alongside Mary as having failed in self-abnegation, and in her case that failure is
a product more of apparent pleasure than devastation. These characters cannot know as
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they choose unbeing what that choice will yield: if they’ll undermine those around them
who occupy positions of power, if their sacrifice will be heard. An inherent part of
unbeing, then, is taking the risk of it coming to nothing, as it seems to do for Mary. Butler
contends that “if the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, and cultural criticism
has a task at the present moment, it is no doubt to return us to the human where we do not
expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its capacity to make sense” (Precarious
151). I have tried to perform that task: to examine these characters in their most profound
moments of “frailty.” The political power of precarity has long been invisible, making it
impossible to know what those who’ve exercised it have accomplished: what power
they’ve disrupted, what dominance has been abandoned in their wake. I hope this project
will join others in mapping, and seeking out, and striving to make visible that power such
that we might formalize ways around the dangerous and illusory tenets of sovereignty.
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